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In the period 1988-9, Antarctica's previously little troubled governing 
regime, the Antarctic Treaty System, descended into the most significant 
discord in its history with the rejection of the agreed Convention to Regulate 
Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities and its eventual replacement by the 
Protocol on Environment Protection containing a limited mining ban. This study 
argues that non-state actors were the driving force behind the defeat of 
CRAMRA. These actors, in the form of environment promotion non-
government organisations, successfully substituted many of the objectives they 
sought, which were at odds with the regime and encapsulated in the notion of a 
"world park". 
The study focusses on the role of non-state actors in the world today. It 
examines who they are in the Antarctic context and what attributes may prove 
important in their exercise of influence over the Antarctic Treaty System. It then 
uses the case study described above to test which attributes proved important in 
the exercise of influence in this period. Finally it considers what cautionary 
lesson lies therein for the operation of international regimes. 
It is the thesis of this work that under some circumstances, non-state actors 
can be a decisive influence in forcing a change upon states acting together in an 
international regime. This conflicts with the political Realist's view that only 
states actually possess the power to accomplish political change, and non-state 
actors can do little more than encourage new directions. Instead it aligns with 
the political Rationalist's belief that allows non-state actors to be a customary 
part of the action in decisions made by international regimes. This study 
argues that it was the "heretics" outside the ATS who gained legitimacy with the 
wider public, and through individual government apparatuses. In contrast the 
ATS, which brought CRAMRA to fruition in a closed and little known 
negotiating process, failed to have this convention approved because it lacked 
legitimacy. The ATS found that the world was prepared to adopt the non-state 
alternative. 
The work begins with a theoretical review of authorities' views on non-state 
actors, their links with international regimes, and the state system of 
government. It continues with what is believed to be the first attempt to 
catalogue non-state actors involved with the ATS, a process that is carried out 
along a common typology. The case study is then examined in two distinct 
phases divided by the watershed of the agreement of CRAMRA. In the first 
phase we see the rise of environmentalism and non-state interest in Antarctica 
paralleling the rise of CRAMRA. In the second phase, the death of CRAMRA 
and birth of the Protocol on Environment Protection are examined through the 
prism of non-state activity in a sequence of five key countries. Finally, the 
study draws conclusions about the methods of change employed by non-state 
actors, attributes that made some of them more influential than others, and the 
overall influence of non-state actors on states in the ATS. 
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it is very clear that any refusal by the Treaty members 
to hear and to reason with their critics could result in an 
up-surge of rhetoric or mischief on the part of some 
organisations. In effect, the consultative parties have it 
within their power to prevent or to provoke a stronger 
reaction from the heretics..." 
- Sir Anthony Parsons, Antarctica - The Next Decade 1987 
"You've got to have a dream, 
if you don't have a dream, 
how are you going to make 
your dream come true?" 
- Oscar Hammerstein II 
"Happy Talk" South Pacific 1949 
INTRODUCTION 
(x) 
This study focusses on the role that non-state political actors play inside the 
international regime known as the Antarctic Treaty System. Non-state actors are 
flourishing in world politics today, for reasons including the rise of pluralism in 
states, spread of information technologies and increased interstate global non-
state contacts. The explosion in their numbers can be seen in measurements 
such as the rise of the Union of International Associations' members from 176 
in 1909 to 18,000 by the mid-1980s. (Boulding 1988, 35). Non-state actors are 
regarded by Rationalists as a customary part of the action in decisions made by 
international regimes. Yet Realists would say that only states actually possess 
the power to accomplish political change, and non-state actors can do little more 
than encourage new directions. This study follows the Rationalist view, arguing 
that it is necessary to understand non-state actors if one is to adequately explain 
international order [For fuller definition of Rationalists and Realists see Indyk in 
Aitkin, 1985]. 
In global politics, Antarctica was once less likely to come to the fore than the 
European state, Albania. Both were obscure, effectively cut off from the rest of 
the world. But on top of that Antarctica has no indigenous human population 
and even now few people interact in a continent where human activity is 
constricted by the severity of climate. Conflict between states over resources 
and territory of Antarctica was remarkable because of its rarity. Few now, for 
example, would recall the tensions of the late 1940s between Britain, Argentina 
and Chile over their overlapping territorial claims that at one point led to the 
firing of warning shots. But in recent decades an international awareness of 
Antarctica has grown for several reasons. Its mooted living and non-living 
resources values have added a harder edge to state interest, there has been 
growing popular interest in its natural beauty, and more pressingly it is a focus 
of popular and scientific interest in world environmental issues such as ozone 
depletion and global warming. 
This has been accompanied by a growing non-state concern with the politics 
of the continent - the only one on earth governed by nations acting together in 
an international regime. The Antarctic Treaty's primary purpose is to ensure - in 
the interests of all mankind that Antarctica shall continue forever to be used 
exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene or object of 
international discord." (Heap 1989, xiv) Yet it is clear to commentators that 
Antarctica's governing system came close to descending into significant discord 
in the period 1988-91. Under the increased weight of external pressures, treaty 
governments split sharply over whether to discard their agreed minerals regime 
in favour of a non-state alternative: a mining ban inside a strong environment 
protection regime that was proposed by non-state actors. Until this period, the 
role of non-state actors in Antarctic politics had been little regarded. Such actors 
themselves tended to represent the older-style educated elites. But in the 1980s, 
increasing interest in Antarctic politics was taken by the globally strengthening 
environment promotion non-government organisations. It was they whose 
alternative was adopted. 
This study's topic was chosen to illuminate their role, particularly over the 
1988-91 period, which commentators say marked an important change in the 
Antarctic political theatre. "In the past neither NGOs nor public opinion proved 
a major driving force on Antarctic policy-makers," wrote the British academic 
Peter Beck. "The course of developments since 1988 suggested that for the first 
time a significant, even decisive, policy input was coming from below." (Beck 
19906, 110) The central argument of this study supports this view. Its thesis is 
that: under some circumstances, non-state actors can he a decisive influence in 
forcing a change upon states acting together in an international regime. 
• In order to test this thesis, a methodology has been chosen that attempts to 
build the work up from a theoretical base, through practical achievement to 
conclusions based on that theory and practice. It begins by examining the nature 
of non-state actors, and specifically those that are the focus of this work, the 
environment promotion non-government organisations. Next we need to see 
what attributes a non-state actor possesses that may make it influential in a 
political theatre. To make this assessment, non-state actors active in the ATS 
during the period of the case study are compared and contrasted. 
(xii) 
The process then moves to a case study approach. This covers the period of 
the emergence of environment promotion groups' interest in Antarctica, through 
the negotiation of the ATS's Convention to Regulate Antarctic Mineral Resource 
Activities [CRAMRA], to its demise and replacement with the Protocol on 
Environment Protection [PEN. The events of this era are examined in the light 
of non-state actors' activities - or lack of them - in order to consider what the 
objectives of non-state actors were, what strategies evolved to achieve them, 
and how these strategies were implemented. 
This study then draws conclusions about how successful these non-state 
actors, particularly environment promotion NG0s, were in achieving their 
desired outcomes, and what attributes may have made one group of non-state 
actors more successful at exercising influence than others. Finally we consider 
the broader context. That is, what influence non-state actors can have over 
international regimes. 
In order to carry out this process a chapter sequence has been chosen with 
the intention of constructing as dispassionate a picture as possible. The first 
chapter begins with a review of political theory about non-state actors, and of 
their relationships to a state system. It examines their position in current global 
politics, and particularly focusses on specific issue environment promotion 
NGOs' standing in relation to international regimes. The second chapter stands 
as what may be the first academic survey of individual non-state actors 
interacting with the ATS, particularly in the period up to 1991. Using the data 
of this survey, these actors are then measured against each other along a set of 
common characteristics derived from theorists' views in chapter one of which 
attributes are likely to make non-state actors influential. 
In considering the shape of a case study, a logical political watershed 
appeared. In the first part of this process, the third chapter of this study, we see 
environment promotion NGOs beginning to take an interest in Antarctica, 
gradually becoming more engaged in processes of the state-based regime as 
CRAMRA moved towards agreement. Concomitantly with their entrenchment 
came the development of their own favoured alternative for the future 
(xiii) 
of the continent encapsulated in the phrase "world park". In the latter half of the 
case study lithe  fourth chapter,] an examination is made of how, with 
CRAMRA moving out of a solely Antarctic theatre into ratification by individual 
states, these NGOs brought popular pressure to bear in order to achieve their 
own goals. Limitations of space and time mean that it is not possible to 
examine the course of events in all the 26 nations that initially agreed to 
CRAMRA. Instead five key examples have been chosen which appear best to 
represent the phases of change. 
Finally the concluding chapter sums up the lessons that this case study can 
provide about the influence of non-state actors. These relate firstly to methods 
that environment promotion NGOs used in the course of their campaigning, 
next to reasons why this particular group of NGOs proved more influential than 
other actors, and lastly, on the overall influence of non-state actors over states. 
This study is based on published and unpublished accounts of the course of 
events in the period, texts on both Antarctic politics and non-state actors, and a 
series of interviews conducted with some government figures and many of the 
main non-government organisations' members who were most active on the 
issue. It makes no claim to being a balanced political history of the era. This 
would be outside its scope. Instead this study tries to get inside the processes of 
non-state actors, the international regime treaty system and states themselves. It 
intends to scrutinise these processes for lessons about their interactions, and 
weigh these lessons in order to assess their performances. 
CHAPTER ONE 
NON-STATE ACTORS 
AND THE STATE SYSTEM: 
A THEORETICAL REVIEW 
1 
(1)  POLITICAL INFLUENCE AND THE STATE-CENTRIC  
MODEL  
This thesis sets out to question the view of Realists in politics that only states 
possess the power to accomplish political change. In order to set the framework 
for this examination, it is necessary to consider the state-centric model, and the 
place of states in international affairs today. 
Sovereign states are generally regarded as the primary units of international 
society. They are autonomous, and pursue in a self-interested way the gain and 
maintenance of 'political power. (Young 1989a, 60.) They are said to have 
achieved this position in the 17th century when the Treaty of Westphalia of 
1648 divided and formally recognised a series of national boundaries, replacing 
the Hapsburg Empire with some 300 independent states. What emerged were 
"clear-cut, hard-shell closed political units" (Keohane and Nye 1977, 380). 
Under these conditions, international law and political reality largely coincided; 
sovereignty equalled supremacy and the state-centric model reflected national 
governments' ability to control their internal and external environments. 
At the time of the French Revolution these European states were further 
modified by the emergence of the "nation-state", a development that 
represented the flowering of a common nationalistic feeling. By the early 20th 
century, nation-states had gained an unparalleled dominance in the conduct of 
international politics through their common global structures and their mutually 
acknowledged rights, powers and territorial divisions. State-centric political 
theory has been identified by Mansbach as possessing a set of assumptions, 
that: 
. global politics is based on the interaction of nation-states which are 
. both actors and targets; 
. each state is the sovereign-equal of others; - 
. each forms a homogenous political system with a central government 
monopolising the means of coercion; 
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• states are independent, distinguishable and subject to no higher 
earthly power; 
• they have exclusive control of territory and subjects, and divide the 
world into neat geographic compartments; 
• their foreign policy agents are the sole participants in world politics; 
all other groups make their presence felt through government; 
and that states are the repositories of the highest secular loyalties. 
(Mansbach 1976, 3). 
The central problem resulting from this model is the notion that states have 
such all-encompassing "sovereign powers", that they are the only relevant or 
true actors in global politics. Can it truthfully be said, particularly, that national 
foreign policy agents are the sole participants in world politics when there is a 
range of non-state actors visibly exercising influence today? Rationalists argue 
instead that the model of the nation-state has been regarded too closely; even 
that facts of political life and the fiction of total sovereignty applied only during 
the brief era of monarchical absolutism. Since then, they argue that the model 
has become a set of blinkers, blinding proper analysis of the world's political 
actors. 
Mansbach dismisses the value of the state-centric doctrine. "In earlier 
centuries the doctrine of sovereignty had an empirical basis," he believed. 
"Today this doctrine does not have such a basis. All nation-states are subject to 
diverse internal and external conditioning factors that induce and constrain 
behaviour." (Mansbach 1976, 22). He regards the continued adherence to this 
doctrine to be an intellectual prejudice that should be cast aside. 
Others emphasise its inadequacy because states are not necessarily unified in 
their interactions anyway. State-centric theories are argued to be poor 
explanations of outcomes from the interaction of various actors in world 
politics, because they do not describe the complex patterns of coalitions 
between different groups of actors. "For a state-centric theory, this is 
represented as 'environment'." (Keohane and Nye 1977, 386). In effect, the 
issue is left in an amorphous and inaccurate "other" grouping. 
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Young also points to this failure, particularly in analysis of the international 
regimes which are agreed between states. He cautions: "it would be a serious 
mistake to overlook the role of trans-national alliances among influential interest 
groups in developing and maintaining regimes at the international level." 
(Young 1989b, 364) 
Having regard to these views, it is the contention of this work that, while 
states are acknowledged as the repositories of varied and considerable powers, 
the state-centric model does not totally explain the elements at play in the 
political events under examination in this thesis, nor the results achieved. 
Instead it will be argued that non-state actors may under some circumstances 
have a considerable influence. What follows in this chapter is an elaboration of 
the theoretical basis for this point of view, presented to prepare the ground for 
an examination in later chapters of a specific case study involving the Antarctic 
Treaty System. 
(II) NON-STATE ACTORS IN THE GLOBAL SYSTEM  
Long before 1648, primary actors in world politics were of many colours 
different from nation-states. They ranged from small nomadic family groups to 
geographical and commercial empires. Even while the nation-state description 
applied to the complex and fast-changing civilizations of Europe, other long-
established political groups such as tribes continued to characterize human 
habitation of large areas of the world. Undeniably, over the bulk of recorded 
history, man has organised himself for political purposes on basetother than 
those now subsumed under the concepts of state and nation-state (Keohane and 
Nye 1977, 374). 
Accepting this extended historical context, would it not be more accurate to 
define an actor by characteristics distinct from those applied to nation-states 
such as sovereignty or territoriality? Instead it is suggested by Mansbach that 
the foundation for political influence is the behavioural attribute of autonomy: 
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the possession of a self contained decision-making process, and ability to make 
responses that cannot always be predicted by others. (Mansbach 1976, 5). It is 
clearly not the only source of influence, but it is an essential ingredient, and if it 
is compromised or infringed upon, then so is the actor's strength effected. 
In states the process of decision-making depends on a bureaucracy and other 
elements of the large government system. If this is the case, argues Mansbach, 
any intrusion upon this process by outsiders infringes upon autonomy. A 
further proposition is that non-state actors can in many circumstances behave 
more autonomously than nation states. "While all nation states are sovereign, 
many are unable to make decisions independently, or to influence people 
situated outside their political boundaries, whereas [many] non-state actors are 
relatively autonomous and influential." (Mansbach 1976, 5). They can, for 
example, move with ease through geographic and political boundaries. 
But when applied to contemporary western political life, the realities of 
modern technology provide means for a high level of transaction among all 
political actors, an interdependence that ends an actor's claim to the autonomy 
of isolation. The effectiveness of modern transport, communications, and 
information technologies add great weight to the view that for all actors, 
"behaviour is affected by the choices of other actors, and policies are structured 
by their decisions." (Mansbach 1976, 5). 
In such a global system it is possible to divide the world into at least six 
types of actors. Based on Mansbach's divisions, they are listed in order of 
breadth of interest rather than any particular ranking of power or influence, and 
elaborated upon in the context of this thesis. 
. The inter-governmental organisation fIG01,  an international regime 
composed of governmental representatives from more than one state. 
This phenomenon has rapidly increased this century and ranges from 
NATO, to the European Union, and the Commission for the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources. 
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• The international non-governmental organisation. {INGO' This type 
encompasses groups of individuals who reside in two or more nation 
-states, but do not represent the governments of those states. 
Functionally diverse, this group's numbers have grown exponentially 
in the 20th century. 
• The nation state. In its physical form, Mansbach defines it as the sum 
of personnel from the agencies of a single central government. Though 
often regarded as unified entities, their parts may behave autonomously 
and in competition. 
. The governmental non-central actor. Personnel from regional, parochial 
or municipal governments who are generally only peripherally 
concerned with international relations. For example, local health 
authorities concerned with implementing strategies approved by the 
state after being arrived at in an international regime. 
. The intrastate non-governmental organisation. INGO] Groups or 
individuals which are located primarily within a single state. Though 
focussing inwardly, these groups may act autonomously in their 
relations with governments. 
.Individuals. Occasionally people acting in a private capacity have been 
able to move into the global political arena [for example Bob Geldof's 
Band Aid phenomenon]; though the theorists say such internationalists 
were more common before the emergence of the nation-state, when 
they took on the roles of diplomatic or military mercenaries. 
Of the above groups, the attention of this thesis focusses most closely 
upon the nation-states, their international organisations and upon the interstate 
and intrastate non-government organisations. These latter two are known in the 
everyday diplomatic world as Non-Governmental Organisations, or NG0s, and 
will jointly be described by that acronym. 
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(III) ACTORS IN THE NON-STATE WORLD  
It is easy to think of interactions between groups of people in functional 
systems other than those of the nation state. Religion links Catholics, Muslims 
or Jews internationally with loyalties that transcend national boundaries; 
business ties individuals who work on behalf of multi-national corporations; 
and common political causes may join groups as diverse as motorists and 
environmentalists. Although many of these linkages have ancient lineage, 
authorities agree that since the industrial revolution particularly, they have 
proliferated and their reach has strengthened. 
One illustrative description for part of this group of non-state actors is 
provided by the term "the Fifth World". A custom grew up in recent decades to 
divide global politics into First [Western /Capitalist], Second [Communist] and 
Third [under-developed] worlds. The UN has used the term Fourth World to 
describe the particularly disadvantaged least developed countries. A further 
claim has been made that there is now a Fifth World, made up of a growing 
number of people who have loyalties and interests that transcend national 
boundaries, who want to help people whom they have never met. "Such people 
are often at their most effective in NG0s. It is these organisations, or the people 
who support them - that constitute the Fifth World." (Suter 1991, 127) 
This analysis does not bear too literal an examination. The initial four 
worlds, after all, were located on discrete geographical boundaries, and 
possessed state structures. Like other analyses of the non-state landscape which 
approach it from an altruistic perspective, this portrayal also fails to take account 
of the strong, legitimate roles in the non-state world played by non-altruistic 
NGO actors, such as resource use promotion groups. But this view is also 
useful in illuminating the world view of many NGO actors, and a traditional 
perception of them. 
The broader geography of the non-state world was well demonstrated by 
Skjelsbaek (Keohane and Nye 1977, 83-4). At the time there were the first 
signs of what would become a big increase in non-state representations. 
NGOs were usually small with significant voluntary work; their interactions 
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with each other and other actors were increasing; they could be sub-divided into 
19 categories from philosophy to science [n.b. there was no environmental 
category at the time, remarkable evidence of the rapid growth of environmental 
issues]; and the developed countries held the greatest percentage of 
representations. In this era, Skjelsbaek saw two characteristics of national 
societies particularly conducive to participation in NG0s. These were: 
• a high degree of technological and economic development which 
encourages specialisation and therefore gives rise to groups to 
represent the interests of specialists; 
• and a pluralistic ideology which permits the expression of specialist 
views. 
In this early taxonomy of what was a fast growing political organism, 
Skjelsbaek used a functional analysis to pin down non-state actors. It is useful 
in introducing a dispassionate analysis of NG0s. But in order to clarify the 
roles of different groups of non-state actors in the present day, it is more helpful 
to consider Willetts' later theory in which he describes a goal-oriented division 
of pressure groups [for which one may read NG0s] made under two headings: 
Sectional and Promotional groups (Willetts 1982, 23). The observation is made 
that Sectional groups may be regarded broadly as acting on behalf of a segment 
of society to achieve benefits for that segment. On the other hand, Promotional 
groups are more likely to be acting on a cause for others. 
Sectional groups may include: 
. economic groups such as companies, commerce, financial institutions, 
trade unions and agriculture; 
. professional associations which have exclusive qualifications for 
membership and operate by codes demanding loyalty to profession, 
common ethics, and the exchange of information globally; 
. recreational clubs which offer increasing trans-national links, promote 
exchanges between members and increase the volume of tourism. 
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Promotional groups may include: 
•welfare agencies which either raise money overseas directly or belong to a 
committee or organisation representing voluntary organisations; 
• religious organisations, which have a long tradition of trans-nationalism 
and a sometimes blurred relationship with states; 
•communal groups such as people with a common ethnic origin, who come 
together to promote their group identity and status; 
•political parties, distinct from plain pressure groups in that they seek to take 
office rather than influence a range of policy outcomes. 
. and specific issue promotional groups. These are the groups most readily 
recognised today when the terms "pressure group" or "NGO" are applied. 
They consist of groups of people who have come together solely for the 
purpose of promoting social change on a particular issue or set of issues. 
These discrete categories would not please some Realists who reject even 
the notion of taxonomies for NG0s. "As Huxley once suggested for the 
slippery term, species, we should perhaps be thinking in terms of gradation - in 
this case of organisations of varying governmental complexions." (Boardman 
1981,4) But Rationalists would see that Willetts provides a useful separation 
of motives and functions of the different organisations. 
Particularly when considering the group of NGOs at issue here, his broad 
definition of specific issue promotional groups shows the functions they have in 
common. They are said to challenge orthodoxies, attempt to raise new issues or 
change the way others are handled, concentrate on influencing public opinion, 
and frequently take their concerns beyond national boundaries. They are also 
generally regarded to have captured the lion's share of attention when non-state 
actors have been considered in the latter decades of the 20th century. 
(IV) THE CHARACTER OF NGOs  
Although professional associations do enter the debate, for the purpose of 
this paper those actors that Willetts describes as specific issue promotional 
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groups are the main actors under examination. They have held centre stage 
during the period that NGOs have been prominent in the case study area of 
Antarctic affairs. 
The origins of NGOs in international politics is a matter of argument. On the 
one hand it is said by some that the term NGO first entered international jargon 
in 1945 when these actors received formal recognition in the UN charter's 
Article 71: "The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements 
for consultation with non-government organisations". (Suter 1991, 130). But 
another authority, Skjelsbaek awards the Rosicrucian Order the title of the first 
NGO, in 1694 -just 50 years after the Treaty of Westphalia defined states 
(Keohane and Nye 1977, 71). Skjelsbaek suggests that the Rosicrucians would 
have satisfied the modern day Union of International Association's requirement 
for NGO membership. Feld dates NGOs back to 1846 when the World's 
Evangelical Alliance was founded (Feld 1983, 26). Moving forward from there, 
another starting point is sometimes nominated. Lador-Lederer (1962, 63) 
suggests that secular NGOs actually had a more profound influence on 
international law than their predecessors, the religious NG0s. The YMCA was 
founded in 1855 and the Red Cross [something of a non-governmental icon for 
its influence with state actors] was founded in Geneva in 1863. This 
organisation quickly gained de facto international legal recognition with the 
signing of the first Geneva Convention a year later, which explicitly provided in 
Article 1 for the immunity of ambulances bearing a red cross. 
The number of NGOs has exploded in the past century. In 1909 there were 
176 international non-governmental organisations (Boulding 1988, 35). But by 
1985-6, a total of 18,000 were reported in the Union of International 
Organisations' yearbook. Of this number about one per cent were federations of 
other ING0s, 8.5 per cent were universal in their presence, 17 per cent 
intercontinental, and the great bulk -74 per cent - regional in their approach. 
Their character is politically dynamic. More than many political actors they 
appear to be in a state of flux with the rise of issues, passage of individual 
leaders, and the fundamental changes in governments and relationships of the 
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states customarily the focus of their attentions. "NGOs are personifications of 
the social functions of, normally, a great span of vitality...Within the group of 
ideological NG0s...it will be observed that in so many cases membership [and 
often more than that zealotry and missionarism] is based on dissatisfaction 
with.. .belonging to a certain national community..." (Lador-Lederer 1962, 59) 
They have flourished particularly in the second half of the 20th century with 
increased interdependence caused by the growth of liberalism, industrialisation 
and means of communication, and should be distinguished from the popular 
issues they tackle. "Popular movements come and go, depending on whether 
conditions exist for the mobilisation of a somewhat fickle public opinion. 
NGOs represent long-term cortunitments to human welfare on the part of their 
members. Until recently they represented an educated elite that had leisure and 
means to pursue altruistic goals beyond national boundaries. The new 
grassroots activism of recent decades is gradually opening up the non-
governmental world to the local activist, while the long-term commitment 
remains." (Boulding 1988, 36). 
In seeking a benchmark for the classification of specific issue promotional 
NGOs which are the main non-state actors under examination in this thesis, the 
Union of International Associations based in Brussels is an authority. 
It prescribes that members: 
. aims must be genuinely international in character and manifest the 
intention to engage in activities in at least three states; 
. the membership must be drawn from individuals or collective entities of at 
least three states, and must be open to any appropriately qualified 
individual or entity in the organization's area of operations; 
. the constitution must provide for a permanent headquarters and make 
provisions for the members to periodically elect the governing body and 
officers; 
. the voting procedure must be structured in such a way as to prevent 
control of the organisation by any one national group, and substantial 
financial contributions in the budget must come from at least three states; 
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• no attempt must be made to make profits for direct distribution to the 
membership (Feld et al 1983, 24) 
Important elements of these criteria are requirements for multi-nationalism, 
open memberships and a measure of democracy. But despite the undoubted 
standing of the UlA founded in 1907, some of these criteria appear too legalistic 
when attempting to embrace the dynamic range of NGOs on display in politics 
today. An alternative approach is the "broad church" of the UN Economic and 
Social Council (ECOSOC) resolution of 1968, defining an INGO as: "any 
international organisation which is not established by inter-governmental 
agreements...including organisations which accept members designated by 
government authorities, provided that such membership does not interfere with 
the free expression of views of the organisation." This definition is qualified by 
criteria demanded of NGOs in order for them to gain "consultative" status at the 
UN. The criteria include an established headquarters, administration, 
authorised representatives and a policy-making body. Provisions were also 
made by the UN for suspension or withdrawal from consultative status if an 
organisation was shown to be improperly under the influence of a government. 
(Willetts 1982, 12). The overall thrust of the UN's definition makes fewer 
demands on the formal internal structure of an NGO, and appears better to 
allow for the flexible, popular base compliant with a centralised direction that 
characterises many of these actors. 
Recognition by an international regime is an important issue to consider in 
analysing the strength of NG0s. So is the question of trans-border co-operation 
by them. When they co-operate internationally, it may be from one of two broad 
directions: from the "bottom up" by means of an alliance or coalition of 
various grassroots national and/or international groups, or from the "top down" 
in the sense that a hierarchy prescribes a common direction for achieving 
centrally-derived purposes, using a similarly directed bureaucracy and financial 
structure. The influence that these organisations achieve over international 
regimes may have a relationship to this structure, depending on the issues at 
hand. 
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The means of co-operation internationally by consortia or coalitions of 
NGOs may include common representations at forums, shared information 
networks, or specific operations such as food or medical relief work. Often the 
resultant operations are a web of linkages of varying degrees of formality. In 
the case of the relief agency Oxfam, for example, it acts as an independent 
fund-raiser, adviser to government, and a member of a national council of fund-
raisers. Willetts asserts that the situation becomes more complex at a global 
level, as a pressure group can relate to the United Nations and to specialised 
agencies of its own volition, and work via national or trans-national 
coordinating bodies. (Willetts 1982, 9). 
In the final analysis of the character of NGOs , the issues that appear central 
to an assessment of their strength in the context of this thesis, are their 
independence of action, resources at their disposal to carry out that action, and 
the web of linkages they have at hand to influence international regimes. This 
brings us to an examination of these regimes, and some of these linkages. 
• (V) INTERNATIONAL REGIMES AND THEIR FORMAL  
NGO LINKAGES  
An international regime is well-recognised in the field of political science as 
"a set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures around which actors' expectations converge in any given area of 
international relations." (Krasner 1986, 2) They are most often seen as 
organisations formed by national governments form to deal with trans-national 
pressures through the creation of specialized inter-governmental actors with 
limited roles. They are also criticised as efforts to oppose change and eliminate 
unpredictability* the formation of exclusive 'gentlemen's clubs'. (Mansbach 
1976, 282). 
An understanding of international regimes and their character is essential to 
test the influence that NGOs may have formally and informally over the organ's 
decision-making process. In gaining this appreciation, it seems useful to keep 
in mind a parallel between the foibles of the human character, and the strengths 
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and weakness of the regimes that we arrive at in order to regulate our affairs. 
Young says that sovereign states are regarded by orthodox students of 
international relations to be the self-interested primary units of international 
society. For the most part, they are said to pursue their immediate interests, 
defined, more often than not, in terms of the accumulation or use of power 
(Young 1989a, 62). The regimes they arrive at are social institutions which 
may be geographically specific to a certain area of the globe, functionally 
circumscribed as in the management of species or ecosystem, or limited in 
membership to a group of common interest nations (Young 1988, 5). 
The several developmental sequences for international regimes can be: 
. self-generating or spontaneous in the growth of interactions such as 
language systems; 
. negotiated institutional arrangements in the form of constitutional contracts 
such as the Antarctic Treaty System or legislative bargains such as the UN 
regime for Palestine; 
. or imposed arrangements such as are fostered in feudal or imperial 
systems. (Young 1989a, 84-88) 
For regimes as much as any other system of representation, their success 
depends critically upon the presence of well-informed constituents, and also on 
the maintenance of high standards of accountability in relationships between 
representatives and their constituents. (Young 1989a, 92). Likewise they are 
not static constructs even after they are fully articulated. Rather, they evolve 
continuously in response to their own inner dynamics, as well as to any 
changes in the political, economic and social environments. Compliance with an 
international regime by the state actor engaged with it is ignored only at the risk 
of great cost. "A reputation for trustworthiness is one of the most valuable 
assets that any member of international society can acquire...The costs of being 
stigmatised by others as a rule breaker may be quite severe, as many Third 
World states have discovered in connection with the dictates of the international 
monetary and trade regimes." (Young 1989a, p74-5) 
When looking for defenders of the regime, Young points to the government 
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agencies, particularly foreign ministries. They find their success in protecting 
agency turf and competing for scarce resources depends in part on their ability 
to portray the regimes they work with as important and successful international 
arrangements. This in turn generally hinges on their ability to demonstrate that 
compliance with the provisions of such regimes is high. As a result, responsible 
agencies typically become staunch advocates for compliance with the terms of 
various international regimes in the bargaining processes that occur with 
governments as they move towards decisions on specific issues. 
Young identifies non-governmental interest groups committed to defend the 
provisions of specific regimes, and prepared to press governments to comply 
with their dictates, as raising pressure for compliance. "In fact the establishment 
of a regime can stimulate the growth of powerful interest groups in a number of 
member states, which then form trans-national alliances in order to persuade 
responsible agencies to comply with the requirements of that regime." (Young 
1989a, 78) 
Hence one may conclude international regimes are not immutable statics, but 
changeable organisms susceptible to pressures. At an extreme, these pressures 
can bring to light internal contradictions which could eventually lead to serious 
failures and mounting pressures for alterations. (Young 1989a, 95-7) "We are 
all aware...that laboriously negotiated revisions in institutional arrangements 
often prove difficult to implement, fail to achieve the results intended, produce 
unintended by-products that swamp the effects of the intended results, or are 
overtaken by changing circumstances before they can be properly instituted." 
(Young 1989a, 86). 
Keeping this brief assessment of international regimes in mind, we now turn 
to an overview of existing comprehensively structured formal linkages between 
NGOs and two international organisations, each operating numerous regimes. 
The purpose is not to provide an encompassing picture, but to shed light on 
how in particular these formal linkages operate, and their value. We begin with 
a preeminent international organisation in global politics in the post World War 
II era, the United Nations, then examine relationships with another large and 
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fast-growing organ, the European Union. 
Since its foundation, NGOs have always had a formal, recognised link with 
the UN. Despite this association, exemplified by the official status that 1,200 
NGO representatives had at the San Francisco conference to finalise the UN 
charter, some believe the position of NGOs in the organisation has been 
overlooked. NGOs have a direct, formal relationship with the UN through its 
Economic and Social Council [ECOSOC]. The original categorisation of 
NGOs by ECOSOC is a division of three: Category A for sectional economic 
groups, Category B for professional associations and welfare agencies, and 
Category C for those primarily concerned with the development of public 
opinion and the dissemination of information; that is, promotional groups. This 
categorisation gives them a status ranking, and different procedural rights. For 
example, Category A organisations had the same rights as governments to 
receive documents and circulate their own written communications to all 
delegations as official ECOSOC documents. (Feld 1983, 13). 
Despite this example, Realists would say that governments historically tended 
to ignore rather than encourage NG0s, and should do so. But countering this 
view, state actors may actually be moved to deny the NGOs' legitimacy when 
criticism is made of them. Willetts gives the example of the discussion of Chile 
during 1975-6 in the Commission of Human Rights (Willetts 1982, 135), in 
which Chile launched a strong attack on NG0s. On the other hand, the 
existence of consultative status at the UN is said to have legitimised 
communication between the UN secretariat and NG0s, whose resources are 
called upon in the preparation of specialized conferences, for example with the 
participation of environmental non-state actors in the UN Environment 
Program's preparations for the 1992 Earth Summit. 
In the European Union, the relationship with NGOs is expressed in two 
ways: through the EU Economic and Social Committee, and the European 
Union Commission. The ESC is "the only [EU] body comprising employers, 
workers, farmers, carriers, traders, craftsmen, members of co-operatives, small 
business, professions, consumers, conservationists and community 
associations". (European Community 1990, 12). Its members come from major 
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national organisations but are appointed in a personal capacity by the Council of 
Ministers for a four year term. The membership is divided into three groups: 
employers, workers and "various interests". It describes itself as an institution 
essential to the construction of Europe, but its role is limited to provision of 
information opinions, for example on "Relations between the [EU] and Newly 
Independent Countries of South East Asia", and the "Channel Tunnel and its 
Transport Policy Implications". (European Community 1990, 34). The ESC's 
power is clearly circumscribed. Instead when wanting to exercise influence, 
European NGOs head for the community's more powerful Commission, where 
in a survey by Willetts 22 major European NGOs ranked contact by external 
lobbying as being most important (Willetts 1982, 135). 
This is an illustration of the value of formal linkages between NGOs and the 
regimes operated by international organisations. One may conclude that though 
NGOs can be influential and significant under some circumstances, such as 
inside the UN, it is a mistake to regard formal linkages as being of over-riding 
importance. Therefore the question clearly is: if not in constructs designed by 
states themselves, where does the influence of NGOs really lie in international 
decision-making by these states? 
(VI) NGOs STRENGTH IN INTERNATIONAL 
DECISION-MAKING  
The unique strength of pressure groups is summed up by one authority as 
their ability to rapidly transmit political ideas. "They may not have great military 
or economic resources, but they can communicate political ideas. They may not 
be able to obtain decisions for which they are working so hard, but they can 
frequently put issues on the political agenda, so others are forced to respond." 
(Willetts 1982, 194) For an example of this notion in practice, consider the 
intentions of one environmentalist campaigner, Mr Will Martin, the director of 
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The [United States] Wilderness Society: "We're dealing with symbolism as 
opposed to what is going to happen tomorrow," he said at the Vina del Mar 
meeting of the ATS in 1990. "We must put in place a permanent regime with a 
complete ban on mining. That's essential. But we must also put in place 
something deeper. A law can be amended. We want a history of protection 
established so that if commercial pressures do build, prospectors would have to 
deal with more than a law. It would be an ethic." [emphasis added] (Hunt 
1990c). 
How then do NGOs attempt to change something as fundamental as the 
actual operating ethic of nation states, and what do authorities say about the 
importance of this relative to the power of these states? In examining 
perceptions of these strengths, two alternative models are offered to the view 
that state-centric power is the only means of describing accurately the course of 
world events. 
Some authorities are convinced the idea that an NGO can wield enough 
power to change the course of international events is illusion. Among political 
scientists, these Realists argue that the world is composed of competing self-
interested sovereign states supreme in their interactions with one another. 
However the Rationalists argue that states form an international society with 
both explicit and implicit rules of co-operation, allowing a greater range of 
actors. The question of limits on NGOs' strength is grounded in these 
competing perspectives on international relations. Willetts comments that if 
traditional international relations involves states mobilising power to promote 
their respective national interests, then pressure groups are not relevant. 
(Willetts 1982, 1). But although states may have international strengths NGOs 
lack, most obviously economic and military powers, they have weaknesses too. 
States provide vehicles for NGO achievement. These are the the political and 
bureaucratic organs of government that may be engaged in debate, in pursuit of 
changes to state agendas. 
In considering the application of this pressure it can be acknowledged that 
the state is almost exclusively driven by immediate political imperatives. Into 
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this perspective come promotional NGOs who can often claim to be promoting 
a changed future. "They have some vision, however modest, of a world 
community in which their organisational goals are implemented and they have 
their own repertoire of appropriate strategies [to do this]. (Boulding 1988, 37). 
The rate of influence may vary from the ineffectual pin-prick of a small scale 
NGO with modest local goals to the severe hostility that an organisation such as 
Amnesty International may provoke from a government whose practices are 
under scrutiny. "As the Soviet delegation observed during an ECOSOC review 
of human rights organisations, governments at times perceived INCr0 activities 
as an infringement of national sovereignty." (Feld 1983, 237) 
At times too, NGO activity can go far towards changing the agenda of 
international discussions and providing a different outcome. Feld says NGOs 
are likely to participate assiduously in negotiations leading to the formation of 
international regimes, and may even instigate them. The example is provided of 
the 1979 World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development 
(WCARRD). 
"INGO activity at WCARRD went a long way to recasting the issues of the 
conference in light of INGO experience derived from rural development projects 
at the field level, and from independent research activities." (Feld 1983, 242) 
NGOs challenged not only the power of government elites to control 
international events, but also their right to define international issues. 
This view rests on the strength awarded to NGOs by all political actors in the 
system in which they are involved. National governments are claimed to have 
acquired a relatively high status by virtue of being in office, and generally being 
assumed to be competent. "Government generally is obeyed notjust because it 
has authority, but also because among a sufficient number of people it has 
legitimacy," remarks Willetts in an observation of fundamental importance to 
this thesis. (Willetts 1982, 17) Legitimacy here is taken to mean the degree to 
which an actor can mobilise popular support, or in a confined sphere, 
demonstrable independent expertise. Not all governments have it, for example 
in totalitarian systems. Alternatively, pressure groups may have low authority - 
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that is a narrow means of exercising power - but their acceptance by the public, 
their legitimacy, may be contrastingly high. For example in the case of labour 
conditions and legislation, an NGO such as the International Labour 
Organisation may embody a legitimate global standard that has authority over a 
single national government. "It is precisely the discrepancy between their 
standards and those of some local regime which is the measure of the 
backwardness of some governments, rather than the attitude of the not-always-
potent international community." (Lador-Lederer 1962, 210). And it is also the 
case that some NGOs are larger, and have a broader international reach than 
some national governments. "Actors such as Al Fatah, the Viet Cong...and 
even the Mafia play a larger role in global transactions than is customarily 
recognised." (Mansbach 1976, 27). 
It must also be borne in mind that NGOs have to prove their own integral 
worth as well. A crucial question that they must answer is whether they are so 
dependent on the consensus or resources of governments for their operation that 
they merely act as surrogate executors of governmental policies or whether they 
formulate and pursue policies of their own, that may freely be in opposition to 
governments. "Only to the extent that they formulate and pursue independent 
policies are they independent actors in world affairs (Keohane and Nye 1972, 
16). 
The above examples demonstrate that when it comes to an assessment of who 
is influential in international decision-making, the answer is not always only the 
state. A purely state-centred view of world affairs is too simplistic. In order to 
spell this out more clearly, we turn now to consideration of NGOs place in two 
models of the world political system: Keohane and Nye's world politics 
paradigm and Mansbach's complex conglomerate model. 
The World Politics Paradigm. 
In this model it is proposed that world politics consists of interactions 
between "significant actors" whose characteristics include autonomy, control of 
substantial resources and participation in political relationships across state 
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lines. The central phenomenon in this is bargaining between a variety of 
autonomous or semi-autonomous actors. It differs from state-centric analysis 
by focussing on the nature of the actors. On this question, Keohane and Nye 
divide their characteristics on two dimensions: the degree to which they are 
governmental or non-governmental, and the extent to which they consist of 
coherent, centrally-controlled organisations rather than government sub-units. 
They conclude: "...the state centric paradigm covers only four of the possible 
36 types of politically important interactions across state boundaries identified 
by the world politics paradigm. This gives us an idea of the richness of possible 
trans-national coalitions that determine outcomes in world politics." (Keohane 
and Nye 1972,381-2) These authors propose a more complex world where 
progress is made by analysis of particular issue areas and the relation between 
them. "It must take account of the differences in the way the game of world 
politics is played on. ..different chessboards, or to escape the bipolar imagery, 
poker tables. Who are the players? What are their resources? What are the rules? 
How do the players, resources and rules differ from game to game? Most 
important, are the different games related to each other." (Keohane and Nye 
1972, 384) 
The Complex Conglomerate Model  
The principal feature of the complex conglomerate system is said to be the 
formation of alignments of actors, who use different means of pursuing 
complimentary objectives. These structures, Mansbach argues, tend to be 
flexible and ideologically diffuse. Like a conglomerate rock, the materials or 
elements are clustered together without assimilation. The author points to 
various characteristics of the global system to back the case, saying among 
other things that: 
. the great post-war ideological blocs are breaking up and making way for 
multi-polarity; 
. global problems such as oceanic pollution are emerging to transcend 
national boundaries and overwhelm individual nation-states; 
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• functional linkages create trans-national perceptions of mutual interest 
and lead to regularised communication among status groups across 
frontiers; 
• a high level of interdependence is fostered by modern communications 
and transport facilities, and complex production processes. 
An analysis of the behaviour of global actors by this author brings the 
conclusion that nation-states through their governments are still the primary 
actors. Yet when analysing other "pairs" of behaviour involving given sets of 
actors there are different conclusions. Non-state actors appear about two thirds 
of the time in these behaviours. "The answer is clear, the more conflicting the 
behaviour, the less a state-centric model can explain. Apparently, non-state 
actors are prepared to invest a higher level of their resources in conflict and to 
take greater risks than states." (Mansbach 1976, 278) 
Clearly these two models follow similar lines of thought about how global 
politics should be analysed. They illuminate a world much more complex than 
the Realists would propose, with decision-making linkages outside a state-to-
state norm, and where non-state actors play important roles. They see more 
value in examining the political outcomes reached in terms of the interactions 
between the players involved in a given situation, rather than assuming a 
naturally dominant position by one set of those players - the states. In 
considering these interactions, it is also of value to make realistic assessments 
of where the cards and wagers are held, and to whom the political actor owes 
allegiance. 
(VII) THE RISE OF ENVIRONMENTAL NGOS.  
AN ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVE. 
Having indicated in theory the broad reach of non-state actors in world 
politics, we now turn to a particular group of promotional NGOs under 
consideration in this thesis. Circumstances have placed these groups in the 
22 
political limelight, and now they illustrate well how non-state actors engage in 
the global political system. 
"Over the past 15 years, environmental protection has been a field of dramatic 
and controversial developments. At the international level there is still much to 
come as countries exhaust the national means at their disposal and discover that 
the problems they are grappling with remain unresolved. In fact, environmental 
issues are fast becoming the third major pillar of the emerging international 
system, together with security and economic issues." (Carroll 1988, 92). 
The strength of environmental NGOs within the global system is a matter of 
great importance, as is influence they may have upon other actors. They have 
arrived at a powerful position in the global system for three linked reasons: 
. because of the trans-national nature of environmental problems; 
. because these groups starkly demonstrate the importance of public 
participation to government legitimacy; 
. and because both of the above have come at a moment in history when 
there is change to be accomplished. 
The trans-boundary nature of environmental problems is common ground 
among commentators. The carbon dioxide problem, the preservation of 
Antarctic ecology, and acid rain all demand bilateral or multi-lateral agreements 
between governments in order to be effective. This provides a dilemma for the 
states. For them to co-operate successfully in dealing with the problem, some 
part of sovereignty or political freedom must be surrendered. "The scope and 
scale of many environmental issues transcend the traditional boundaries of 
national interest and responsibility. Governments are being asked to co-operate 
in the implementation of international agreements in which national interests 
may be seen as unclear or adversely affected. Governments have conceded 
more authority and resources to international organisations." (Carroll 1988, 
13). 
This commentator goes so far as to say that national governments are 
characteristically reluctant tciinitiate proposals for international environmental 
action which extend beyond both national frontiers and the self-interest of 
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office-holders and their constituents. Be that as it may, the response of NGOs 
to environmental problems today is intrinsically global in thinking and 
approach. There exists now an organised international environment movement 
not circumscribed by national self-interest. As a long-time Antarctic 
environmental NGO advocate, James Barnes, puts it: though NGOs lack the 
powers that states arrogate to themselves, they may share one significant 
characteristic. "As contrasted to individual states which so often pursue what 
they are pleased to term 'national interests', the NGOs bring a much needed 
global perspective to issues under consideration. Frequently they are the only 
group talking about the long term view, or bringing up the difficult concept of 
the rights of future generations." (Wolfrum 1985, 173). This approach is 
executed in several ways. They may monitor administration of treaties and 
international agreements, report back to the public on compliance, identify 
failures, and take direct action. Whatever course they take, cumulatively it is 
argued by Barnes to be effective in accomplishing change. They have become 
what is described as a regular and anticipated part of the action. 
The second factor that places environmental NGOs in a position of power is 
the recognition by governments that they reflect and represent public feeling: 
they have legitimacy. Though they may usually rank low measured against 
government authority, their standing has become high when it comes to 
acceptance by the people. Some initiatives for international co-operation on 
environmental issues have arisen outside goverment bureaucracies and the 
hierarchy of major political parties. "Proposals and pressures for co-operative 
action characteristically have originated within groups of persons organised to 
promote some common purpose and to persuade governments to act on its 
behalf." (Carroll 1988, 17) 
In general terms Barnes describes this as the "cutting edge" phenomenon. 
He succinctly concludes its value thus: "public participation enhances viability 
of government decisions because the substantive results are usually better." 
(Wolfrum 1985, 175) Policies formulated without consulting these interests 
involved often lead to decisions far outside the reigning or conceivable political 
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consensus. Otherwise they are so unacceptable in their demands on a particular 
interest group, that the resistance generated will thwart the action. Very often, 
says Barnes, it is only by admitting non-state actors to the process that a 
regime's unconsidered benefits may be articulated and developed. He cites the 
example of the International Whaling Commission, where only after NGOs 
demanded participation as observers in the early 1970s did the IWC begin to 
include "advocates" for the whales. It may be added, too, that this also opened 
the door officially to lobbyists for other groups such as the whaling industry 
and indigenous peoples. 
If the benefit of NGO participation is true in general terms, it is argued to be 
doubly so with pressing global issues such as those argued by environmental 
NG0s. The costs of failure to act upon these issues are there for all to see. This 
is not to suggest environmental NGOs always have great standing with experts; 
or even that they necessarily have a solid grasp of scientific veracity. But it is to 
say their message can have great impact with, and acceptance by, the public. 
Their grassroots origins and campaigning styles, together with their alacrity at 
distributing messages, ensure that is the case. This situation has improved for 
environmental NGOs especially in the last decade, and in pluralistic and wealthy 
nation-states of the "North" or "West". Here the mechanisms for influencing 
governments are greatest. It is not confined to these areas though. The 
authority Fouere cites the example of central America, a region buffeted by 
political and social conflict, with an average of more than 70 per cent of the 
population living in rural areas. "NGOs have been able to operate in areas 
where governments have no control and a state of lawlessness prevails." 
(Carroll 1988, 43). 
The spread of environmental NGOs raises the third point in favour of their 
increased power that these organisations have grown concomitantly with a 
moment in history. They have appeared, probably naturally, at a time of 
unparalleled communication between elements of the global system through the 
development of a new world order. More prosaically there are much greater 
technological means of taking advantage of change. Means of global 
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communication of ideas and information - important to NGOs in general - are 
certainly so to environmental NGOs whose agenda is global. High levels of 
transaction provided by modern technology, referred to by Mansbach earlier in 
this chapter, are personified by them. 
Likewise there has been a flowering of political liberalism. Observers 
commonly point to the United Nations Environment Program's Stockholm 
conference of 1972 as both the point at which environmental issues moved 
squarely onto the international agenda, and the time when environmental NGOs 
began to exert political pressures on global forums. Within a short space of 
time, the organised environment movement has taken on a world scale. 
Caldwell records that by 1980 the Environmental Liaison Centre in Nairobi, 
established by NGOs to facilitate their co-operation with UNEP, reported that 
more than 1,000 organisations were represented at the centre, and that half of 
them were from less developed countries. There is also the personal factor. The 
nature of environmental issues tends to take people around the globe on 
negotiating teams, in fact-finding groups or interchanging between NGO 
organisations and inter-governmental programs. "This personal factor should 
not be discounted, for it is through people that institutions actually work." 
(Carroll 1988, 26). 
It is important to recognise too, that however vital, this diverse body of 
environmental NGOs is not of a single character or voice. Demands they are 
articulating may compete and conflict. "They may collaborate on longer term 
projects and coalesce on an ad hoc basis when immediate questions erupt. Or 
communications may break down completely and be difficult and painful to 
restore." (Boardman 1981, 6) 
The character of environmental NGOs generally places them squarely in the 
category that Willetts suggested of specific interest promotional groups. They 
seem to fit all the necessary criteria. They have come together for the purpose of 
promoting social change; challenging orthodoxies; attempting to influence 
public opinion, and taking their concerns beyond national boundaries. See this 
operating in what Tom Burke describes as the structure of Friends of the Earth 
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International: "It operates internationally at five levels: creating a national 
constituency for international issues, bilaterally with non-government and 
government organisations, through the lUNEP-linked] Environmental Liaison 
Centre in Nairobi on global issues, through the European Environment Bureau 
on EC issues, and via the FOEI [internal) network." (Willetts 1982, 114). 
It is important to note too, that environmental NGOs have earned places both 
in some organisations with government, such as IUCN, and as consultants or 
delegates in a wide series of international regimes where their value is accepted 
to a degree by state actors party to these regimes.The International Convention 
to Regulate Whaling, the London Dumping Convention, the Antarctic Treaty 
and its subsidiary instrument CCAMLR all have official environmental NGO 
observers. 
This enables them to participate in an official sense, but it is the full extent of 
this participation that is central to this thesis. Barnes describes it as 'prodding'. 
"Basically what NGOs do is make a certain component of public opinion felt in 
the diplomatic and political process. They cannot do much more than this. After 
all they lack armies, great treasuries, judges, etc...What they do have is the 
enormous popular will to understand and protect the environment." (Barnes 
1985, 174). 
(VIII) CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS  
In setting a theoretical framework for this thesis it is argued that while 
nation states are acknowledged as the repositories of varied and considerable 
powers, the state-centric model is outmoded and does not satisfactorily explain 
the elements at play in global political events. Instead, some non-state actors 
may under some circumstances have considerable influence. Of special interest 
is the category of NGOs known as specific issue promotional groups; dynamic 
organisations which represent a grassroots activism focussing on social change. 
They may be prepared to act at risk of greater costs to their organisations than 
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their opponent states could consider possible, in a world of emerging global 
issues and where ideological and technological change all benefit NG0s. In 
doing so they engage the vehicle of state actors' global political and social co-
operation, international regimes.These regimes are susceptible to pressures 
from critics because their viability depends upon compliance by the member 
nations, and the member nations must respond to the views of critics in order to 
act legitimately. Balancing this, the organs of government responsible for 
acting in regimes may defend those regimes in which they are stake holders. 
When considering the success of states versus NGOs in this theatre it is 
helpful to assess these actors' authority and legitimacy to measure their real 
strength. In making this assessment, central issues are their basic autonomy, 
resources, and complex of linkages they have to deal with states. Defining 
NGOs in terms of formal recognition by international regimes is one means of 
pinning down their influence. But it alone will not yield a true picture of their 
strength, and formal relationships with these regimes may represent only a 
fraction of the activity they conduct in forcing states into processes of change. 
At the same time, NGOs themselves are under scrutiny for the real extent of 
their independence of action. 
Among specific issue promotional NG0s, environmental organisations are 
one group that has emerged in recent decades in a stronger position than many 
others in the global system. Nevertheless they present a dilemma for states 
which is illustrative of the influence held by NGOs generally. Their interests are 
frequently at odds with official state interests, but in many international regimes 
they have become an anticipated part of the action. They should not be seen as a 
homogenous group, being diverse and possessing competing demands. But 
because of their origins and concerns, environmental NGOs are from time to 
time regarded as having great legitimacy derived from the public. Though their 
authority may not be commensurately high, they can be seen as directly 
responsible for some changes in dealing with the environment. They have 
grown concomitantly with a moment in history. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
A SURVEY OF NON-STATE 
ACTORS IN THE ANTARCTIC WORLD 
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(I) CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
Having prepared a theoretical ground for the consideration of non-state 
actors in international relations, we now move to apply this in the sphere of the 
Antarctic Treaty System [ATS]. The broad aims of this chapter are twofold: to 
examine NGOs which are actively engaged with the ATS, and to measure them 
by common criteria in order to highlight attributes and limitations that may 
explain their varying strengths. 
The purpose is not simply to provide an encapsulated history of these 
organisations and their relationships, though it is necessary to set out such 
matters as their lineage in order to better understand the positions they hold 
now. Instead it is hoped that an examination of these organisations will provide 
a useful reference point for other work, including the subsequent case study. In 
addition a typology may place them in a context to give a better understanding 
of individual and collective strengths or weaknesses, particularly in relation to 
their standing with the ATS and the wider world. 
In the literature on Antarctic politics there appears to be no collected analysis 
of the NGOs that influence it. The following is therefore proposed as beginning 
that task, though because of its context in the current thesis it makes no claim to 
being exhaustive. As for the case study which is to be examined in this thesis, 
this catalogue is an opportunity to introduce the key non-state players. 
Analysis of a typology of these actors may assist by setting out qualities that 
have enabled them to, or prevented them from performing an influential role. It 
makes no claim to statistical precision. But it shows, for example, low general 
public support for the more traditional "science-based" NGOs which depend 
wholly on government resources for their existence. And it shows as having a 
more limited formal recognition by the regime, NGOs with a strong popular 
support base or charismatic leadership. 
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This typology and its conclusions are submitted as a means of analysing 
why some NGOs prove in the coming case study to be more influential than 
others in changing the course of the regime's deliberations. Which groups of 
NGOs could be regarded as showing more success, and what traits do they 
share? Answers to such questions may help answer the main hypothesis of this 
work; to reiterate: that one group of non-state actors can under a set of 
circumstances prove strong enough to overcome the collective will of an 
international regime. 
(II) THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM  
In order to place these considerations into an immediate context, it seems 
timely now to give a brief overview of the ATS, to bare the state-agreed bones 
of the regime at issue. 
The international regime governing Antarctica has become known in political 
science and diplomatic circles as the Antarctic Treaty System. Its main 
framework is provided by the umbrella Antarctic Treaty of 1959, which came 
into force in 1961 and could be opened to review 30 years later, a provision that 
was to give some impetus to the debate which is the subject of the current work. 
Over the years a series of sub-agreements were reached including the Agreed 
Measures for the Conservation of Flora and Fauna [1964], Convention for The • 
Conservation of Antarctic Seals [1972], the Convention for the Conservation of 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources [1980], the Convention on the Regulation of 
Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities [1988] now lapsed, and Protocol on 
Environment Protection [1991] yet to come into force. 
Although some authorities do not strictly regard the Antarctic Treaty to fulfil 
criteria necessary for it to be called an international organisation - specifically 
because it lacks a permanent headquarters - the regime is widely seen as 
possessing most of the trappings, by its members and the United Nations. 
(Beck 1986, 149) 
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It began with 12 original signatories and expanded over the years to include 26 
consultative parties (ATCPs) and 14 non-consultative parties (NCPs) - all of 
them states - at the XVIII Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM). 
The chief decision-making body, the ATCM was held biennially until 1992, 
and annually from 1994. Decisions are reached at the ATCM by consensus, 
and implemented through recommendations. Consultative parties are able to 
take part in decision-making but non-consultative parties are not. Admission to 
the "club" of ATCPs has been confined to states with a demonstrable active 
interest in Antarctic science at the time of application. A strictly limited number 
of organisations are invited to send official observers to ATCMs, and these 
include both other international government organisations and non-government 
organisations, who may be designated as experts and consulted, but hold no 
formal powers. Deliberations of ATCMs are conducted in camera, and 
responsibility for their organisation rests with host countries. There is as yet no 
permanent secretariat. Among subsidiary instruments of the ATS, only 
CCAMLR has developed an organisational structure with a headquarters and 
regular meetings. The seals convention provides for an organisation which is 
yet to be brought into being. Over the years ATCPs have also found it useful to 
hold Special Consultative Meetings devoted to particular issues, for example, 
the minerals regime and then on environment protection. 
The Antarctic Treaty System is clearly a regime as defined by Krasner earlier 
in this work, possessing such necessities as explicit principles, rules and 
procedures (Krasner 1985, 2). These are executed in a variety of ways. At their 
most fundamental they effect the basic state preoccupation of defence [the treaty 
specifies that Antarctica is to remain untnilitarised]. At their most ordinary they 
may circumscribe day-to-day movement around Antarctica by prohibiting most 
entry to areas designated Sites of Special Scientific Interest, or make activities 
in the extreme climate safer by jointly agreed but largely informal emergency aid 
procedures. 
32 
(III) PARAMETERS FOR A TYPOLOGY  
The point of a typology in this current work is to assess the non-state actors 
against common benchmarks in order to understand characteristics likely to 
make them influential actors in the case study that follows this chapter. To do 
this, common criteria for assessment are now defined, based both on the 
foregoing theory and practical examples such as the previously discussed 
qualifications for membership of the Economic and Social Committee of the 
United Nations. 
In the preceding chapter, Mansbach said the defining characteristic of an actor 
was its autonomy, its possession of a self-contained decison-making process 
that could not always be predicted by others (Mansbach 1976, 5). This most 
fundamental attribute finds practical voice in provisions such as the UN 
ECOSOC demand that a non-government organisation be free of restricting 
government influences. But how can we see whether Antarctic NGOs firstly 
possess, and secondly use this prized autonomy? Keohane and Nye saw 
autonomy to be linked to the control of substantial resources, and participation 
in political relationships across state lines (Keohane and Nye 1977, 381). 
Likewise, Willetts said its strength depended upon independence of action, 
which was comprised of basically the same two elements: resources at their 
disposal to carry out that action, and the web of linkages at hand to influence 
international regimes (Willetts 1982, 9). Therefore it seems the most useful 
way to assess these organisations in this thesis is to use parameters that examine 
structure, i.e. the sum of resources they possess, and relationships, or their 
web of linkages. 
In such an analysis, a capacity for autonomy should become visible in the 
structure of these NG0s. Moreover, the relationships they have should provide 
evidence of their legitimacy; their acceptance by the public in question, whether 
that be for example an expert Antarctic public, or the general public. We recall 
Willetts's observation earlier in this thesis that legitimacy, acceptance by such 
publics of these NGOs' validity, may at times prove to be more powerful than 
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the traditional authority or means of exercising power held by governments 
(Willetts 1982, 17) 
We begin by analysing the structure, where issues of interest are the extent 
of membership commitment possessed by an organisation, and the strength of 
its resources. An organisation's scale as an actor on the international stage is 
most visible in membership, its size and scope. In assessing the legitimacy of 
an actor before the popular public, this size is a key indicator. On the other 
hand direct control over policy, finances, and resultant provision of hardware 
such as equipment for independent transport, is vital to self-determined action 
and may have little to do with size of membership. By comparing these two 
sets of criteria, and later considering the performances of these NGOs in the 
case study it may be possible to see not only which actors have the best of both 
worlds, but which attributes of autonomy are more important determinants of 
actors' effectiveness in a given set of circumstances. 
It is proposed that standard reference points for the measurement of these 
Antarctic NGOs should therefore include for their STRUCTURE:  
. Resources Control. To what extent do these actors direct their own 
policy, obtain their own finances and through that, amass the resources 
they use? 
. and Membership . To what extent is it restricted on a professional basis 
and lacking popularity? Is it betwixt the restricted and popular 
worlds because it is confined group to an aggregated membership of 
popular groups, or is it broadly popular? 
The second set of criteria for the NGOs under examination here immediately 
brings to mind the caution in the first chapter that mere formal relationships do 
not present a good guide to the influence of a non-state actor on a regime. At 
the same time, in order to make an illuminating comparison about these NGOs' 
spheres of operation it seems useful to examine both possible directions: 
inward to the ATS, and outward with the rest of the world. The proposed 
reference points in the case of RELATIONSHIPS are: 
. ATS Standing in a range from non-recognition to a functionary role. 
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[i.e. whether the NGO is unconnected with the ATS, takes part in a 
national delegation, is recognised as an observer in its own right, or 
carries out tasks at the regime's request] ; 
. and the focus of activities [i.e. the total suite of activities 
the NGO engages in, ranging from Antarctic focussed, through a limited 
suite of other activities, to globally focussed]. 
These indicators should give a clear view of the formal relationship of the 
state-based ATS regime with different NG0s, and contrast it with the NGO's 
place in the wider world. The resulting table, and consideration of the NGOs 
thus grouped in the case study, should help illustrate which relationships are the 
more valuable to these actors in their attempt to influence the course of events, 
and the extent to which legitimacy from specific publics proves valuable. 
These parameters and the grids plotted from them are not represented as an 
attempt at precise statistical method. Their aims are to highlight salient features 
of these NGOs and encourage assessment of the reasons for their influence, or 
lack of it. What follows is a detailed examination of 10 NG0s, all but one of 
which is international. This group does not include all NGOs which at one 
stage or another have taken an active interest in Antarctica. Nor does it portray 
present day levels of involvement. However it does cover all those NGOs who 
directly interacted with, or claimed a substantial impact upon, the ATS during 
the period of the case study, or arose as a result of that era. 
(IV) KEY NON-STATE ACTORS AND THE ATS  
The Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research  
SCAR holds a unique and long-lived place among NGOs in the Antarctic 
sphere, but in recent years has been undergoing a turbulent phase of its 
existence. After years of what it now admits to be declining influence, it is 
making an unusually open attempt to regain lost ground. 
Older than the Antarctic Treaty itself, SCAR claims to run in tandem with the 
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ATS. In the initial phase it fulfilled a pivotal advisory function. But with the 
rising complexity of the ATS, this role changed to a point where gradually more 
questions were raised about its powers and directions. It clearly claims to be an 
NGO (FifieId 1987, 1). In a pure form it appears to be an outcome of the 
conditions Skjelsbaek described as conducive to the spawning of an NCTO, that 
is: a group of specialists which has emerged from a high degree of economic 
and technological development in the societies concerned (Keohane and Nye 
1972, 83-4). Yet links with national governments on the one hand and the ATS 
on the other are fundamental to its purpose. As will be elaborated, they appear 
to circumscribe its ability as an actor. 
The antecedents of SCAR are in the Comite Special de l'Anee Geophysique 
International [CSAGI], created by the International Council of Scientific Unions 
[ICSU] to plan the International Geophysical Year of 1957-8 in which there 
was to be unparalleled Antarctic research (Beck 1986, 41). Even at the pre-
event planning stage, the ICSU chose a successor for CSAGI in SCAR, which 
was intended to provide permanent machinery for scientific co-operation in the 
Antarctic region. The first delegates to SCAR met at the Hague in February of 
1958. They represented national scientific associations, and later, national 
Antarctic science committees. In fact to this day almost all individuals connected 
with SCAR also serve as advisers to their respective governments on Antarctic 
Treaty matters, or may be employed in their Governments' research programs. 
"In doing so, these individuals are careful to keep their roles in SCAR separate 
and distinct from their roles in treaty matters (Fifield 1987, 7). But this 
dichotomy is highlighted with the comment: "a non-government organisation 
was established with representatives from sovereign countries." (Jorgensen-
Dahl and Ostreng 1991, 153). An admission is also made by SCAR itself: "not 
all SCAR members are independent of political pressures from governments :" 
(Antarctic Treaty 1991d, para 5.2) 
Its constitution when first formulated said in preamble: "SCAR is a Special 
Committee of the ICSU charged with furthering the co-ordination of scientific 
activity in the Antarctic, with a view to framing a scientific programme of 
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circumpolar scope and significance. In establishing its programme, SCAR will 
take care to acknowledge the autonomy of other existing international bodies." 
There have been revisions and the current version, under the title "Guidelines 
for the Conduct of SCAR Affairs" suggests that "SCAR will abstain from 
involvement in political and juridical matters, including the formulation of 
management measures for exploitable resources, except where SCAR accepts 
an invitation to advise on a problem." (Fifield 1987, 2) 
The intention appears to be to place SCAR in as neutral a position as 
possible. Though Beck sees it as an unofficial scientific arm of the ATS, it is 
also viewed by him as an NGO, anxious to avoid international politics and, in 
his opinion lacking a formal connection to the ATS. He concludes that SCAR's 
actual working relationship with the system is based upon a subtle politico-
scientific interaction. "Thus the consultative meetings seek expert advice from 
SCAR as a means of facilitating the process of management of Antarctica." 
(Beck 1987, 162). 
Membership of SCAR is conditional upon the national committee applicant 
being actively engaged in Antarctic research; that is, being part of a national 
government's program. It is formally structured with a continuing executive, a 
biennial meeting, a number of working groups, and groups of specialists to 
tackle specific tasks. The status of SCAR observers in the various organs of the 
ATS also gives insight into the organisation's position. "A SCAR observer is 
not a delegate but a representative who, while generally aware of the SCAR 
policy, can make up his or her own mind about an issue and does not act under 
instructions and delegated authority from SCAR." (Antarctic Treaty 1991d, para 
5.2.1). 
Financing of SCAR is government-based. Originally its budget was set at 
$US6,000 per annum, with each of the 12 national committees contributing 
$US500. In future years it was decided members would contribute additional 
amounts in proportion to their level of Antarctic activity as measured by over-
wintering personnel. This criterion was dropped with the growth of summer 
programs. (Fifield 1987, 2). It now operates under a three-tiered system which 
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sees a significant Antarctic operator like Australia contributing only $US12,000 
per annum (Budd interview, 1992). Its total funding is around $US250,000 per 
annum, a quantity SCAR describes as totally inadequate, but all that is available 
to co-ordinate scientific research, maintain a secretariat, publish reports and 
provide advice on applied problems of the ATS. "What is needed is direct 
financial support to SCAR, such as is provided for example to CCAMLR and 
will be provided for the Committee for Environment Protection [CEP]." 
(Antarctic Treaty 1991d, para 5.1). 
The motor driving SCAR's operations appears to be the ATCM, and this was 
particularly so in the early phases of the system. It was made clear where state 
actors were coming from in recommendation 1-1 of ATCM I which said: "The 
representatives recommend to their governments that they should facilitate the 
continuation of the exchange of information regarding plans for scientific 
programs as now carried on through the Special [now Scientific] Committee on 
Antarctic Research, and through member unions and committees of the 
ICSU..." (Antarctic Treaty 1961, 5). Under such circumstances one must 
begin to query the effective independence of SCAR as an NGO. 
This is not to attack its stature. Through the history of the ATS, SCAR has 
been a source of advice for many big issues integral to the functioning of the 
system and it continues to be the main force co-ordinating and attempting to 
avoid unncessary duplication of scientific effort. Issues it has tackled ranged 
over environmental, logistic, telecommunications, land use and resources 
questions. But must be said that even though ATCPs' authority over SCAR is 
notionally circumscribed, and it is not in theory obliged to perform tasks 
assigned at ATCMs, there is no record of SCAR every refusing a task asked of 
it. It was included explicitly in the earlier formal instruments of the system. It 
was invited to act as an information exchange and oversight mechanism on the 
Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Flora and Fauna, and to co-ordinate 
scientific advice to the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals. 
However it was excluded from such a function in the more industrially active 
machinery of CCAMLR. Under the defunct CRAMRA it was given a very 
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limited function, being nominated as one of a number of possible advisory 
bodies. Under the Protocol on Environment Protection, SCAR has an 
observation and consultation role linked to the Committee on Environmental 
Protection, and it may offer emission standards and equipment guidelines for 
waste disposal under Annex III, Article 3 of the protocol. 
SCAR's advocates have claimed in the past that repeated adoption of its 
recommendations by ATCMS prove its strength. "References to SCAR are 
more and more frequent at ATCMs. SCAR becomes stronger every time there is 
a need to consult and evaluate scientific programs." (Jorgensen-Dahl & Ostreng 
1991, 156). However, in the absence of factors such as visible dissent, or 
what Mansbach described earlier in this work as the ability to make responses 
that cannot always be predicted by others, the number of references and 
acceptance of recommendations may be a sign of its usefulness as an arm of 
governments rather than its strength as an independent actor (Mansbach 1976, 
5). Additional evidence of this emerged in the late 1980s when commentators 
began to raise public alarms about SCAR's influence. 
The development of internal expertise in subsidiary instruments such as 
CCAIVH—R and the governments' Council of Managers of National Antarctic 
Programs (COMNAP) is said to have cost SCAR its central position. As the 
deputy director (science) of Australia's program, Patrick Quilty, commented 
"There is a sense in which this is a creeping derogation of the role of 
internationally-coordinated science through SCAR. International bureaucrats 
have a greater role now, and dictate requirements to be provided by science." 
(Herr, 1990, 36). 
Recently as much was admitted by SCAR itself. It pinpointed its own decline 
beginning from 1975 when ATCPs asked it to prepare a report on the 
environmental impacts of minerals exploitation, a report that was submitted in 
1977. "For political reasons this report was not seriously considered by the 
ATCPs who set up an inter-governmental Group of Experts which produced a 
parallel report. From this time SCAR's pre-eminent role in providing scientific 
and management advice to the Treaty system began to diminish." (Antarctic 
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Treaty 1991d, para 2.6) 
All is not lost for SCAR though. Kimball makes the point that without it, 
current logistic co-operation in Antarctica would be greatly reduced. "Timing of 
[information exchanges] is such that national plans are not communicated far 
enough in advance to permit much collaborative planning and/or operational 
activities. In practice, informal SCAR communications have supplanted these 
exchanges which give effect to...logistics co-operation." (Joyner and Chopra 
1988, 34). SCAR claims to be still playing a central role in the management of 
a human presence in Antarctica. For example at the 1992 meeting, COMNAP 
agreed fully to support SCAR objectives on meeting the challenge of global 
change in national building programs. 
In recent years, it has also attempted to present a more pro-active face to 
treaty meetings with presentations and information (Budd interview, 1992). 
In a change important for this analysis, SCAR is now beginning to admit that it 
has been marginalised from influence in the system, particularly by another set 
of NG0s. In a detailed report to ATCM XVI in Bonn 1991, SCAR makes what 
is in effect a plea for a return to the status quo of the 1960s when it was much 
more integral to the ATS. SCAR warns ATCPs that unless its views are 
accorded greater•weight and it gets substantially more funds, it may be obliged 
to withdraw from giving advice on management problems. (Antarctic Treaty 
1991d para 1.10). 
It blames inadequate funding, the duplication of scientific effort and, of 
particular interest to this thesis, the disproportionate influence on the regime of 
environmental pressure groups for its plight. "Antarctic scientists are generally 
concerned that governments may respond positively to public relations pressure 
campaigns of some environmental NGOs with quite different objectives to those 
of scientists." (Antarctic Treaty 1991d, para 1.7). SCAR presents itself instead 
as an actor who is the legitimate provider to the regime of data and advice on the 
consequences of ATS decisions. "The new factor is the role of environmentalist 
pressure groups which have strong views about the environment, and which 
attempt to persuade governments to support their objectives. It may sound 
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arrogant, but it is nevertheless the case that scientific philosophy and method is 
to seek the truth and scientists do not have political skills." (Antarctic Treaty 
1991d, para 6.3). 
Rather than arrogant, this appears to be a little out of touch. Like any actor in 
a political regime, SCAR gains authority based upon own its relevance and 
strength of political performance. But a repulsion for politics is something that 
SCAR takes very seriously. Its vice president, Bill Budd, says SCAR believes 
it must stay away from a political approach because of the danger that impartial 
science may go overboard. "We expect politicians and bureaucrats to listen to 
the information because of its soundness (Budd interview, 1992). 
In the final analysis, SCAR's ability to act autonomously appears to have 
suffered from its reliance on government resources and directions. Yet it would 
be able to claim that in offering sound, science-based advice, it is still freely 
acting as an NGO under the UN's definition elaborated earlier in this work, a 
definition that demands government involvement not interfere with the free 
expression of views of an organisation. 
ASSESSMENT: 
STRUCTURE: 
Membership: SCAR has a closed, exclusive membership based on Antarctic 
scientists only, who form a small professional association. 
Control over resources: SCAR has limited resources and exclusive financial 
support from state actors. It traditionally relies on the ATS itself to provide 
work directives, but regards advice then given as being of high independent 
scientific standing. 
RELATIONSHIPS: 
ATS standing: SCAR is older than the system itself, is seen as a stepping 
stone to full membership of the ATS, and has long-standing formal recognition, 
as an observer and functionary of the system. 
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External activities: Although it is Antarctic focussed, as a member of ICSU, 
SCAR has some expert international recognition in the outside world. 
The World Conservation Union (IUCN)  
The International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources, now known both as IUCN and the World Conservation Union, has 
an over-arching role among environment NG0s. Its role in Antarctic politics 
has been long-lived, and increasingly closely-linked to a point where it must be 
regarded as one of a handful of NGOs that are ATS "insiders". 
The union was formed in 1948 to promote the protection and sustainable use 
of living natural resources, based on scientific principles and adequate research 
(Barnes 1982, 70). The British diplomat, Sir Julian Huxley described it in his 
memoirs as "the organisation for nature conservation I have founded and built 
up at UNESCO". (Boardman 1981, 4). But the impression should not be held 
that it is a de facto inter-government organisation. It is much more of a hybrid. 
IUCN at the time of its 40th anniversary in 1988 had 634 members and 
affiliates from 120 countries. Among those members were 56 nation states. 
Each state member has three votes, one of which may be exercised collectively 
by government agency members. But the overwhelming number of members is 
composed of national and international non-governmental organisations which 
each have one vote too (IUCN, 1987). 
Following the signing of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959, the scientific machinery 
attached to it might have presented an opportunity of access for an organisation 
like IUCN, but it did little in the first two decades to become involved. "Its 
capacity to translate thoughts into action was severely constrained by the more 
exclusive nature of Antarctic inter-governmental relations." (Boardman 1981, 
138). Latterly the same observation is made by Kimball who suggests that even 
in the 1980s, collaboration was difficult between SCAR's relatively closed 
network of old Antarctic hands and IUCN, which lacked Antarctic credentials 
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and had a more prominent advocacy style (Joyner and Chopra 1988, 36). 
The start of IUCN's involvement in Antarctic issues appears to be 1972 
when it asked a US academic to develop the first world park proposition for the 
continent, subsequently approved at IUCN's Second World Conference on 
National Parks at Yellowstone-Grand Teton in Wyoming, USA. IUCN was 
involved in preparatory work for the Convention on the Conservation of 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources (Barnes 1982, 70) and when the instrument 
was drawn up, the commission and scientific committee were required to co-
operate with non-governmental organisations. "Ones like SCAR and IUCN 
seemed to be in mind." (Herr 1990, 143). 
One of the earliest intentions of IUCN appears to have been to gain better 
access for NGOs to the closed ATS. In 1981 an IUCN resolution called for 
ATCPs to invite qualified NGO representatives to participate in ATCMs, 
according to "normal international practice" and in order to foster public 
education. It also urged national governments to consult with, and include NGO 
advisers on their delegations. 
It is a matter of interest that this second suggestion urging the inclusion of 
advisers has been taken up generally with very little enthusiasm by ATCPs. 
Probably the first NGO adviser to join a national delegation joined the US 
contingent to CCAMLR negotiations in 1980. (Beck 1986, 226). Since then a 
handful of NGOs have found places in national delegations. IUCN appears, in 
that case, to have had only limited success. 
But on the matter of direct representation by NGOs in the ATS, IUCN has 
been something of a pathfinder. It gained admission to observer status at ATCM 
XIV, and maintained a presence at most meetings of the system - scheduled, 
special and CCAMLR - since then. It is regarded to have had an evolutionary 
role. "When we started out the profile was more passive and over the years it 
has grown," said IUCN's Antarctic coordinator, Paul Dingwall (Dingwall 
interview, 1992). "For example at ATSCM XI on the Environment Protocol we 
presented in three treaty languages the IUCN Antarctic Conservation Strategy, 
an 80 page detailed document." 
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At meetings IUCN has presented formal plenary statements on behalf of the 
union, as well as papers to working parties. It is making such a strong 
contribution to the system now that at ATCM XVII, a paper resulting from a 
joint SCAR-IUCN workshop on protected areas formed the basis for ATCPs' 
discussion of the issue. This is a good example of the way IUCN sees its role. 
"We are essentially a science and technical conservation body, not a political 
body, so we like to align with SCAR," Dingwall said. "By twinning science 
and conservation expertise we can establish a reputation with the national 
authorities." (Dingwall interview, 1992). This involvement reached a point on 
the minerals issue where there grew up a tentative collaboration between IUCN 
and SCAR in the form of the conservation plan referred to. "Eventually, after 
being raised by IUCN's Ecology Commission in 1981, in late 1985 a joint 
SCAR-IUCN working group was established to outline a long term 
conservation plan for Antarctica." (Joyner and Chopra 1987, 39) 
IUCN's involvement in Antarctica should be seen in the context of a big 
global spread of interests and increasingly strong concentration of its resources 
on the Third World. Between 1981-2 and 1991-2 the project budgets of 20 
selected regional and country offices of IUCN rose from Sfr 13.4 million 
[$A14 million] to Sfr25.8 million [$A27 million]. (IUCN Bulletin 1992, 15.) 
Of course, this publication continues, no such allocation is made for the far 
south: "There are places where establishing a presence would be prohibitively 
costly: Antarctica for example." 
Nevertheless Antarctica traditionally has found a place at IUCN General 
Assemblies. Issues raised include the preparation of the conservation strategy, 
an Environment Impact Statement on Dumont d'Urville airstrip in 1981, and 
encouragement for the adoption of Antarctica as a Nature Reserve and Land of 
Science in 1990. 
An advisory committee on Antarctica was established by 1UCN in December 
1983. At the past four general assemblies, specific workshops on Antarctica 
have been held. The tenor of IUCN's approach can be detected in this example 
of its 1981 resolution. It recognises the "paramount importance to mankind of 
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[Antarctica's] great wilderness qualities for science, education and inspiration." 
(IUCN 1991, 74) At this point it opposed any exploitation of minerals, and 
said ATCPS should not bring any minerals regime into operation until "full 
consideration has been given to protecting the Antarctic environment completely 
from minerals activities." (Wolfrum 1985, 431). 
It should be noted that many national governments which are key ATCPs are 
also represented at IUCN. For example at the 1981 UN Assembly there were 
11 (Harris 1985, 319). But despite the strong direction of the assembly's 
language, ATCPs are not bound to follow its resolutions. IUCN's rules do not 
prescribe that, and neither do IUCN's energies appears to be focussed on that 
path informally. "IUCN is a strange beast because of its membership, and it has 
to tread a fairly circumspect line." (Dingwall interview, 1992). 
Some suggest that the composition of IUCN gives it extra sway. "Its hybrid 
structure makes it more difficult for governments to ignore what it is saying, 
although a trade-off is that IUCN is not oriented toward advocacy. "(Barnes 
1984, 172). IUCN's structural facts of life also mean that its membership 
constrains it from the kind of activism that exposes brightly the sins of wrong-
doers. "One whose membership comprised a hybrid mixture of states, 
government agencies and private bodies was denied much taste of this luxury." 
(Boardman 1981,73). Activism is the kind of thing perhaps better handled by 
its close relative WWF, which tends to play a separate role from IUCN in the 
Antarctic sphere. As a political actor it holds a unique position in relation to the 
ATS; being at once a forum for the discussion of sensitive environmental and 
scientific issues at its general assemblies, and secondarily a quiet promoter of 
environmentalism in joint activities in Antarctica. 
ASSESSMENT 
STRUCTURE 
Membership: IUCN is marked by an exclusive membership of non-state and 
state actors who can only join with others' approval 
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Resources control: It has extensive means of financial support from constituent 
states and private sources, and uses its resources in a range of globally 
significant programs. 
RELATIONSHIPS: 
ATS standing : The union has a strong formal standing with the ATS as an 
official observer and a continuing contributor. 
External activities: IUCN's external political linkages are great, and the time it 
spends on Antarctic-related matters is relatively small. But it tends to focus on 
the expert. Despite its breadth of operations it is little known in popular terms. 
World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF)  
WWF originated from IUCN in 1960. Some say it was proposed as a fund-
raising twin (McCormick 1989, 41), others suggest it was created by 
individuals concerned about the gap between urgent conservation needs and the 
apparent inability of existing organisations to tackle them. (Boardman 1981, 44) 
By 1991 it was described as the world's largest private international nature 
organisation, claiming more than three million regular supporters, and national 
and associate organisations in 27 countries. (Suter 1991, 136) WWF has a 
structure of national groups, which are involved in policy discussion, but final 
decisions are taken centrally. WWF's Antarctic campaign coordinator, Ms 
Cassandra Phillips, says: "We then try to come to an agreement on what the 
'family' policy will be, and on how funds raised will be spent. The 
international headquarters in Switzerland consults very closely with the national 
organisations, and they sit on various committees planning policies and 
spending, but once the decisions are reached, then all the national groups go 
along with it." (Phillips interview, 1992). In other words there is an internal, 
consensual, but centrally-directed policy base. The origins of its involvement 
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in Antarctic conservation are linked to one of the organisation's founders, Sir 
Peter Scott. During the 1980s, Scott was said to have become very concerned 
with growing threats to the Antarctic, and to have made sure WWF became 
increasingly involved with efforts to protect it. "All the time until he died in 
1989 he held high offices within WWF. He was the chairman at one point, and 
his always was an extremely influential voice. Conservation in Antarctica was 
one of his crusades really..." (Phillips interview 1992). 
There was no opportunity for Scott to address the ATS directly, but he sent 
personal messages reproduced in ASOC's ECO magazines at the minerals 
negotiations, and was instrumental in getting resolutions passed by IUCN. 
"Certainly all through the 1980s at IUCN there was always a big discussion 
about Antarctica, and WWF was pushing those very hard."(Phillips interview, 
1992) Scott also wrote to world leaders, for example jointly signing with the 
French activist Jacques Cousteau an April 1989 letter to Australia's Prime 
Minister, Bob Hawke, urging the rejection of CRAMRA. The Antarctic torch 
that Scott kept burning in WWF induced other environmentalists to become 
active in the area too. "I remember coming back from a meeting with Peter" 
recalls ASOC's Jim Barnes. "I was so enthused about it that I put a sign up on 
my wall saying 'Think Big about Antarctica', and that was there for about 10 
years." (Barnes interview, 1992). 
WWF sees its role in Antarctic politics as lobbying politicians and keeping 
the public informed of major issues (Phillips, Martin-Jones, interviews 1992). 
It claims to be an influential part of ASOC and a significant financial backer. 
WWF has not seen any need to make an independent effort separately to lobby 
ATCPs. It has never formally sought the standing within the community that 
ASOC and Greenpeace have desired. 
It has taken a specific interest in joining some Antarctic projects though. For 
example in 1991 with the Fondation Cousteau, ASOC and the French League 
for the Protection of Birds, a WWF representative visited Point Geologie to 
report on the effects of airstrip construction (Cousteau Society 1991, 11). In 
1991 also WWF co-sponsored a pilot study on the effects of tourism in 
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Antarctica that was jointly operated by the UK, Chile and Argentina, though it 
decided not to carry that sponsorship any further. (Phillips interview, 1992). 
Such work is mainly on the 'soft' side of Antarctic political lobbying. In the 
course of the minerals debate it became involved in harder public campaigning, 
particularly in the UK which has a strong membership support base. WWF 
joined with the conservative Women's Institute and Greenpeace to mount a 
mass lobbying effort, both directly of political leaders, and by a public petition 
campaign. This is an indication of what appears to be one of WWF's strengths 
as an NGO: the national program. Another example is the Australian branch's 
decision to include in its lobbying document "Greenprint for the Environment,  
a Conservation Agenda for the Federal Government, 1990", a list of detailed 
policies, including the creation of a new Antarctic conservation regime. The 
indications are that as an actor, WWF has the capacity to be a significant player 
in the ATS, if it has the inclination. 
ASSESSMENT  
STRUCTURE 
Membership: WWF has an openly available membership and claims a huge 
support base to make it one of the most popular environmental NGOs in the 
world. 
Resources control: The organisation has a big budget and resources which are 
often devoted to practical projects developed through a centralised control over 
the assembly and execution of policy. 
RELATIONSHIPS: 
ATS standing: WWF has no formal standing inside the ATS, but keeps a 
little informal standing when it works on a project basis with some ATCPs. 
External activities: WWF operates in most developed countries of the world 
and thrives particularly in Europe. It has a range of linkages through expert to 
strongly popular and crosses a broad range of environmental preservation 
issues. 
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Antarctic and Southern Oceans Coalition (ASOC) 
ASOC is the most strategically placed environment promotion non-state actor 
in the Antarctic Treaty System. After years of external lobbying it forced its 
way through the ATCP walls to gain official recognition through observer 
status in the two active forums of the ATS: the ATCM and CCAMLR. The 
position was not achieved without controversy and resentment from others. 
ASOC's formation was initially the idea of US environmentalist, Jim 
Barnes. Against a background of concern at the shape of the embryonic 
CCAMLR, and inspired by Sir Peter Scott, Barnes, an American lawyer, said 
in 1977-78 he decided to organise a coalition of environmentalists interested in 
Antarctica. His method recalls a trail blazed 10 years earlier by the American 
environmentalist David Brower when he formed Friends of the Earth, (FOE) 
initially by approaching his own friends overseas (Willetts 1982, 106). Barnes 
said: "it took me a matter of days when I first broached the subject 
to colleagues in Australia, New Zealand, England and Canada, as well as the 
United States, to form a small coalition. We started operations shortly 
thereafter." (Barnes interview, 1992) Membership rose from an initial 12 
groups in five countries to a peak of about 200 groups in 40 countries. But care 
is needed in interpreting this number. Some of these groups are very locally 
based, and the extent of their real active interest in Antarctica may be 
questionable. In addition, although financial assistance was sought and gained 
from large and small, eventually only a few large NGOs became the supporting 
core of ASOC's work. ASOC's strategic approach was to maximise the use of 
thin resources for Antarctic environmental lobbying. "It was not a high priority 
issue for major groups, not even ones that ended up having a huge role, like 
Greenpeace and WWF." (Barnes interview, 1992.) The coalition operated on a 
shoestring budget of about $25,000 for many years, using part-time secretariat 
offices. 
Some experts such as Kimball and Suter call ASOC a clearing-house for 
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information, publicity and action on policy issues. (Joyner and Chopra 1988, 
30; Suter 1991, 75). But Barnes denies that for member organisations, ASOC 
is simply an information network for member groups, rather than a means of 
involving them in direct decision-making. "This has been a consensual process 
to the largest extent possible," he said. "Certainly one of the key things we do 
for member groups is to give them accurate information several times a year 
about what's happening. (But) we solicit their views in a very straightforward 
way, and we have an active correspondence with many member groups." 
(Barnes interview 1992). Neverthless he says that in practice those most 
involved are members of the "big three" environmental ING0s: Greenpeace, 
WWF and FOE, plus six or seven key nationally-based member groups, such 
as the Australian Conservation Foundation, the Environment Council (ECO) in 
New Zealand and The Wilderness Society in the United States. At its height in 
the early 1990s there were nominally three ASOC "secretariats"; the Antarctica 
Project in Washington DC; ASOC-NZ in Wellington and Greenpeace Australia 
in Sydney. Based in these three cities were the handful of people who actually 
did the day-to-day work of ASOC, and who were supported by the larger 
international NG0s. 
An important mechanical function for this widely dispersed workforce, and 
one which illustrates well the united manner in which ASOC approached the 
task of lobbying has been its use of electronic mail. Years before it became 
popular, it was seen by ASOC as particularly useful. But the actual presence of 
ASOC teams at ATCPs' meetings is seen by Barnes as the most useful measure 
of active involvement by individuals. "It was those opportunities when we 
were actually working in the flesh together which I think helped us to make the 
clearest decisions about policies." Barnes emphasised his belief that decision-
making within ASOC was also consensual. (Barnes interview 1992) 
ASOC puts its views both in formal statements to ATS meetings and in 
discussion papers. For much of its lifetime, it has also used the Friends of the 
Earth-based occasional newsletter of international meetings, ECO, to project 
alternative views to ATCPs and the wider community. Published locally at the 
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ATS meeting venue, its exhortatory style is directly addressed to delegates, 
though it may be distributed to a wider audience than that. Some ASOC activists 
have also been taken onto national delegations. However although ASOC and 
some of its members requested observer status at various Antarctic treaty 
meetings, this was denied until in 1988 it was accepted at CCAMLR. "In other 
words, ASOC is now an important player in the CCAMLR debates." (Suter 
1991, 134) This high level of standing was acknowledged by SCAR, but for 
different reasons. "[ASOC] has been very successful in handling the media and 
tackling governments on environmental affairs," SCAR said (Antarctic Treaty 
1991d, 236). ASOC's position inside the system was even more strongly 
entrenched in 1990 when it was invited to participate in the Special ATCM on 
environmental protection at Vina del Mar, Chile. Since then it has become one 
of a handful of organisations, both inter-governmental and non-governmental, 
to be regarded by the ATS as having enough scientific or technical interest in 
Antarctica to qualify to be invited to attend as observers at ATCMs (Antarctic 
Treaty 1991d, 38). 
Inside the forums of the system ASOC maintains a less strident voice than is 
expressed by its own more activist component groups who address the general 
public outside. There was a nice illustration of this in 1987 in Hobart. After 
Greenpeace activists dramatically hung from ropes to unfurl a banner from a 
bridge to coincide with the CCAMLR meeting, ASOC members continued their 
morning coffee break lobbying of diplomats. ASOC is the agreed primary 
vehicle for environment groups when dealing with treaty parties. For example, 
when Greenpeace backgrounded the final negotiating session of the SCM on 
environmental protection, it carried notes on four different proposals: the 
ATCM draft protocol, the UK position, the US position and ASOC's. 
In all, its role is said to add up to an effective mechanism for NGOs to 
collaborate with. "ASOC has monitored all the treaty meetings and government 
negotiations through the 1980s. ..They have developed lobbying strategies and 
taken a lead in preparing many major documents used by the environmental 
community." (CODEFF 1990, 100). A corollary of this less public approach by 
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ASOC is, of course, that less public recognition comes its way. It appears to be 
largely unknown in the wider community. For instance when government and 
NGO congratulated each other in Canberra upon signing the Madrid protocol, 
no mention was made in the formal speeches by either Greenpeace or the 
Australian Foreign Minister of ASOC, the organisation through which much of 
the lobbying work was actually done. 
ASSESSMENT 
STRUCTURE: 
Membership: ASOC is open to any group and claims a diverse range of 
members but in fact is backed more by an active handful of the major world 
environmental activist NG0s. 
Resources control: Policy is centrally controlled and executed by an inner 
ASOC group representing the major organisations and one or two ASOC 
executives. Its thin resources are provided by the major organisations, hence 
ASOC cannot be said to be largely self-determining. 
RELATIONSHIPS 
ATS standing:  ASOC gained a prized formal status of observer within ATS 
meetings; a singular role allowing coalition members to keep activist functions 
at arm's length while gaining the insider's information. 
External activities: ASOC is Antarctic focussed and has little or no other 
international interest. 
Greenpeace International  
Greenpeace International officially adopted Antarctica as a campaign issue in 
June 1983 (May 1988, 172) following pressure from some environmentalists 
concerned about the minerals negotiating process. The decision was taken by 
the organisation's governing council on a submission by Jim Barnes and the 
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New Zealand environmentalist Roger Wilson. At this point in Greenpeace's 
history it was one of the world's most prominent environmental organisations, 
and it has continued to grow. It claimed 2.8 million supporters in 1988 and five 
million in 1992, with global revenues of $US151 million. (Reuter 1992) 
Greenpeace has a reputation as a direct action environmental organisation. "It 
is important to stress...how isolated the examples (of direct action) are amidst 
the vast amount of lobbying by environmental groups." (Lowe and Goyder 
1988, 62). In the words of one of its pamphlets, "Greenpeace operates within 
the philosophy of non-violent direct action because we believe we must change 
attitudes generally in order to influence the decision-makers within governments 
and society to abandon the many destructive abuses of the environment." 
(Greenpeace, 1992) 
This has always involved sophisticated use of news media. Over the years, it 
is said to have succeeded in drawing attention to environmental issues more 
dramatically than any other pressure group through spectacular designed-for-tv 
actions. "the main objective for most Greenpeace actions has simply been to get 
onto the TV news, and campaigners have regularly risked their lives for the 
cameras." (Porritt 1988, 95) 
For the decade after its 1983 adoption of Antarctica, Greenpeace expanded 
the campaign in several directions. "I'm very much aware that successful 
environmental campaigns always had three components: the political, public 
awareness-raising and scientific. I've never seen a really successful campaign 
that hasn't combined all three. So when we actually set up the campaign 
properly, it was important to get working in each of these three areas." (Wilson 
in May 1988, 172). 
It is also important to note that in this campaigning process there has been a 
good deal of joint co-operation with other groups, and key practitioners, as was 
outlined previously in relation to ASOC. There can be identified four 
particularly significant thrusts in the Greenpeace Antarctic campaign, some of 
which do not appear specifically focussed on the overall goal of achieving 
world park status for the continent. 
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Firstly in 1983 Greenpeace picked up and exposed to ATCPs the 
construction of the Dumont d'Urville airstrip without an environmental impact 
assessment and with apparent destruction of wildlife. A decade later the strip 
was abandoned, and Greenpeace's continued pressure against its construction 
claimed to be vindicated. As a reminder to ATCPs that an external activist group 
can monitor them for embarrassing non-compliance, its importance should not• 
be understated. 
Allied to this is the second thrust, in which Greenpeace became an active 
monitor of environmental behaviour at national stations. The Antarctic Treaty 
makes provision under Article VII for treaty members to inspect each others' 
bases in order to maintain a self-policing role for ATCPs. In practice, these 
inspections under the treaty seem to be remarkable for the apparent absence of 
breaches, rather than the reporting of them. Since 1986 Greenpeace has copied 
provisions of the treaty in undertaking its own inspections. It has met various 
degrees of co-operation or hostility along the way from different ATCPs, and 
has reported upon the state of the bases at the end of the season, often very 
unfavourably. Again, Greenpeace as a non-state actor is by this process directly 
taking to task nation-states party to the Antarctic Treaty and, to boot, using the 
example to further its aims. "It is worth considering that there are not likely to 
be any stronger controls over minerals activity than are possible over scientific 
activity on the continent," says one expedition report. (Greenpeace International 
1988, 78). 
Greenpeace's extensive logistic capacity rivals, and sometimes exceeds, that 
of the smaller ATCPs. It includes the ice-strengthened ships Greenpeace" and 
'Gondwana' which have given the organisation a capacity to translate 
campaigns into direct action unrivalled among NG0s. This was evidenced best 
by the third issue for discussion: the World Park base. Established and run for 
five year-round seasons at Cape Evans before its removal in 1992, this four 
person base showed Greenpeace to be more active on the Antarctic continent 
than some of the smaller national programs. Said campaigner Roger Wilson: 
"By establishing the base, we have fulfilled the same kinds of criteria that are 
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applied to nations that seek membership of the Antarctic Treaty as consultative 
parties. We at least deserve observer status." (May 1988, 174). Greenpeace 
had obtained neither status when it dismantled and removed the World Park 
base. 
It has not been successful in obtaining representation in the forums of the 
ATS, having applied repeatedly both to ATCMS and CCAMLR, and been 
refused. For example in 1990 Greenpeace applied at a time when some of its 
members were involved in an action that conflicted with Soviet Union in the 
Arctic. On the ground of such behaviour, the Soviets black-balled Greenpeace's 
admission to CCAMLR. 
The Australian Foreign Minister, Senator Evans, commented that although 
his country continued to speak in favour of attendance by Greenpeace at 
Antarctic meetings, "I think there is some way to go before we achieve that". 
(Evans 1991, 2). But Greenpeace has not been content just to lobby the 
ATCPs about Antarctic; it has also taken another route which is likely to get 
their backs up: by going to the United Nations, which in the 1980s sought to 
challenge the ATS's hegemony over the continent. While it has been happy for 
ASOC to take the running in ATS forums, Greenpeace has made considerable 
contributions to the United Nations debate, and encouraged the UN to take a 
greater interest in Antarctica. "The participation of Greenpeace in the UN 
debate has been absolutely essential to any success achieved there. Annual 
briefing documents have been very important and widely used by government 
representatives at the UN." (May 1988, 175). 
ASSESSMENT  
STRUCTURE 
Membership: Greenpeace has a very large grassroots membership of 
increasing global reach, giving it great popular support. 
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Resources control: The organisation's governing council exerts direct control 
over major policy, which is executed in strictly bureaucratic fashion. Extensive 
finances and the possession of large scale capital resources give Greenpeace a 
high degree of self-determination. 
RELATIONSHIPS: 
ATS standing: Greenpeace's lacks a formal linkage with the ATS despite 
numerous attempts to engage the system in official interactions, from requests 
for observer status to base inspections. 
External activities: Greenpeace's activities cross a broad range of generally 
marine-related global environmental issues. 
World Resources Institute (WRI)  
The place of the "think tank" in Antarctic politics can sometimes be 
overlooked in a study of NGOs active in the system when in fact they provide 
significant support to others developing policy, not to mention their own direct 
policy input. One example of such an institution which has had a substantial 
input into ATS decision-making is the Washington-based WRI. 
It was launched by a group of wealthy individuals in what appears to be a 
case of the American philanthropic tradition. A private foundation, the John D. 
and Catherine T. McArthur Foundation, provided the core funding for a five 
year start-up, and continue to provide a substantial portion of its total revenue, 
which stood at $9,218,487 in 1990. (World Resources Institute 1991, 24). It 
also relies strongly on funding provided by the US Government through the 
Agency for International Development. That funding stood at $1.58 million in 
the same period. 
WRI sees its role as conducting objective policy researah, publicising new 
options and encouraging their adoption, and providing strong technical support 
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to developing countries to help them implement policies that sustain healthy 
economic development (World Resources Institute 1991, 1). One staff member 
of WRI, Lee Kimball, was an influential NGO representative in Antarctic 
debates during the 1985-91 period. But the approach she brought to discussions 
differed significantly from that of the environmental activist NG0s. For 
example the WRI approach was one of continuing support for CRAMRA 
during the course of its decline in international popularity, as being the best 
means of safeguarding Antarctica against possible mineral development. 
(United States of America, 1990b). She has also campaigned consistently for 
strengthening the institutional and inforrnation underpinnings of the system. 
Kimball was the NGO representative in US ATCP delegations in the key 
phase of negotiations for CRAMRA. In addition she wrote a series of influential 
reports and commentaries, and participated in, or helped to organise, a number 
of meetings of Antarctic experts. WRI described her work as one of its linked 
initiatives designed to heighten international co-operation on environmental 
issues. 
WRI has a trans-Atlantic relative, the International Institute for Environment 
and Development [lIED], which operates on similar lines and in similar global 
spheres. Today LIED is better known for wider Third World issues. But in its 
early years in the UK, the organisation founded by British woman Barbara 
Ward and US petroleum industry philanthropist Robert 0 Anderson, showed a 
limited interest in Antarctic policy. IIED published in 1980 "The Management  
of the Southern Ocean", a booklet that "predicted the crisis to come in Antarctic 
governance". (IIED annual report, 1990-91) IIED also played a role in the UN 
debate over control of Antarctica, by organising press conferences shortly after 
the UNCLOS negotiations in which key ambassadors denounced the exclusivity 
of the ATS. Since that time, IIED's North American arm has merged operations 
with the World Resources Institute, while the London-based headquarters of 
LIED has firmly focussed its attention on issues of sustainable development. Ms 
Kimball began working on Antarctica when with LIED, but continued through 




Membership: WRI has a small, closed and expert membership. It claims no 
popular support, but seek to speak with authority through its expert familiarity 
with the governmental systems it analyses. 
Resources control: Origins of its financial support are philanthropic business 
and government. It has the possibility of a high power of self-determination in 
the policy it reaches, always keeping in mind the goals of its financial backers. 
RELATIONSHIPS: 
ATS standing: WRI had a prestigious formal role as a long-standing member of 
a powerful national. 
External activities: WRI has a range of international interests and linkages on 
issues of sustainable development policy, of which Antarctic policy plays a 
small part. 
The Cousteau Society/ Fondation Cousteau  
In 1988 the charismatic French ecologist Jacques-Yves Cousteau began a 
petition in his home country against the adoption of CRAMRA. This was the 
beginning of a campaign by the organisation bearing his name which has 
considerable importance in the case study under analysis. Previous to that, 
though he had been to Antarctica five times, Cousteau does not appear to have 
been regarded as an actor in relation to the ATS at all. 
The NGO known in France as Fondation Cousteau and elsewhere as the 
Cousteau Society is a French and American-based organisation claiming 
300,000 members, many of whom pay a SUS28 family subscription. Its work 
over the past four decades has been directed at raising awareness about marine-
based ecological issues. Key members are, for example, repeatedly engaged in 
lecture tours in the United States. Captain Cousteau is the society's guiding 
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light, a well known international media figure, and could be regarded as a 
household name in France. There was no question he had very good access to 
key national politicians, including President Mitterand of France, Prime 
Minister Hawke of Australia [who provided him with honoured visitor status to 
Australia] US Secretary of State James Baker (Browne 1989, 15) and 
President Bush of the United States. 
For his petition Cousteau claimed to have gathered 180,000 signatures in 
France by March 1989; 1.5 million in Europe and the United States by October 
1990, and two million by June 1991. (Cousteau Society 1991, 3). The petition, 
addressed to different national governments, called upon them not to ratify 
CRAMRA, but to support a "global protection measure". Even in its early 
stages, the petition seemed to significantly influence the French Government. It 
was linked by Prime Minister Michel Rocard in March 1989 to a need the 
government had recognised to ban industrial development and permit research 
only (transcript of TF1, "Questions A Domicile", 24/4/89). 
Following the fortunately-timed Paris ATCM, where ATCPs' divisions came 
into the open and Cousteau appeared close to French Government figures, he 
planned a lobbying effort of the four countries most resistant to change, the US, 
Britain, Argentina and Chile, employing two foundation officials full-time on 
the lobbying task as well. The foundation maintained a formal distance from 
other environmental promotion NG0s, although unofficial linkages were clear. 
In one media campaign Captain Cousteau took six children - one from each 
continent - to Antarctica in January 1990, where he filmed and then televised the 
result. Upon settlement of the environment protocol, the society claimed pride 
in being at the forefront of the debate. Since settlement of the protocol, it has 
less interest in Antarctica. It attended the 1990/1 SCMs and ATCM as an NGO 
member of the French delegation and also took part in a fact-finding mission by 




Membership:  The Cousteau Society claims a grassroots membership. 
However membership confers few policy control benefits, if any. Although 
supporters' numbers are high, their involvement is more passive than some 
other environmental promotion NG0s. 
Resources control: Direct control of policy remained with one central 
charismatic figure who made a public appeal for support and conducted the 
foundation's campaign in high level political lobbying, self-financed, and 
government provided publicity exercises. 
RELATIONSHIPS 
ATS standing:  The Cousteau Society's formal interest in the ATS has been 
largely confined to the period under study when its representatives joined 
French Government delegations. 
External activities:  The Cousteau Society takes an interest in maritime 
environmental issues on a range narrower than the large global groups, but the 
presence of a charismatic figurehead can allow a high level of international 
entree. 
International Association of Antarctic Tour Operators (IAATO) 
The International Association of Antarctic Tour Operators is probably the 
most recently formed Antarctic NGO; it is also one of the more strategically 
directed. It is the first case of an industry non-state actor being specifically 
formed to act in the ATS. IAATO was formally convened in 1991 with seven 
members initially. In July 1992 another six joined. Its membership is weighted 
heavily toward the US, from whence most Antarctic tourists come. It has a 
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part-time executive secretary whose main employment is with one of the major 
operator members. 
Since as early as ATCM IV a series of measures have been introduced to 
regulate tourism in Antarctic; these measures being aimed at protecting both the 
tourists and the local environment. By April 1991, Antarctic tourists numbered 
approximately 3,500 passengers per year, most of the visitors were ship-borne, 
and the impetus towards the formation of IAATO was growing. The way that 
IAATO's executive secretary, Ms Melissa Folks, put it was: "four tour 
operators got together in the 1988-9 seasons and drafted joint guidelines for 
operating in Antarctica. Then gradually more and more operators have become 
active, and we felt the need to speak with one voice. So it wasn't the 
governments asked us to form one group. I guess you could say it was the 
industry." (Folks interview 1992) 
There is no doubt however that the industry was strongly urged to form an 
association, particularly by the U.S. Government, from whose country the 
tourists were mainly sourced, at a time when operators recognised imperatives 
likely to be imposed upon the industry by a surge in environmentalist strength. 
The matter was brought into the open at a meeting of the Pacific Asia Travel 
Association in Bali in April 1991. "The Environment Protocol's approach to 
tourism is now taking shape," said Mr Jack Talmadge, of the US Antarctic 
Research Program on a video presentation to the conference. "The question 
currently under negotiation is: will the world choose to govern Antarctic tourism 
through an adversarial system of regulation and bureaucratic oversight? Or will 
we build on the success of US interaction with its Antarctic tour operators? 
This relationship includes: government-industry co-operation, the education of 
tourists and persuasion backed by strong federal law.. .The US co-operative 
model." (Talmadge 1991). 
PATA established an Antarctic Fund "to promote senstivity and awareness of 
Antarctica", with a proposal that funding could be primarily by a levy on tour 
sales to Antarctica. PATA also met in August 1991 to discuss further the 
proposed IAATO. There it was agreed to present an industry position paper to 
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XVI ATCM and to explore representation at the Bonn meeting. IAATO did 
attend Bonn, where it was an external observer unrecognised by the system 
although the IGO, the World Tourism Organisation, was formally given 
observer status, At a special ATCM on tourism immediately before XVII 
ATCM in Venice, IAATO gained observer status. 
While IAATO is perhaps the most prominent industry NGO in the ATS, it is 
not the only one. Mention may be made here of another that has shown serious 
interest in the ATS. The Japan Deep Sea Trawlers Association strongly 
influences its national delegation to CCAMLR, and with Japan one of the big 
two Antarctic fishing nations, this is a matter of some consequence. A 
CCAMLR insider describes the JDSTA as an ever-present pressure on that 
delegation. "No other country is so concerned about the confidentiality of their 
commercial interests," the source said. According to the JDSTA representative 
at CCAMLR XI in 1992, Mr Take Takahashi, the association is a small 




Membership: IAATO has a small, closed membership confined to specialist 
commercial enterprises in the field of Antarctic tourism. It attempts to represent 
such specialists, but not all belong. 
Resources control: Self-financing from members, it can maintain close control 
over resources and specifically aims to promote an industry position. 
RELATIONSHIPS 
ATS standing: IAATO gained observer status at ATCMs. 
External activities: The political focus if IAATO is inward to the ATS. It has an 
insignificant international political standing, but may be recognised as an 
authority by others in the tourism industry. 
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Friends of the Earth International (FOE)  
The third of the 'big three' environmental promotional ING0s, FOE has in 
recent years largely left the running on Antarctic issues to Greenpeace. In earlier 
years of environmentalism FOE was significant among several contributors 
who took an interest in representing itself the politics of the continent. Later it 
gave a key supporting role to ASOC, and in the most active phase of 1988-91, 
it played an important role again in raising grassroots campaigns. But it should 
be noted that FOE has largely eschewed direct interaction with the ATS. 
In the late 1970s it was active in promoting concepts of protection for the 
continent such as its designation as a "Wilderness Area", outlined in "World  
Law and the Last Wilderness", by K.D.Suter and published by FOE in Sydney. 
This proposed what the author described as a "multi-system approach" to the 
Antarctic, concerned with protecting the complete environment. For the next 
decade FOE largely faded to the background of the Antarctic debate. However 
resources it provided to aid the Antarctic Secretariat in Washington DC, and to 
the publication of the NGO periodical ECO, showed it was prepared to maintain 
at least an interest in events. Its third phase of involvement came in 1989 when 
FOE joined in the "Group of 10" US national-based NGOs who determined to 
band together in opposition to CRAMRA, and in support of the environmental 
initiative. 
Other NGOs like FOE who have come and gone over the years after taking 
an interest in Antarctica include the US-based Environmental Defense Fund, 
the British-based information clearing house Earthscan, and the previously 
mentioned International Institute for Environment and Development (UK) 
ASSESSMENT 
STRUCTURE 
Membership: Commensurately high with other major environmental 
promotional NG0s, FOE is strongest in specific European nations and in North 
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America. 
Resources control: It has extensive international finances and resources directed 
at grassroots lobbying. 
RELATIONSHIPS 
ATS recognition: FOE's involvement with the ATS has been limited. Usually 
taking on a supportive role to other NG0s, it has no recognition by the ATS 
and has not sought any direct role, neither as delegation member, observer, nor 
external activist. 
External linkages: FOE's external standing internationally is high profile in 
many Western countries and covers a range of environmental interests. 
Nationally-oriented NGOs active on Antarctica.  
Apart from the fore-mentioned NGOs who are all international in their 
operations and activities as non-state actors in Antarctic politics, there is a suite 
of national-based NGOs who have come and gone over the years from the 
scene. Though there is a clear limit to their relevance to a study examining 
direct interactions with the ATS, some of these are worthy of mention not only 
for their indirect inputs to the system, but also because as the national 
representatives of INGO efforts they provide a measurement of the strength of 
political outputs of the ATS. In the former case they may, for example, provide 
delegation NGO representatives, or resources to support them. In the latter they 
may agree to campaign at a national level on behalf of INGOs who have 
brought back decisions from their interactions with the ATS. 
These national-based NGOs include the Sierra Club and The Wilderness 
Society [USA]; the peak Environment and Conservation Organisation [ECO-
NZ], and in Australia the Australian Conservation Foundation, Fund For 
Animals and Antarctic Defence Coalition - both now subsumed. In order to 
illustrate the individual roles of national organisations, an example has been 
chosen for brief study and inclusion in measurements of strength and influence. 
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This example has also been chosen because it represents the emergence of an 
NGO that is not part of the First World, the place where most come from. 
Commite Nacional Pro Defensa De la Fauna Y Flora (CODEFF)  
CODEFF is a Chilean membership NGO with no reliance on government 
funding, independent of any religious or political affiliation, and not receiving 
specific support of any government organisation (Verscheure, 1992). "We 
operate on several levels; we lobby a lot, work through communications with 
the public and legal actions against polluters, companies and government," said 
Verscheure. "We use public action as a tool for influence, and we have a lot of 
international level contact in order to get results." 
Founded in 1968, CODEFF eventually claimed to have won a space for 
Latin-American NGOs in the debate about Antarctica in 1990. "The theme of 
the Antarctic has traditionally been seen in our country as a field of decision 
making which is only for the government, military, industrial and in some ways 
the scientific community," said CODEFF's Sandrine Fernandez at the 1990 
workshop sponsored by WWF marking the entry of these Latin-American 
NGOs into the ATS sphere. "We are interested that the non-governmental 
movement continues to take part in the generation of regional proposals and that 
they consider themselves as an actor which can contribute towards generating a 
new series of dynamics...In this regional work there are two spaces to which 
we must have access: the national parliament and the military (CODEFF 1990, 
20). As a result of that workshop a network of NGOs of Latin America was 
formed. A somewhat uncertain space was also won by CODEFF on national 
delegations representing Chile at one meeting of the XI SCM, and at ATCM 
XVI. "I can't say that we are permanent members of the delegation," said 
Verscheure. 
CODEFF is the only known South American-based NGO currently showing 
an interest in Antarctica. This is important because it demonstrates a shift away 
from the almost exclusive dominance by First World non-state actors, and thus 





Membership : Possessing a limited but open membership, it is based on activist 
groups in Chile. 
Resources control:  Its control over policy development is asserted to be 
independent, and it claims a total membership financial support base 
RELATIONSHIPS 
Recognition by ATS:  CODEFF is taking part in national delegations and 
extending its links to other South American NG0s. 
External activities : Outside the Antarctic world, CODEFF appears to focus on 
many other national issues and take a broad regional interest in the environment. 
(V) COMPARING THE RELATIVE STRENGTHS OF NGOs  
ACTIVE IN THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM  
To reiterate: the purposes of the preceding analysis have been to assemble 
NGOs who had a significant linkage with the ATS during the period of the case 
study, and assess their qualities against common criteria. Using these criteria, 
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(VI) CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS  
In order to understand better the role of non-state actors in the ATS, we can 
draw some initial conclusions about qualities held in common or separately by 
the above NG0s. These conclusions are worth keeping in mind as this thesis 
proceeds with its case study, which should illuminate how these qualities were 
in fact used, in the period under examination. Recalling the discussion earlier in 
this chapter about the measurement of these NGOs' strength as independent 
actors, we remember that one of the main focuses of interest is upon their likely 
capacity to exercise autonomy. The other is upon their prospects for possessing 
legitimacy with publics either in the ATS and/or the world outside. 
Firstly on the issue of STRUCTURES, it is strikingly clear that most of the 
NGOs in question possess great control over their resources; they have that all 
important quality described earlier in this thesis: a self-contained decision 
making process. With such resources at hand most of these NGOs have the 
capacity to dismiss claims that they act as arms of state or other actors. Specific 
issue promotional environment groups are prominent in this respect, no matter 
what their spheres of operation. The centrally-directed policy of the "big three" 
environmental promotion NGOs [FOE, Greenpeace and WWF], together with 
their extensive apparatuses and finances, mean they would in theory have a high 
degree of resource capacity and flexibility to impact on a debate. 
In counterpoint to these non-state actors, the NGOs dependent upon others 
for their resources might on the face of things have a question mark over their 
autonomy. But it is interesting to note what a mixed bag is this group with 
limited independent resources. The scientists' SCAR, industry's IAATO, and 
the environmentalists' vehicle ASOC all have places. Each wholly depends on 
other sources for funding and policy development; apparently possessing little 
personnel or material to let it act autonomously in a political environment. 
Marginally better placed is WRI, which also depends to a significant extent on 
government funding. But clearly resource dependence is not an overwhelming 
factor either. For example, we know ASOC was a central actor in the period 
under review. ASOC's direct linkage to the well-endowed "big three" gives it, 
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if not strict autonomy, certainly ability to act as agent for the more autonomous. 
Likewise IAATO is a direct vehicle for industry. Only SCAR, though it claims 
independence of action from the governmental sources of its funding, appears 
truly dependent when measured on a resources score. 
In considering membership structures, it is worth noting the wide variety of 
constituencies claimed by these NG0s. Obviously the claimants of the widest 
popular support are the large multi-national environment promotional groups, 
and their near relatives confined to specific geographic areas. When combined 
with a high level of control over resources, this theoretically would make them 
formidable actors, able to claim widespread public legitimacy. 
Not so the more "expert" groups such as SCAR, WRI and IAATO, which 
can be regarded as having exclusive membership lists confined to specific 
professional or business attributes, and totally lacking popular support. Their 
voices are more likely to be significant before some circumscribed specialist 
audiences and in some theatres. By the same token their external legitimacy with 
the general public is lower. If this comes on top of a lack of resources, their 
capacity to act independently would be further constricted. 
Falling in between, and of particular note, are those actors with aggregate 
memberships: IUCN which is composed of other NGOs and governmental 
representatives, and ASOC. IUCN's acknowledged position between the state 
and non-state worlds is reflected by this, while ASOC is a coalition claiming to 
be freely open to other organisations, but really more likely to be the province 
of an expert core of NGO members who use it as a common vehicle. The 
constituency from which each of these organisations can derive their legitimacy 
is therefore much more circumscribed. However what makes them different 
from SCAR is that they have a resource capacity behind them. 
When it comes to assessing RELATIONSHIPS, the expected widespread 
focus of activities of the "big three" environmental promotion NGOs and IUCN 
appear to emphasise their strength as international actors. Also up there is WRI, 
a much different actor, nevertheless possessing a wide range of interests 
external to the ATS. It is interesting to see how and whether this is used in the 
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politics of the case study. The nature of the Cousteau Society and CODEFF 
makes them more limited players, restricted to some areas of the globe in the 
case of Cousteau, and to national boundaries in the latter case. Lowest on the 
scale naturally come the Antarctic specialist trio of SCAR, ASOC and IAATO. 
Their limited external Profile is emphasised by this position. The question that 
arises for the case study is, which proves more valuable in influencing the 
course taken by the ATS: close links with the system itself, or with the outside 
world? 
The place of Antarctic specialists close to the heart of the treaty system is also 
apparent on the measurement of ATS standing. Emerging in a singularly 
interesting position is IUCN. IUCN not only has an observer's seat, it has 
repeatedly devoted some resources to functional tasks hand-in-hand with the 
system. Clearly a much closer functional role has been claimed by SCAR; the 
closest of all NGOs to the regime. But IUCN's position demonstrates the close 
involvement of one NGO broadly based outside the system 
Of potentially greater importance is this grid's measurement that some of the 
apparently strong environment promotional NGOs are barely recognised by the 
ATS. The question that arises from this is one of the most fundamental to be 
considered in this thesis, and draws on the earlier measurements. Given that 
these environment promotion NGOs [such as Greenpeace, Cousteau and 
CODEFF as a representation of national NG0s1 possess a great degree of 
resource control, have widely popular memberships and are active on a range of 
external fronts, they can make claims to great autonomy of action and public 
legitimacy. What difference does it make if they play no recognised part in the 
activities of the ATS? Is it more important for these non-state actors that they 
bring to bear their strengths in a broader international context, to change the 
way the regime itself operates? And what does this say about the regime's 
approach to these actors and the likelihood of it achieving successes against 
their campaigning? Answers will emerge in the following case study. Now 
having documented and catalogued the "heretics" of the non-state world, we 
move on to the execution of their doctrines. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
A CASE STUDY (1) 
THE RISE OF ENVIRONMENTALISM, 
AND OF THE CONVENTION TO 
REGULATE ANTARCTIC MINERAL 
RESOURCE ACTIVITIES 
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(I) CHAPTER INTRODUCTION  
A case study has been selected in order to test the strength of non-state actors 
in their interactions with governments in the Antarctic Treaty System. The case 
study covers the period up to and including the negotiation of the minerals 
regime, CRAMRA, and its subsequent replacement by the Protocol on 
Environment Protection, the Madrid Protocol. 
Lessons learned from this case study should given an insight into a general 
exercise of power by non-state actors in international regimes, how they try to 
gain public legitimacy and use that to enforce their views over state actors. It 
should shed light on weaknesses inherent in these regimes, and on frailties in 
the non-state actors themselves. Evidence should be found in the case study to 
show which attributes of individual non-state actors prove helpful to their 
cause, and which are a hindrance. Likewise there may be an insight into which 
linkages, both with the regime and the external world, prove valuable in 
influencing the course of events. These directions mean the case study should 
not be seen as a comprehensive history of the era under scrutiny, but as an 
attempt to shed light on its outcome. 
This chapter deals with the first of two phases in an era divided by the time 
line of the signing of CRAMRA. This division has been made because of the 
clear separation in the dynamics of the periods under study. In the first era, 
political decision-making was almost exclusively the domain of government 
participants in the CRAMRA negotiation process; there were few publicly 
recognised non-government inputs to the process. In the second phase, the 
democratic process became available for use by NGOs in a manner not hitherto 
possible. The non-government inputs had a new level on which to operate; one 
which is dealt with in the subsequent chapter. 
This chapter shows how one particular group of non-state actors, 
environment promotion NG0s, began to engage themselves in a contest with 
the governments of the ATS over the fundamental future direction of Antarctic 
governance. It endeavours to put this in a context with external political 
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influences of the time, examine how these NGOs began to campaign, what 
strategies they used inside the ATS, how they endeavoured to grow a public 
campaign, and how governments reacted. 
(II) THE GLOBAL CONTEXT 
From the early 1970s, international environmental politics flowered. A 
critical event in placing this change on the international agenda was the United 
Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, in 1972. By the 
1980s environmental issues had escalated in importance in global politics. One 
barometer of this change was a series of annual reports published from 1984 
by the Worldwatch Institute, a New York-based organisation advising the UN 
Environment Program. It found that initially, international environmental issues 
were confined to local transboundary concerns such as discussions on acid rain 
between the United States and Canada, or pollution of internationally shared 
rivers like the Rhine in Europe. By 1990, Worldwatch's project director Lester 
Brown concluded, genuinely global issues such as ozone depletion, climate 
change and the preservation of biological diversity had attracted the attention of 
national political leaders and the international community. "Environmental 
security issues now share the stage with more traditional economic and military 
concerns, inaugurating a new age of environmental diplomacy." (Brown 1990, 
17) 
This extraordinary explosion of interest was quantified in a 1986 UN poll in 
14 disparate countries - rich and poor, East and West, North and South. It 
found in every area alarm about the state of the environment. The reasons for 
this finding were emphasised by UNEP's World Commission on Environment 
and Development, which published the Brundtland Commission's report "Our 
Common Future" in 1987. The commission's secretary -general, James 
MacNeill, affirmed that in the latter years of the decade, environmental issues 
had become "deadly serious. A sea change in public opinion has forced them to 
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the top of the political agendas in the United Nations. ..and in capitals around 
the globe." (MacNeill 1989-90, 13) 
In line with this global perspective, there was a change in public perceptions 
of Antarctica. In the mid-seventies a typical menu of Antarctic issues gathered 
in a standard global environmental issues handbook - Ehrlich's "Population, 
Resources and Environment" - included past issues such as whaling and 
sealing together with the domestic agenda of garbage disposal and the escape of 
station dogs, and raised the prospect of future mineral exploration. (Ehrlich 
1977, 169). This agenda began to change early in the 1980s, and by the middle 
of the decade altered rapidly so that Antarctica began to enter the general 
public's perceptions in a most dramatic way. 
The revelation by British Antarctic Survey scientists in 1985 of large losses 
of total ozone in Antarctica (Farman 1985,79) immediately gripped 
international attention. When subsequent scientific research formally linked the 
discovery to the production of CFCs, an existing international discussion on the 
control of these chemicals under the United Nations Environment Program 
intensified. A "hole" in the earth's upper atmosphere, photographed by satellite, 
was presented as a visual image through the news media. As a result, Antarctica 
immediately came home as an issue to the public at large. 
Running in tandem with ozone depletion was the issue of global warming. 
Extant for many years before the 1980s, it became much more prominent 
globally during this decade, with greater resources devoted to it. Antarctica's 
huge physical attributes: the role of its ice cover as a heat sink and climate 
generator; and the speculated cost in sea level change of perturbation in the ice 
sheet's mass balance, meant that it became central to the issue of global 
warming. The continent and surrounding waters came to be seen both as a 
source of scientific information about the composition of the globe in the past 
and present; and a determinant of our future. Commentators suggested these 
two major issues represented very rare environmental crises. "Greenhouse 
gases and ozone depletion have brought Antarctic research into high public 
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profile and created, rather suddenly, a trans-national perspective on human 
fate." (Suter 1991, 118) 
This abbreviated survey sketches a scene of rising global imperatives during 
the period of the case study. It is important to understand that political 
interactions of the time are taking place against this background, which would 
normally be considered to give birth to, and nurture the cause of environmental 
pressure groups as years passed and issues became more pressing. As theorists 
cited earlier in this work said, environmental NGOs personify political vitality, 
being in a state of flux with the rise of issues (Lador-Lederer 1962, 59) and 
[importantly for the latter part of this case study,] coalescing on an ad hoc basis 
when immediate questions erupt (Boardman 1981, 6). 
In the decades under examination, political theorists and diplomats responded 
to such a change in global perspective with the development of theories and 
practice of the "global commons" and "common heritage of mankind". The 
political scientist Garrett Hardin made popular the idea that a shared global 
resource could be considered in the same way as a Middle Ages village 
common ground, where ownership of a space could be held by no-one, but 
regulation was needed to avoid over-exploitation. (Hardin 1968, 1243) 
As the UN's Law of the Sea Conference proceeded from 1967, a similar 
view that the seas were the common heritage of mankind to be exploited by all 
was put forward, particularly by Malta's Arvid Pardo. At the Third UN Law of 
the Sea Conference in 1975, this notion was also applied to Antarctica when its 
president, Hamilton Shirley Amerasinghe of Sri Lanka, described Antarctica as 
"an area of the planet where opportunities remain for constructive and peaceful 
co-operation on the part of the international community for the common good of 
all, rather than the benefit of a few. (Beck 1986, 279). This was echoed in 
1977 by Christopher Pinto, also a Sri Lankan UNCLOS diplomat, who spoke 
of the need for an Antarctic regime to "secure optimum benefits for mankind as 
a whole" (Beck 1986, 280). UNCLOS was a significant influence on 
international perceptions of Antarctica. At its conclusion in 1982 Ghazali Shafie 
of Malaysia urged delegates to focus their attention on another area of common 
interest... ."I refer to Antarctica, where immense potentialities exist for the 
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benefit of all mankind." (Beck 1986, 284) 
The importance of the common heritage debate during the 1970s to this 
analysis of NGO power rests in the way that the debate helped set parameters 
for the later discussion outside the ATS of Antarctica's governance on behalf of 
the international community. It introduced the idea of open participation in 
contrast to the closed control exerted previously by the ATS. In the promotion 
of this, states were the principal actors. The role of environment promotion 
non-state actors in these early years was offstage. The exceptions were few, 
and illustrative of their lack of influence. In 1957, for example, an American 
NGO called the Commission for the Organization of Peace published a little 
regarded report which made a plea for an international, common resource 
exploitation regime for Antarctica, to be administered by the UN. (Zou Keyuan 
1991, 180). In 1977 the press conference at which Pinto commented was 
organised by the British-based International Institute for Environment and 
Development (IIED), one of the few NGOs to give Antarctic issues passing 
consideration at the time. 
(III) EARLY APPROACHES TO THE ATS BY NGOs  
The first ambitious challenge by an environmental promotion NGO to the 
hegemony of the ATS over the continent probably came in 1972 with a 
proposal that emerged from IUCN advocating the creation of a world park for 
the continent. In the same year as the Stockholm declaration, and in what 
appears to be much the same spirit as its Resolution 38 for states to set aside 
ecosystems of international significance, IUCN prepared a paper on Antarctica. 
Previously IUCN' s only interest in Antarctica had acknowledged the control 
of the ATS. In resolution 7.6 of July 1960 at Warsaw, IUCN urged the treaty 
parties to set aside inviolable areas for the conservation of the unique polar 
fauna and its natural environment (IUCN 1991, 74). But in 1972 the IUCN 
secretariat asked an American councillor and academic, Raymond Dasmann, to 
prepare a paper on Antarctica. Dasmann, an ecologist, already had written 
another paper on the conservation of Antarctica for the US National Science 
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Foundation. 
His new work advocated the creation of a world park to delegates from 80 
countries meeting at the Second World Conference on National Parks co-
sponsored by IUCN at Yellowstone-Grand Teton in Wyoming, USA. 
Recommendations of this conference proposed a relinquishment of ATS 
control: "that nations party to the Antarctic treaty should negotiate to establish 
the Antarctic continent and the surrounding seas as the first world park, under 
the auspices of the United Nations." (Recc.5) According to Dasmann, the 
phrase "world park" had been discussed for some time."The idea of world park 
for Antarctica seemed to make sense because it had all the claimants to it, but no 
specific country really controlled or owned any part of it. It was already being 
managed as an international preserve as such; it already was. It was not a big 
step to be moving towards world park." (Dasmann interview, 1993) Despite the 
modesty of this view, others say in retrospect that what was proposed at 
Yellowstone was something quite bold. "ElUCNI didn't really deal with things 
outside national boundaries in those years," said ASOC's Jim Barnes. "And 
Ray introduced this resolution which was passed unanimously at the 
congress.. .This resolution was really quite avant garde." (Barnes interview, 
1992) 
Be that as it may, not much seemed to happen as a result. Dasmarm said it 
raised very little comment. "Like most things presented at technical sessions of 
• the IUCN general assembly, you hear nothing about it afterwards unless you 
publish it." (Dasmann interview 1993.) IUCN sent notes to the treaty parties 
drawing their attention to the recommendation but received no formal response. 
(Mitchell 1983, 82.) The idea was abroad for the first time nonetheless, and 
though it was left on the shelf by IUCN when it moved onto other areas of 
Antarctic work, it was available for others to pick up, dust off, and use. 
Later in the decade Barnes did just that. "It seemed like exactly the right 
phrase," he was to recall in 1992. "You look for a phrase that has...a resonance 
with the public at large, and you look for a phrase that captures the imagination 
and allows you to fill it with certain specific content, so to speak." (Barnes 
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interview, 1992). This awareness by Barnes of the publicity value of such a 
phrase is worthy of emphasis. It shows the direct appeal to the public that an 
environment promotion NGO has in mind. Barnes's idea of filling it with a 
content also indicates a speed and flexibility of action unavailable to states acting 
together in a formal international regime where words and phrases customarily 
have precise diplomatic meanings, to avoid confusion and costly mistakes. 
This was not the case with the world park idea, which was sometimes 
proposed only in a hazy, general sense. An example of this change was over the 
issue of UN control. Certainly to Dasmann it was explicit. But over the next 
two decades, NGOs took the idea of an over-arching environment protection 
regime through several other metamorphoses in which ATS control was 
explicit. In many ways then, "world park" came to encapsulate an attempt by 
these NGOs to exercise what Willetts called earlier in this work the unique 
strength of pressure groups to rapidly transmit political ideas. (Willetts 1982, 
194) 
When next the proposal was raised, by Barnes in 1979, it was in a letter to 
President Carter signed by 20 representatives of prominent US and other 
environment groups. It advocated a "World Preserve" to he agreed by ATCPs 
as the best means of avoiding potential conflict over minerals exploitation. This 
would involve a ban on exploration and exploitation that might be permanent or 
for a significant number of years, allowing for consensus termination thereafter. 
(Barnes 1982, 77.) The initiative was not picked up by the US. The importance 
of this attempt lies in the transfer of the world park idea from the less active 
forum of the IUCN to activist environmentalists. Neither was much attention 
paid in 1980 when Barnes followed up with another letter to President Carter 
asking him to direct the State Department to analyse carefully benefits that 
would result from "acting to protect Antarctica as World Preserve or World 
Heritage, or in some other appropriate way." Similar letters from NGOs went to 
other heads of state around the time of the signing of the Antarctic fisheries 
regime, CCAIVILR, when it was clear that a minerals regime would be the next 
preoccupation of the ATS. 
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Such letters went from ASOC to treaty governments, but in the words of 
Barnes, "were ignored" (Barnes interview, 1992). Although they may have 
served to keep the NGOs and issues concerned in the minds of bureaucrats to 
whom they were eventually destined, there is no evidence that they reached a 
wider general audience. Their role from a historical perspective seems merely to 
illustrate an embryo lobbying campaign where the world park idea was being 
developed. The correct name itself was still being settled, through interchange: 
"world park", "world heritage" and "world preserve". 
It was not until 1981 that NGOs managed again to bring it before the IUCN 
forum, when it was raised in front of the 15th IUCN General Assembly in 
Christchurch. The Australian Conservation Foundation put forward a motion 
approved by the assembly that: 
.recognised the "paramount importance to mankind of [Antarctica's] great 
wilderness qualities [para 1]; 
. recalled the 1972 world park proposal and other protective designations 
[para 91; 
. recommended ATCPs ascribe to the Antarctic environment such a 
designation [para 11c]; 
. urged that no minerals regime be brought into operation without full 
consideration of protecting the Antarctic environment completely from 
minerals activity. [para 13] (Barnes 1982, 61) 
The passage of this resolution marked the active emergence of a world park 
incorporating a mining ban onto the international environmental non-state 
agenda. It is worth noting that this was agreed even though the IUCN forum 
included the representatives of .11 ATCPs (Harris 1984, 320), IUCN voting 
rules giving strength within the forum to the vastly more numerous NG0s. The 
following year, NGOs spread this message further among their community at a . 
UNEP forum in Nairobi. Encouraged by individuals such as the Australian 
Keith Suter, a resolution was passed by the forum calling for a special UN 
conference on Antarctica to assess its management in the interests of all nations, 
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and requested both ATCPs and the UN to give serious consideration to 
"declaring Antarctica a World Park in recognition of its inestimable value to 
humankind and its status as a global commons." (Barnes 1982, 64). Also in 
1981 the Third World Parks Congress in Bali, under the aegis of IUCN, 
supported "an internationally protected area designation" for Antarctica 
(Friends of the Earth 1983a, 2). 
Such resolutions as these three served to raise questions among a wider 
audience about state actors' monopoly on Antarctic politics. It showed the 
environmental NGOs willing to look for a wider audience in pursuit of their 
aims, a decision that should have rung alarm bells among the ATCPs. Different 
nuances contained in these resolutions showed how the debate was developing 
in these forums with a flexibility unavailable to state actors. As a result, states 
of the ATS were being served notice that external influences were now taking 
an interest in the future of their domain, at a time when they themselves were 
embarking on the most difficult task they had faced: agreeing on a regime for 
the exploitation of minerals. 
Some states in the ATS had developed ideas of their own for an innovative 
international environmental status for Antarctica, but these had been rejected by 
the regime. At ATCM I in Canberra 1961 the British delegation called for 
recognition of Antarctica as a nature reserve, and in negotiations for the 1964 
Agreed Measures on the Conservation of Flora and Fauna it was at one stage 
suggested by the Soviet delegation that Antarctica be declared an "International 
Wild Life Reserve". (Rothwell 1990, 10). But the only attempt by a single state 
to carry through the spirit of the original IUCN world park resolution was 
carried out by New Zealand in 1975. It approached ATCM VIII in Oslo with 
the view that Antarctic mineral resources were of widespread international 
interest, and exploitation could seriously damage the environment there. "It was 
against this background that the New Zealand delegation. ..advocated a policy 
designed to preserve Antarctica as a world park, free from commercial activity. 
As with the earlier effort to achieve a temporary moratorium, an absolute 
prohibition on the exploitation of resources proved unacceptable to our other 
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treaty partners. But as a result of the New Zealand lead, it is probably fair to say 
that a notice [sic] of real environmental concern was injected into the 
discussions for the first time." (Talboys 1978, 33) 
This understates the proposal put forward by the New Zealanders. It is said 
to have contained a package deal proposal for a minerals activity ban, UN 
administration and relinquishment of all territorial claims. (Hay, Hemmings and 
Thom 1990, 76.) There appears to be no documentation about this proposal in 
the ATS's official records. It apparently was proposed informally and possible 
even at the preparatory meeting rather than the ATCM itself. (Jackson 
interview, 1993.) Whatever the case, backing for it from other treaty parties at 
the time appears to have been minimal. Hindsight says its importance was two-
fold: it was a sign that ATCPs did not want to let go their control to others 
outside the "club" of their regime, and it helped to set New Zealand on a path 
toward taking a key role in negotiations for the state-based solution to the 
difficulties minerals problem: a new controlling regime. In this NZ decision, the 
diplomat Christopher Beeby was credited with changing his country's course 
and he was later to become the chairman of the minerals talks. 
One leading NGO campaigner saw this change of path as illuminating well 
the political approach of non-state actors. "It was a major difference of 
assessment," said the campaigner Cath Wallace of ASOC NZ. "He looked at 
the political reality and said 'no, it won't wash, we'll have to go to the next 
option'. He took that as the parameters whereas NGOs said right, we have to 
change the way governments think. We have to change this political reality, and 
that's what NGOs are all about." (Wallace interview, 1992) This comment 
goes to the heart of the campaigning approach of specific issue promotion non-
state actors, whose aim is bringing pressure to bear on the entrenched direction 
of a state-based regime. 
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(IV) ESTABLISHMENT OF A CAMPAIGN 
The formal commencement of the minerals regime negotiations in June 1982 
at Wellington marks a useful point at which to analyse the next phase of 
development of the world park concept. It offered the NGOs for the first time 
the opportunity to formally lobby the ATS when it was specifically focussed on 
this issue. But first it is worth examining which non-state actors geared up their 
campaign, what they comnunicated to the wider public, and how Antarctic state 
actors reacted. 
ASOC had begun to make its presence felt in the concluding stages of the 
CCAMLR negotiations in May 1980, lobbying treaty meetings to encourage the 
ecosystem approach the regime eventually adopted. In Britain, the United States 
and Australia, environmental promotion NGOs had begun to build a knowledge 
base about Antarctic campaigns. An example of their approach comes from the 
early anti-minerals campaigner Michael Kennedy, then based with FOE and a 
subsequent short-lived incarnation in Australia called Fund for Animals. 
"Clearly we had to start planning for a way to stop the inevitable," said 
Kennedy. "We decided we were going to have to kill this (minerals regime) one 
way or another. The experience we gained through CCAMLR, the ATCMs and 
ASOC meant we had to utilise all those skills and knowledge very quickly to 
ensure we got a good running start when the negotiations began." (Kennedy 
interview, 1993.) Note particularly his recollection of the task of non-state 
actors in their approach to dealing with a state-based issue. "I must say in terms 
of general lobbying, it's often easier to kill something than to build something." 
(Kennedy interview, 1993). When state actors are engaged in the often 
tortuous task of consensus building, they are susceptible to the kind of 
pressure from NGOs that Young observed: pressure bringing to light internal 
contradictions which can lead to serious failures. (Young 1989a, 95) 
Meanwhile the increasingly environmentally aware general public was being 
addressed through a variety of mass audience publications: World Law and the  
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Last Wilderness (Suter 1979); Antarctica, No Single Country, No Single  
Sea (Bond, Siegfried and Johnson 1979); Antarctica: Wilderness at Risk  
(Brewster, 1982); and Let's Save Antarctica! (Barnes 1982). Writers were 
beginning to communicate what they saw as environmental dangers facing the 
continent, and the need for campaigning to address those risks. The first-named 
book is a good example of their approach. In its foreword Jacques Cousteau 
praised the ATS and advocated declaration of "humankind's first International 
Park". Following this the author makes a direct appeal. "Environmental 
groups should start campaigning now for the maintenance of a total ban forever 
on all exploitation of non-living resources. There should be an international 
recognition of the need to preserve the Antarctic's fragile environment...No 
commercial exploitation of non-living resources should take place." (Suter 
1979, 78.) He asserted that already NGOs around the world were taking an 
increasing interest in the Antarctic, by such activities as auditing government 
behaviour, educating the people, encouraging governmental responses, and 
using the mass media. 
Barnes's Let's Save Antarctica! perhaps best exemplified the rallying cry 
tone of environmental campaigning being brought to bear at this time. Its 
foreword was written by Sir Peter Scott who described the idea of making 
Antarctica a world park as "exciting". Then Barnes went on to say: "there has 
never been a more urgent need for people to stand up and declare their intention 
to protect this extraordinary region." It concluded: "Antarctica can become a 
symbol of hope to all people, a living reminder of human ability to preserve its 
past, present and future, and to live in harmony with nature. If Antarctica is 
saved, conservation, environmental, animal welfare groups and ordinary 
groups all over the world will have won a victory no government can ignore. It 
will be a step forward toward saving Planet Earth." (Barnes 1982, 36) 
The examples from these two books encapsulate the rhetoric, addressed to an 
environmentally aware public, that came onto the agenda at this time and was 
used repeatedly in ensuing years as environment promotion non-state actors 
worked to gather support for their cause. Antarctica was portrayed as a pristine 
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wilderness and the activities of governments in this "sacred" place were brought 
into question. The approach supports Barnes's view that NGOs looked to the 
world park image as having a resonance with the public at large, and were intent 
on filling it with a meaning of their own. It also supports Wallace's assertion 
mentioned earlier, that the path to success for NGOs lay in their unique ability 
to promote with the wider public a change in the political reality exemplified by 
the state-based regimes' control. 
Now that the world park idea was known broadly by ATS diplomats and 
members of NGO groups, a debate developed in NGO and academic circles 
about what it actually meant and whether it could work. One campaigner to 
provide a view of why it would not work as the environmentalists believed was 
Barbara Mitchell of LIED. She did believe that the "best way of barring 
exploration and exploitation throughout Antarctica would be to declare it a 
world park or preserve sui generis." (Mitchell 1983, 84) In an important 
critique she then outlined a plan by which ATCPs would take the initiative by 
declaring Antarctica a world park and then remain responsible for running the 
region, with a mining ban that might be permanent. Costs would be shared, as 
was normal, with perhaps a small UN component; the treaty would be retained 
and the whole agreement brought to the attention of the UN in the interests of 
the global community. 
This approach has striking similarities to what was decided in the eventual 
Protocol on Environment Protection. But virtually alone among NG0s, the 
LIED decided that such an approach could not work. Mitchell concluded at the 
start of the minerals negotiations that a world park would not succeed for 
several key reasons. The world park concept was a threat to territorial claims, 
would obstruct those who wishes to explore and exploit minerals, and gave no 
"safety net" in the form of a regime that would be in place to prevent pressure 
that might develop as a result of the collapse of a moratorium. Despite all this, 
Mitchell concluded, it was "the best guarantee of environmental protection in 
Antarctica". (Mitchell 1983, 84) 
This state-centric view of the likely failure of a world park campaign proved 
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singularly unpersuasive to other NG0s. Environmental NGOs gained an 
external footing as lobbyists at the first two sessions in Wellington of the 12 
session minerals negotiations, SCM 	and ii, June 1982 and January 1983. 
Michael Kennedy and Michael Bland [attached to WWF/Fund for Animals] 
were the only two to come from overseas to these sessions, in which the NGO 
effort was sustained by a handful of New Zealanders. But even at the first 
meeting the NGOs advocated a permanently protected wilderness and prepared 
an outline case against exploitation in economic terms (Friends of the Earth 
1982b, 2). Just as significantly, during the period covering these meetings, 
these non-state actors began to develop an overall campaigning strategy and 
analyse the ATS players. 
The strategy was based on a decision to campaign on dual fronts: firstly to 
promote world park as the ideal, and secondly to nevertheless engage in the 
minerals debate. Said Wallace: "we were intent on defeating the minerals 
convention, but if we failed to do that we couldn't just be so marginalised that 
we didn't try and influence the convention for the better." (Wallace interview, 
1993) In hindsight, this strategy proved extremely successful. 
From the start, according to Wallace, ASOC campaigners also conducted a 
political/economic analysis of the ATCPs. "We looked around to see who were 
the allies and who was the potential opposition, who might be in the middle or 
induced to move to being allies. We did quite a lot of assessments of those 
kinds." (Wallace interview, 1993) Part of the value of this process was in 
gaining an understanding of the political dynamics of the ATS, what some call 
the kaleidoscope of interests that sees ATS parties lining up in different factions 
according to the specific issue of the moment: territorial claims, conservation, 
resource users, original signatories and the like. But beyond this simple 
educative role, two important levels of strategic thought operated: the 
development of approaches toward individual countries, and of a strategy that 
involved the wider community outside the ATS. 
Wallace recalls that in Wellington the NGOs began to consider the internal 
dynamics of each country involved. In the case of New Zealand, for example, 
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she said a hegemony over Antarctic policy-making was held tightly by the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs. "One of things we set out to do was to break that, 
and bring the environmental agencies into the policy-making picture. By 
contrast in Australia, we were well aware there were different agencies taking 
different position and there wasn't necessarily a single view." (Wallace 
interview, 1993) 
This development of a direct assault on the internal dynamics of a state 
bureaucracy was one of the striking features of the non-state approach to 
furthering its world park aims. It recalls Young's point, mentioned in the first 
chapter of this work, about the character of bureaucracies, such as foreign 
ministries which become staunch advocates for a regime they themselves have 
carved out turf in negotiating, against the interests of other bureaucracies in the 
same government. (Young 1989, 78) In this case, non-state actors clearly saw 
the imperative of engaging bureaucracies and exploiting their internal rivalries. 
On the question of how the debate should be taken outside the ATS world, 
Wallace recalled that early on during the 1982-3 period, the NGO groups who 
addressed the question of gaining world attention decided on two approaches. 
"One was to engage various sorts of constituencies in the world community [for 
example Greenpeace], and the other was to take it to the UN. We weren't 
necessarily suggesting there would be UN administration and control, but we 
felt that the issue of the administration of Antarctica, and whether it should be 
mined, had to go to the world community." (Wallace interview, 1993) 
This illustrates the general approach towards agenda-setting by these NGO 
groups. In addition, they began to flesh out what they meant by a world park. 
In 1983 Fund for Animals and ASOC prepared a 350 page document, World 
Park Assessment which was written as an Environment Impact Statement by the 
ASOC coordinator, Lyn Goldsworthy. But one should not over-state the 
coherence among NGOs on this direction. "I have to say that it took up to two 
or three years through to 1986 to actually work out what we were saying," said 
Goldsworthy. (Goldsworthy interview, 1993) 
An example of tentativeness is an argument over the use of the term "world 
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park". Michael Kennedy said that although it was always a goal, FOE was 
particularly keen not to use the phrase. "It never did us any good. If you used 
the name world park it ended discussions because [government negotiators] 
thought you were nuts. We used world park in an international public relations 
sense, but when it came to negotiating you had to talk their language, you had 
to show in practice how you would develop a conservation regime." (Kennedy 
interview, 1992) Indeed when Greenpeace first became involved, the 
organisation that was to become synonymous with world park objectives did 
not use the phrase in its contribution to the UN debate with a submission in 
1983 titled The Future of the Antarctic. Acknowledging in passing that a world 
park was being proposed by some NG0s, it favoured the protection of 
Antarctica as "an international Zone of Peace.. .A collective declaration of the 
region as a World Heritage Area by all nations may be one method of 
accomplishing this." (Greenpeace International 1983,4) 
A short time later Annette Horsier, an Australian NGO campaigner for Fund 
For Animals, went so far as to condemn the notion. "The belief that the 
minerals negotiations are likely to break down is little more than a vain hope," 
she wrote. "Coming to grips with this reality has forced a number of 
environment organisations to realise something that should have been obvious 
years ago: the volatility of the World Park concept..." (Harris 1984, 329) 
Likewise the WRI member Lee Kimball, in referring to the world park push, 
claimed nevertheless that some of its backers realised the minerals negotiations 
would continue and the next best option was a legal regime with stringent 
safeguards. (Alexander and Hanson 1984, 204). 
Such disagreements over direction serve to outline the separation that was 
developing between some of the less environmentally ambitious campaigners, 
and the environment promotion NGOs who continued to take an ideal line, 
refused to accept a next best world, and began to develop strategies to engage 
the state actors in a conflict. It is also a clear illustration of Boardman's caution 
that environmental NCrOs should not be seen as always cohesive or monolithic; 
their demands may compete and conflict. (Boardman 1981, 6) 
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(V) NGOs MOVE ON ATS FORUMS  
From SCM IV-iii in Bonn July 1983 onward these environment promotional 
NGOs escalated the campaign for a world park until it could be argued that they 
had become a force in the negotiations. This was achieved through two means 
in particular the dedication of greater resources to campaigning, and admission 
of these NGOs to the talks, a theatre from which they were previously excluded 
by state actors. 
In the first phase of the campaign there had been very little attention paid to 
the wider environmentalist public, and precious few resources devoted to that 
cause. The NGOs made engagement with the system a clear priority. After all 
there was no visible general public groundswell. Escalation of the campaign 
was seen to require the delivery of more financial and organisational resources 
and those possessed by Greenpeace International were seen as providing the 
answer. The ofganisation was approached by Jim Barnes and an FOE 
campaigner in New Zealand at the time, Roger Wilson. Their proposal put 
before the Greenpeace governing council was initially rejected as having a low 
priority, but they pressed it again and in time for SCM IV-iii, Greenpeace 
adopted it. The support it would give was fundamental to the ability of NGO 
lobbyists to attend all meetings and directly engage governments in argument, 
face to face, and to publish papers and commentaries such as in the periodical 
ECO, the only publicly available periodical offering current criticism of the 
negotiations. The dedication of resources was a key decision of increasing 
importance as the lobbyists developed personal skills and strategies over the 
ensuing period. 
Being present outside the talks was one thing. Knowing exactly what was 
going in inside was quite another. The inclusion of NGO members in national 
delegations was an important breakthrough. Until 1984, NGOs spent much of 
their time attempting to find out what was actually happening inside. Although 
Kimball of WRI was on the US delegation, her organisation was taking a 
different path and did not communicate these happenings to the environment 
promotion NG0s. 
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What changed was that in 1983/4 Australia and New Zealand agreed to put an 
environmental NGO on their delegations. "The fact that we started to get very 
accurate information fed into our strategy helped in formulating it," said 
Goldsworthy. "Later of course it became incredibly important because when it 
got to 1987-8, we knew what had gone on before. We knew the history." 
(Goldsworthy interview, 1993). This was an important concession by these 
governments and followed intensive lobbying by the NG0s. It was not to 
suggest that delegation leaders were entirely happy about having them there, but 
shows them accepting that it was, metaphorically, better to have them inside the 
tent, than outside with a knife sawing away at the ropes. It represented a clear 
recognition by these governments that in terms of these negotiations, the NGOs 
represented an important popular constituency. If the governments were to 
continue to retain legitimacy in the negotiations, then that constituency should 
be represented. 
It also raises the question: were the NGOs merely co-opted into the state-
based system? Certainly they were restricted in some ways by membership of 
delegations, for example by signing Official Secrets Acts and needing to keep 
faith with other delegation members. But campaigners say they used delegation 
membership in order to gain an exact knowledge of the course of negotiations 
for the wider ASOC campaign. They also gained greater legitimacy inside the 
ATS for their own points of view. And neither did their external campaigning 
diminish. 
NGOs' clear view of their own importance to the ATS was explained in a 
non-paper on their role distributed at SCM IV-v in Tokyo, May 1984. They told 
delegates that public participation [implicitly, NGO participation] enhanced the 
political viability of government decisions because the substantive results were 
usually better. "NCrOs are also perhaps more experienced in dealing with 
environmental issues than most of the government negotiators working on the 
minerals regime...Governments often do not seem to have the will to take 
necessary actions to deal with this continuing contradiction. Franldy, they often 
need prodding from inter-governmental organisations, non-government 
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organisations and private individuals." (ASOC 1984, 1) 
With Greenpeace's backing for the lobbying effort and the inclusion of NGO 
members on delegations, the strategy from 1984 onward began to crystallise. It 
was to block the minerals regime through a public campaign, and also block its 
construction in the negotiations: to actually attempt to make it unworkable. As 
for the public campaign - according to Goldsworthy that remained a long-term 
project, something to do if the negotiations were finalised. Then there would be 
something for the public campaign to oppose in the shape of a completed 
regime. 
"More important to us at the time was to try and block the minerals 
convention and make it unusable. That was done by utilising our NGO contacts 
and scientific team on the outside, and playing countries off against each other 
to get wording in different sections that we knew would make some countries 
say: 'oh, we're not going to bother'...and also to provide us means of causing 
problems later on." (Goldsworthy interview, 1993). 
Clearly then, these non-state actors were developing an agenda of subverting 
the state-based process. One key illustration of this method in detail emerged 
later in the final decision by Australia to abandon CRAMRA. Early in the talks, 
Wallace helped to develop an economic argument: that really the minerals 
negotiations were not about erecting a turnstile and regulating what would 
otherwise be a messy scramble for resources, their sub-text was to remove 
political and economic barriers to investment in minerals exploitation. 
According to this view, the purpose of the regime was to assign rights for 
minerals tenure. Without a regime there would be neither investment security 
nor exclusivity for the developer. Having prepared this analysis, she put it 
before a Treasury representative on the Australian delegation, who agreed. 
"That chap from Treasury was quite a conservative fellow. He said quite 
plainly that they wanted to get as much as they could, and if they didn't, it 
wasn't worth the candle. They didn't want a bar of it." (Wallace interview 
1992). "I do remember him saying in one of those conversations over several 
years: 'if we don't get what we want, we'll go for world park'. I laughed and 
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said that would be a joke and he said: 'no, I'm serious'." The point will be 
elaborated later in this thesis that the Australian Treasurer became the first 
politician in power to oppose CRAMRA when he eventually put forward 
exactly this argument. Even if the NGOs did not plant this seed, it illustrates 
clearly the pragmatism of the non-state approach in achieving an end goal. 
It is also worth emphasising Kennedy's view that departmental attitudes were 
there for the making. Bureaucratic processes provided voids to be filled, if only 
NGOs were prepared to be opportunistic. "Often enough departments were 
devoid of ideas," he said. "That's what we wanted to do; give them an idea that 
they felt comfortable with, that they could run with, framed in a certain way." 
(Kennedy interview, 1993). Surely this is a shining example of Willetts's 
dictum, that states provide vehicles for NGO achievement in the bureaucratic 
and political organs of government that may be engaged in debate. 
All of the above indicates the resources and methods used successfully by 
NGOs to become viable actors in the internal workings of the ATS minerals 
negotiations. During these early and middle years of these negotiations, NGO 
presence was just one factor, and could not have been said to have dominated 
at the expense of states controlling the ATS. But at the same time they entered 
the process. They were a constant critical presence outside meeting halls when 
delegates met around the globe; an informed presence inside some delegations; 
and a keen promoter of causes that would fit their aims and at the same time fit 
some shades of the bureaucratic point of view. 
(VI) EXTERNAL NGO CHALLENGE TO ATS LEGITIMACY  
The natural advantages available to any NGO campaigner on behalf of 
Antarctica, its romantic public appeal, were summarised clearly in 1987 by a 
British government committee. "For many NG0s, the current interest in the 
future of the Antarctic has been a wonderful opportunity. Where else can one at 
the same time question concepts of sovereignty and security, international 
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equity, the environment and the rule of international law, without regard to the 
indigenous people? Where else can the untouched beauty of the Earth be 
presented so evocatively, and the opportunity for political adventurism, or even 
mischief-making - all in the name of ideals - be so easily secured?" (Parsons 
1987, 34) 
The breadth of the non-state challenge identified here was far greater than the 
internal lobbying of the system outlined in the previous section. Outside the 
negotiating theatre, something entirely different occurred when Greenpeace 
increasingly focussed on Antarctica through the devotion of large scale 
resources to build the World Park Base and provide a linked ship-based 
presence in Antarctica, and then to carry its message into another forum, the 
United Nations. 
This Antarctic presence represented a strong overt challenge to the way 
states operated on the ice. Greenpeace actually attempted to place itself on an 
equal logistic footing with these previously unrivalled governments. A non-
state actor used its own means to make direct claims that it was a more credible 
upholder of the spirit of the Antarctic Treaty than the allegedly possessors of 
that mantle, the nation states. 
According to Roger Wilson it was always in the back of the minds of 
campaigners that, once the campaign was established, they would need to go to 
Antarctica themselves. He enumerated several reasons for doing so, such as 
establishing credibility in the debate, providing a forward platform for 
addressing the wider public, and monitoring activities of other nations. (May 
1988, 173). Other activists confirm the value of this strategy. "The key was 
being there. Antarctica is a frontier setting - no laws, no nothing. And your 
opinion about it doesn't count for much with some treaty nations if you aren't 
there. Greenpeace, a private organisation, has logged more time on the ice than 
several major countries. This makes it very difficult for anyone to dismiss our 
ideas." (Bogart and Sabella 1990, 11) 
World Park Base ideas developed during 1984 and it was at the Greenpeace 
Council meeting that year, that the budget was approved for the expedition. 
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(May 1988, 173). Greenpeace tried in 1985/6 to establish the base but was 
forced back by pack ice. It finally succeeding in fabricating the base at Cape 
Evans, Ross Island, in 1986-7. 
It was occupied year-round by successive four person teams for four years, 
before being dismantled and removed entirely. To one campaigner involved its 
ultimate purpose was to "urge forward" the declaration of Antarctica as a world 
park. (May 1988, 160). The Greenpeace expeditioners used satellite 
communications with the outside world to provide direct contact with those on 
the ice. They tried to demonstrate at the base the best environmental practice, 
and collect evidence of the environmental failings of others. This involved the 
second leg of Greenpeace's Antarctic-based effort, the use of ice-strengthened 
ships to carry out a series of eight expeditions to monitor and inspect other 
stations, particularly those in the Ross Sea and Antarctic Peninsula. 
Like the establishment of a base, regarded as a prerequisite for full entry to 
the ATS, these inspections emulated provisions of the regime in the way they 
were conducted with limited prior notice and familiarity with an inspection's 
requirements. They were an overt challenge by Greenpeace to compliance with 
the letter of the Antarctic Treaty by these governments operating in Antarctica. 
The state-based operations were almost invariably found in the inspections to 
have poorer environmental practices than either some implicit treaty standards 
permitted, or than Greenpeace was practising itself. The NGO communicated 
these failings to a wider public, fuelling its case against minerals exploitation. 
"The impact that even scientific bases are creating reinforces the belief that, if 
minerals exploitation were to take place in this pristine continent, it would spell 
disaster for wilderness and wildlife...If it is not possible for all states to observe 
established rules for human behaviour in Antarctica under present conditions, 
one must be very cynical about the future." (Greenpeace International 1988, 32) 
, Linked to this general claim of neglect by state actors, Greenpeace used a 
particularly sensitive environmental misdemeanour by one ATS member state to 
further question the strength of ATCPs to ensure compliance with the letter of 
their own rules, the Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Flora and Fauna. 
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Soon after France began constructing the Dumont d' Urville airstrip in 1983, 
Greenpeace alleged breaches of the Agreed Measures which restrict human 
interference in the environment. The NGO documented the deaths of a small 
number of penguins, the destruction of up to 1,500 eggs and disruption to 
other seabird colonies in the construction of the airstrip. "The French have been 
accused of breaching the Agreed Measures in several respects, killing native 
birds without a permit; failing to minimise harmful interference with the 'normal 
living conditions of native mammals or birds' and using explosives 'close to 
concentrations of birds and seals'." (May 1988, 136) Greenpeace alleges that 
the ATCPs have shown little will to deal with the problem. Though New 
Zealand may have made a direct representation to France, and Australia reached 
a formal determination of a breach, the issue has never been formally raised in 
an ATCM or other meeting of the system. Greenpeace has not directly linked 
the Dumont d'Urville issue with the minerals negotiations. The weight of it lies 
in the evidence of non-compliance by a state that the NGO was able to point at 
repeatedly in the years since construction began. 
A further external irritant for the ATS from Greenpeace was its decision to 
embrace the growing United Nations debate that had posed a direct challenge to 
NGOs' hegemony over the continent. It was a hazardous strategy. "It is really 
important to understand that we didn't want the UN to take over the Antarctic 
Treaty," said Goldsworthy. "We wanted the Antarctic Treaty nations to realise 
they couldn't just sit down there and do what they wanted. It was part of the 
broad public outcry, or call, for a world park." (Goldsworthy interview, 1992). 
She admits readily that NGOs did not always have total control over the 
outcome of their promotion of the issue before the UN. "There were real 
dangers in getting people excited.. .But it was definitely a strategy, and there 
were a couple of ASOC people with the specific task of spending time with UN 
people." (Goldsworthy interview, 1992) 
In the UN debate, non-ATS states led by Malaysia and Antigua-Barbuda 
continued to argue both before the General Assembly and other international 
forums that the ATCPs were unjustly claiming for themselves what belonged to 
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the whole world. Though the powerful ATCPs successfully stonewalled against 
any action in the UN, these debates continually raised issues of exclusiveness, 
and questioned their guardianship of the continent. It resulted in some major 
changes to the modus operandi of the ATS, particularly in becoming more pro-
active about providing information on its operations. In relation to the minerals 
negotiations, NGOs could take their challenge to ATS legitimacy to the main 
external forum. For example: "Greenpeace has prepared this paper to present 
an alternative path away from the exploitative course now being set by ATCPs 
towards a vision of Antarctic 'management' that is truly sustainable and in the 
interests of the international community as a whole." ( Greenpeace International 
1986, 1) Greenpeace proposed instead to the UN an Antarctic Conservation 
Convention, which would be part of the ATS and carry into practice the concept 
of world park. Necessary prerequisites were protection of wilderness values 
and wildlife, and that Antarctica was to remain a zone of science and peace 
where minerals activities would not be permitted." (Greenpeace International, 
1986, 3) 
The importance of this contribution is in the attempted undermining of the 
minerals convention it represented. A case was being put forward by an NGO at 
the nation state's main global forum for protecting Antarctica better than the 
existing neglectful ATCPs. "The World Park strategy clearly adheres to the 
spirit of Article IX [of the Antarctic Treaty providing for peaceful research and 
conservation]; resource exploitation does not." (Greenpeace International 
1986,4) 
The Greenpeace World Park Base/Antarctic voyages and the UN debate 
were vehicles that cultivated a widespread public campaign by environment 
promotion NGOs during the 1980s. But it was nowhere near a high pitch at the 
time of the adoption of CRAMRA. As was outlined at the beginning of this 
chapter, the negotiations occurred at a time when green issues generally were 
beginning to gain currency on the public agenda, but initially Antarctica was far 
from prominent. The negotiations themselves were an unspectacular process 
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involving bureaucrats and diplomats rather than politicians; and by and large the 
continent was seen as unspoiled, if it was considered at all. In addition the 
limited NGO resources in the early years were concentrated on acting in the 
process itself. But the non-state actors did not yet have a clear opportunity to 
point publicly at the "failings" of the state-based regime. 
Greenpeace's work was capitalised upon in media activities, and through the 
more grassroots activities of circulating world park petitions and notices which 
over the years attracted hundreds of thousands of signatures; by proclaiming a 
"World Park Week" each February, and in the establishment of a "World Park 
Embassy" in some capitals during the course of the negotiations. (Barnes 1987, 
256). Most publicly-focussed protest action carried out by NGOs was aimed at 
limited symbolism. Dressing protesters as penguins, unfurling banners and 
placards; this was done by a small number of people in the immediate vicinity of 
the negotiating session. The impact was limited to brief attention from the media 
of the host city and reproduction in campaign publications. But of course these 
media activities may be seen as part of what Barnes described as a "long term 
education process" by ASOC, which distributed information about these events 
world-wide through its own network. 
There also may have been a cost for Greenpeace in terms of its relationships 
with the ATS. Its efforts on the ice were seen by some as a bid by it to gain an 
official status with the system itself; the base and inspections fulfilling the kind 
of requirements faced by states. Greenpeace applied for, but was refused 
observer status at ATCM XIV, Rio de Janeiro, 1987. But a loss of legitimacy 
inside the ATS for Greenpeace can be regarded by the actor as a small price to 
pay for the effect of its other activities on the world outside. 
(VII) THE NON-STATE CHALLENGE CONSOLIDATES  
By the late 1980s there was a recognition by some figures inside the ATS 
that the non-state challenge before them could have an impact. "It is very clear 
that any refusal by the Treaty members to hear and to reason with their critics 
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could result in an upsurge of rhetoric or mischief on the part of some 
organisations," warned the British policy consultant Sir Anthony Parsons. "In 
effect consultative parties have it in their power to prevent or provoke a stronger 
reaction from the heretics. They will have to face up to the pressure that the 
NG0s, often in an informal alliance with the governments of non-member 
States, bring. It is for this reason that the modifications demanded by such 
organisations are very much a part of the mix that will determine the future of 
the area." (Parsons 1987, 36) What foresight this indicated! At the time 
though, there was no sign that the "church" of CRAMRA negotiating states 
intended to surrender any authority to the "heretics". 
As the minerals negotiations slowly continued, an additional advantage to 
non-state actors of this pace became clearer. "These long time horizons, which 
are inherent in Antarctic negotiations, are valuable to the parties involved. Non-
state actors also prefer long time horizons for two primary reasons. The first is 
that time provides these groups with more opportunities to gain admission to the 
negotiations. ..The second is that time can be constructively utilised to 
demonstrate their capabilities and knowledge to other groups and states, thereby 
improving their credibility." (Child 1988, 210) 
The absence of organised countervailing pressures against these NGOs was 
also giving them something of a free ride. Mining advocates were almost 
entirely absent from delegations at a time when the exploitation of Antarctic 
minerals was seen as technologically and economically improbable for the 
medium to long term, if ever. Other non-state actors who may have put 
environmental NGOs to a more rigorous test on such facts opted out of the 
forum. 
The bleak position of SCAR was summed up by the organisation itself: 
"SCAR had no part in the formulation of [CRAMRA] and was assigned no role 
in its operation." (Antarctic Treaty 1991d, 236). The organisation publicly kept 
to its rigid apolitical line during this period, refusing to become involved in any 
commentary on the progress of CRAMRA. It was left behind in consultative 
terms when the more vocal environment promotional NGOs were making the 
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running. 
IUCN's General Assemblies might have provided an opportunity for the 
ATS states to defend their course, but in the negotiating period IUCN walked a 
generally quiet line between NGO and national members. In Madrid 1984, 
IUCN recommendations did not address minerals or world park issues. In 
Costa Rica 1988 it did with Resolution 17.53 urging ATCPs to give serious 
consideration to the well-founded conservation concerns expressed by Non-
Consultative Parties and appropriate NG0s. At the same time, these two 
meetings advised IUCN to prepare an Antarctic Conservation Strategy. "This 
was a proposal, emphasising conservation objectives rather than prescribing 
detailed administrative or legal mechanisms." (IUCN 1991, vi). However its 
preparation remained underway after the minerals negotiations concluded, so no 
document was produced urging the talks to go in any particular direction. 
IUCN's role as a forum remained low key, but gently supportive of the 
environmentalist NGO view. 
As CRAMRA moved toward finalisation, inside the ATS there were scattered 
signs that the gradually accumulating non-state pressure on the system was 
beginning to impact, and some countries wavered a little. At SCM IV-x in 
Montevideo May 1987, Chile's head of delegation, Ambassador Fernando 
Zegers, raised the notion of an Antarctic Treaty Park in corridor discussions. 
Chile was said to be concerned that the minerals convention would erode its 
sovereignty status and be too costly. Instead Zegers "suggested that an 
Antarctic Treaty Park, reserving the continent for co-operative scientific 
endeavour, might be more constructive." (ASOC 1987b, 13) 
NGOs seized on this prospect. "It was brilliant because it actually achieved 
environmental protection but without threatening these diplomats," said 
Wallace. "We heard he had mentioned it to a claimants' caucus. He was happy 
for us to mention it. "(Wallace interview, 1992). In ECO subsequently, NGOs 
did so, describing it as the maintenance of the status quo with an explicit ban on 
mining. "ECO urges that more delegations seriously consider this kind of 
future for Antarctica. It might be easier to achieve than consensus on a minerals 
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regime." (Friends of the Earth 1987a, 1). The subject of an Antarctic 
Conservation Convention had been raised at other ATCMs by Australia, 
according to ECO , nevertheless diplomats left Montevideo having agreed to 
finalise negotiations in Wellington in a session from May, 1988. 
Here there were further straws in the wind indicating that a shift in direction 
could be happening. By 1988 the Australian delegation was showing strong 
signs of internal division. Goldsworthy recalls a continual "chipping away" at 
the previously mentioned Treasury position. A participant who would not be 
named also recalled: "everyone had the same problem that Foreign Affairs had 
their own agenda. In the last couple of sessions Foreign Affairs would have a 
little meeting with itself, then there would be the general delegation." This 
camp had an obvious disinclination to agree, and intervened in the final stages 
of the CRAMRA talks to indicate that the lowest common denominator might 
not be satisfactory. "My experience of Australian delegations is that we don't do 
that sort of stuff very often, although other nations didn't realise that." 
(Goldsworthy interview, 1992). 
Of course, all 32 treaty parties present did agree to adopt CRAMRA, on 
June 2 1988. This gave non-state actors their acid test at last. With a regime to 
wave around, would they be able to raise a strong public campaign? ASOC put 
the best face on events when it told members that in fact the agreement had 
been inevitable. "We now face a long hard struggle to stop the Convention from 
entering into force." (Goldsworthy 1988, 1). "The signing of the final act was 
virtually inevitable and it would be wrong to assume that NGOS had 'lost' the 
battle even though we opposed the negotiation. Significant changes occurred as 
a result of NGO input and these should make the process of opposing mineral 
exploitation easier when the regime comes into force. First, however, the 
convention must be signed... One strategy for the future will be to try to prevent 
some of these states from signing and ratifying the convention, or at least to 
severely delay them, which will have the effect of preventing the convention 
from coming into force." (Goldsworthy 1988, 10) 
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(VIII) CHAPTER CONCLUSION  
Fundamental questions this thesis asks of non-state actors' involvement in 
the ATS are: what differences did they make in their attempts to prevail over 
states involved in the debate, and if they did, then how? The foregoing chapter 
examined the period from their early involvement in Antarctic issues, to the 
adoption of the minerals agreement in June 1988. During this time environment 
promotion NGOs emerged as the heretics outside the ATS "church". The field 
was surrendered to them by the expert, but less popular pressure groups, the 
old-style educated elite which was giving up ground at the time on many of the 
world's environment issues (Boulding 1988, 36). 
The first niche was secured with the introduction of the notion of a world 
park. It is interesting that this idea emerged in IUCN - what the typology of 
this thesis characterises as an aggregated NGO of high global standing, with 
great control over its resources and a specific ATS recognition; in other words 
an NGO with claims to legitimate strength as an actor on many grounds. IUCN 
showed the ability to get a credible new idea drawn up and accepted by its 
broad-based membership. It was a prime vehicle for giving birth to a resonant 
popular phrase, one that was filled later with suitable contents and recognised 
by the general public. 
The phrase itself demonstrated the kind of flexibility available to NGOs 
compared to the careful but ponderous diplomatic negotiating language of an 
international regime. It showed the non-state actors' overt intention to set a 
different A ntarrlir agenda, one that state actors had failed to embrace. In their 
rejection of world park notions and the NGO adoption of them lay a lesson in 
the role of non-state actors in changing perceptions of what is possible, and of 
how a state-based ethos may be proven wrong. 
This is not to suggest that these NGOs were all of one Mind. But in their 
differences of opinion, particularly over world park concepts and their use, lie 
lessons in the freedom and vitality of thought unavailable to state actors without 
great political costs. There is also an early illustration of the differences in the 
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typology between the popular appeal of the environment promotion advocates, 
and the quieter "experts" of WRI and LIED. 
When ATCPs actually began to negotiate CRAMRA formally, this gave the 
impetus for environment promotion NGOs' to become engaged with the regime 
on an ever more serious basis. Again an aggregated organisation came to the 
fore in the shape of ASOC, but of course this was exclusively Antarctic in its 
focus. ASOC's strategic campaign aimed to kill CRAMRA, but their tactics 
involved making it so difficult to negotiate that it might be rejected, and stalling 
for time in order to strengthen the non-state hand. In order to achieve its end, 
ASOC, with its sole focus on Antarctica, came to the fore as a small group of 
members analysed the treaty parties, separately and as blocs, to determine the 
dynamics of the system and where they could be most effective in their 
lobbying. 
One of the weak points they discerned lay in the competing intra-national 
bureaucracies. They saw opportunities to exploit the character of bureaucracies, 
filling voids with ideas and playing departments off against each other. This 
helped serve the purpose of gaining the non-state position recognition and 
strength within treaty governments, for example by encouraging an argument 
accepted by some that the regime's unspoken sub-text was actually the 
assignment of property rights. Similarly, an important breakthrough came 
early in the talks with admission to the negotiations of NGO observers on 
delegations. Entry to delegations, limited though it was, represented an 
admission by some important governments of the influence of the non-state 
viewpoint in these countries' politics, and gave the NGO vital insights. 
The third major step was the successful early consciousness-raising done 
with the general public. The external atmospherics were such that the issue of 
Antarctica's role in the global environment grew increasingly prominent among 
the general public over the course of the negotiations. But it was the decision of 
a widely popular and burgeoning environmental NGO with great resources and 
global interests that was vital to furthering the effort. While FOE and WWF 
stayed on the sidelines, Greenpeace was not only persuaded by ASOC to give 
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significant financial and logistical backing to ASOC's own lobbying, its 
resources allowed it to set up World Park Base and conduct its own inspections; 
means by which this NGO could mount an overt challenge to the legitimacy of 
ATS states, question their compliance with their own dictums, and challenge 
their authority as the guardians of the continent. By these means it gathered fuel 
to use against CRAMRA. The case was put that NGOs were protecting the 
interests of Antarctica even better than the neglectful state actors, that not only 
did an NGO have legitimacy in the debate, it could claim popular authority to 
act directly for its protection. 
Also in the wider world, Greenpeace's global standing enabled it to take its 
complaints about the ATS to the UN, which was the forum for a serious state-
based external challenge to the Antarctic club. The case was put in that forum by 
NGOs that as non-state actors they did a better job of protecting the interests of 
Antarctica than the neglectful ATS member states. 
The environment promotion NGOs were given something of a free ride by 
the absence of countervailing non-state pressures. SCAR was left behind. 
Though an Antarctic expert, it had no popular constituency and little control 
over its own resources in order to develop a policy direction, had it chosen to. 
Only WRI was putting an alternative non-state actor's case as a member of the 
US delegation; one that would have had added credibility because of the strong 
information gathering resources WRI was able to put behind its case. But as an 
expert group, this voice was limited to the internal forums of the system. 
Environment promotion NGOs began to receive some recognition of their 
potential power in the ATS, for example in the Parsons assessment. Their 
policies also gained a little currency with state-based actors in the latter stages of 
negotiation of CRAMRA. They failed to prevent CRAMRA's text from being 
adopted, a failure that did not appear to perturb them seriously as the process 
devolved into national ratifications, with all the opportunities for intervention 
that this presented. Instead the long time-line enabled them to enter and gain 
legitimacy in the debate at what was coincidentally a crucial moment in history 
for all environmental NG0s. In a timely horoscope for this new world, the 
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secretary-general of the UN's World Commission on Environment and 
Development [the Brundtland Commission], Jim Macneill, said: "Legal 
regimes...have been rapidly outdistanced by the accelerating pace and scale of 
change. New norms for state and interstate behaviour are needed. They must 
evolve for the global commons and future generations." (Macneill 1989, 20). 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
A CASE STUDY (2) 
THE DEATH OF CRAMRA 
AND BIRTH OF THE PROTOCOL ON 
ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION 
104 
(I) CHAFFER INTRODUCTION  
From a broad brush approach in the third chapter, this second section of the 
case study moves to a state-by-state analysis of the role of non-state actors in 
the collapse of CRAMRA and the rise of its replacement Protocol on 
Environmental Protection [PEP, or Madrid Protocol]. The watershed, as is 
mentioned earlier, came with the transfer of the issue into domestic political 
arenas as CRAMRA's ratification process opened. The temptation here is to 
write a history of this fascinating era of Antarctic politics, in which NGOs 
banded together to play power politics with great vigour on several fronts at 
once, in what was an unusual flurry of decision-making by the normally 
quiescent system. This 25 month period in treaty history - from June 2 1988, 
to July 3 1991 - is the time of greatest foment in the regime's history. It saw for 
the first time in the ATS the fracturing of a previously agreed consensus. After 
this came the rejection of an arduously negotiated regime; concern that the ATS 
itself was in peril ; and the final introduction of basic changes to the operations 
of governments in Antarctica: and all of this with strong non-state input. 
But it is outside the scope of this thesis to write such a history. Instead the 
critical matter under examination is environment promotion groups' role in 
creating and exploiting this foment. As one of the best known ATS 
commentators put it: "In the past neither NGOs nor public opinion proved a 
major driving force on Antarctic policy-makers. The course of developments 
since 1988 suggested that for the first time a significant, even decisive policy 
input was coming from below." (Beck 1990b, 110.) This chapter's intention 
is to analyse the mechanical role these actors played in order to better 
understand and reach decisions about their exercise of power at the time. 
Because of the intensity of activities in this period, a detailed chronological 
framework has been prepared and added as an appendix to this current work in 
order to provide a frame of reference. It sets out the national and international 
milestones along the path from original acceptance of CRAMRA to the signing 
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of the protocol. This framework is meant to provide common reference points 
for events that will recur as the body of the chapter, a set of national case 
studies, is examined. The chronology is also important in its own right as a 
broad overview of the strategic approach to the ATS jointly taken by NG0s. 
These case studies have been chosen because, in the cascade of events over 
this three year period, they represent important moments of change. It should 
be emphasised that all 25 ATCPs who initialled CRAMRA at Wellington in 
June 1988 some time later turned away from the minerals regime in favour of 
the protocol. The case studies are not claimed to exhaust the possible suite of 
key decisions. But when the chronology is examined, the five nations chosen: 
Australia, France, New Zealand, Britain and the USA, best illustrate the phases 
of change, and therefore provide the most valuable insights into non-state 
activity. First Australia and France split the consensus by moving separately 
and then jointly, away from CRAMRA and towards the PEP. Subsequently 
they led much of the state-to-state international campaigning. New Zealand held 
a key position as facilitator of CRAMRA, and particularly because of the 
intragovemmental politics on this issue it provides a valuable insight into non-
state tactics. Britain's influence in the ATS was historically powerful and it 
remained a determined opponent of change, while the USA proved the most 
overtly intractable. 
The intention is to see how NGOs shaped the decisions of these particular 
countries, in order to draw general conclusions in this thesis's examination of 
the strength or weakness of non-state actors, and their challenge to the 
legitimacy of a state-based decision. This basic question remains to be fleshed 
out: who fared best in the quest to achieve acceptance by the public as the 
legitimate authority over Antarctica in this period: the ATS as represented in 
system organs such as ATCMs and its diplomatic "representatives" in 
government, or some of the non-state actors? 
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(II) NON-STATE ACTION ON INDIVIDUAL STATES  
AUSTRALIA  
A TARGET FOR CHANGE 
When Australia initially signed CRAMRA in Wellington, NGO members 
already had identified and encouraged a bureaucratic division in the delegation, 
between on the one hand representatives of Treasury and Primary Industries 
and Energy, and on the other, Foreign Affairs.Though some concern was 
expressed about some provisions of CRAMRA by Foreign Affairs at 
Wellington in June 1988, ultimately it backed the regime. Treasury conversely 
stuck to a long-held economic rationalist position that developed in the course 
of the negotiations, as early as SCM IV-v in Tokyo 1984. This argument ran 
that a pre-requisite for Australian approval was economic benefit for 
exploitation in the national claim, and that the regime should not derogate from 
Australia's sovereignty. (Wallace interview, 1993; Goldsworthy interview 
1993; Bergin 1991, 224). This division was clearly apparent to NGO members. 
Cath Wallace of ASOC New Zealand recalls colourfully how an unapproving 
Australian Treasury delegate observed the signing process with some disdain, 
commenting: "Look at them, they sold their country for a mess of potage." 
(Wallace interview 1993). 
This division was one factor that led NGO members to focus a campaign on 
Australia. Others involved the mechanics of politics. There was a strong, well-
funded ASOC secretariat with good access to national Antarctic decision-makers 
in government, and tied to a flourishing national NGO network. (Goldsworthy 
interview 1993.) The nation had a strong link with Antarctica. It was 
historically strong in the exploration phase, geographically broad in its claim, 
and currently active with an annual program expenditure rising above $60 
million. The national program listed among its stated aims the preservation of 
peace, sovereignty and strategic influence. 
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Australia's strength as an actor within the ATS at the time is subject to 
varying assessments. Its seniority in the system was apparent in elements such 
as its original signatory status, and the choice of Australia's delegation leaders 
to speak on behalf of the ATS inside and outside United Nations debates. 
However NGO members such as Wallace, Barry Weeber of ECO-NZ and 
Alistair Graham [ASOC] maintain that it was at times excluded from an inner 
circle of negotiators or "A" group of nations who conducted the informal 
CRAMRA discussions, which more often included NZ, Britain and USA. 
Moreover Beck makes the judgment that Australia has rarely aspired to a 
leadership role in Antarctic affairs. "Within the ATS it has generally performed 
an influential though often undistinguished role. In particular, an awareness of 
Australia's middle power status means that successive governments have 
avoided the assumption of attitudes adjudged likely to place the country in an 
isolated or vulnerable position on key questions. "(Beck 1990b, 106) 
Having targeted Australia, the NGO campaign continued in two directions in 
1988. The assets of domestic NGOs were called upon to help mount a national 
campaign of public education and political pressure, and to focus upon 
intragovemmental rivalry, in order to achieve a breakthrough at the ministerial 
level. 
PUBLIC LOBBYING 
ASOC already had a public education campaign in its early stages before the 
signing of CRAMRA. Among the tasks that began immediately afterwards was 
a speaking circuit throughout major cities in which Goldsworthy and other 
speakers addressed a string of service clubs, including Lions and Rotary. This 
task was maintained until about May of 1989. Also joining in at this time was 
the Australian Conservation Foundation, at that stage a powerful non-state 
actor domestically, whose leader Philip Toyne, had the ear of Prime Minister 
Hawke. 
ACF formed an Antarctic Action Group whose members prepared a video of 
Antarctica which "sold itself" widely to schools, clubs and interest groups, 
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according to AAG member Mr David Westlake. (Westlake interview, 1993). 
The focus of the action group was in obtaining community support, and the 
ACF and ASOC networks, with their strong NGO membership, were used to 
that end. Steps taken included a write-in postcard petition focussing on key 
figures in government, and a growing media campaign. 
Examples of this campaign include a series of ACF releases whose 
gradually strengthening news value indicated the growth of the issue itself. On 
21 March, under the head "Our Last Chance To Avert Environmental Disaster in 
Antarctica", a statement focussed on a joint letter from 81 New Zealand 
scientists opposing CRAMRA. The next two, on 29 March, pointed at the 
Exxon Valdez disaster. One was headed: "Alaskan Accident, the lessons for 
Australia and Antarctica"; the other from Toyne referred obliquely to the 
Foreign Minister, Senator Evans, and the Environment Minister, Senator 
Richardson, as "misguided and naive" for believing CRAMRA would control 
the exploitation of Antarctica. "As the Alaskan spill demonstrates, no amount 
of hollow regulation, vague assurance and untried technology can avoid 
environmental disasters." 
Other material included a series of fact sheets, which told the public that "the 
convention will enable mining to take place", that "exploration was too risky to 
attempt", "mining would lead to environmental degradation", and the world 
park proposal was "a clear, firm alternative". (Westlake 1989, 1) In this 
material ACF urged that the Federal Government should not sign CRAMRA. 
"Australia should encourage other treaty nations to commence studies on the 
World Park option, while agreeing to extend the moratorium on mining until 
full consideration is given to the World Park option. The Federal Government 
should set up a working group to commence discussion on a conservation 
convention." 
In fact this proposal - raised publicly at least as early as 13 April 1989, and 
at a time when there was clearly no path chosen by the government, turned 
out to be broadly the direction chosen. It provides clear evidence that the goals 
of the non-state actors would become a success; that they were able to co-opt 
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the Australian Government to carry out their agenda. 
There was a question over the effectiveness of the public education and 
pressure campaign. Senator Richardson cited an unnamed poll in which 98 per 
cent of people said they would oppose mining in the Antarctic. (Oakes 1989, 
4). But the campaign was not generating high profile media events such as 
public rallies or protest actions. Whether it actually served the purpose of 
spreading concern about CRAMRA into the general population was open to 
debates such as that in the Senate on 12 April 1989. The Opposition 
Environment spokesman Senator Chris Puplick remarked: "there has been no 
real community discussion of this matter. A large number of issues need to be 
addressed and they have not so far been addressed because the Government has 
not lived up to its promise to promote community discussion..." (Australia 
Senate 1989a, 1430). In reply Senator Richardson claimed: "by keeping 
[CRAMRA] on the table for a very long time, the Government has enabled 
debate to progress on this issue all around the country. In fact, I think it has 
received enormous coverage in recent times." (Australia Senate 1989a, 1437). 
INTRAGOVERNMENTAL CHANGE 
The initial focus of Australian NGOs in their internal lobbying effort after 
CRAMRA's agreement was upon Treasury. This was despite the lack of 
concern in Treasury about environmental aspects of CRAMRA. The lobbyists 
were instead happy to promote sovereignty and economic benefit arguments if 
they served the overall purpose of slowing down the ratification procedure. 
"We had a number of meetings with Treasury officials reinforcing the concerns 
that we had and that we knew they had." (Goldsworthy, interview 1993). It 
was from this department, in a relatively short space of time, that the first fruit 
came. Three months after CRAMRA was signed Treasurer Keating wrote to 
Foreign Minister Evans: "I do not believe that Australia should sign the 
convention until we attempt further to negotiate provisions that better protect our 
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national interests. Signature would mean we concede our economic claims over 
Antarctica for virtually nothing, forfeiting our sovereignty and opening up the 
possibility of subsidised (mining) production competing with Australian mineral 
producers...I believe we must be prepared to stand alone if necessary on this 
issue." (Keating 1988, 1) 
This letter represents the first known evidence of determined dissent within 
the highest levels of a significant ATS country, and strongly followed the NGO 
promoted line that Australia would be economically worse off under CRAMRA. 
It is not claimed by NGOs to have emerged solely as a result of their efforts at 
lobbying the Treasurer, but they do assert that their efforts in lobbying Australia 
at the time to stall CRAMRA were concentrated on the Treasury (Goldsworthy 
interview, 1993), and they could hardly have had a handier ally. Keating is 
known to have been increasingly pressing his claims to leadership of the Labor 
Party against Prime Minister Hawke at the time. In this context the "stand 
alone" proposal by Keating - a course that was eventually adopted by the Prime 
Minister - may have extra significance as a challenge on leadership. 
It should be noted too that although at the time CRAMRA was not specially 
significant on the national agenda, Keating evidently approached it with some 
seriousness. In October, before CRAMRA had been even tabled in the 
Australian parliament, he raised both the Australian position and his own views 
in a meeting in Paris with the French Prime Minister, Michel Rocard (Keating, 
1989). He also already had the Cabinet backing of the Resources Minister, 
Senator Peter Cook, who held the view that with no anti-subsidy provision in 
place, Australia's mining industry would be adversely affected. (Bergin 1991, 
224) 
Leakage of the Keating letter to newspaper reporters came two days before 
the CRAMRA documents were tabled in Federal parliament by Senator Evans 
and Senator Richardson. Senator Evans said: "the Government's purpose in 
tabling the Convention is to promote community discussion." (Evans, 
1988, 1). Plainly though he also backed the convention, using rhetoric familiar 
to CRAMRA advocates. "Contrary to some misconceptions, the aim of these 
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negotiations was not to encourage minerals activity in Antarctica. The 
negotiations proceeded on the basis Antarctica would remain closed to minerals 
exploitation unless a specific decision were taken to open it. This important 
principle is reflected in the Convention." (Evans 1988, 1). When these two 
ministers tabled CRAMRA they are said to have been confident that there would 
be little real opposition, and at the end of the day the government could argue 
that the Convention met Australia's broad objectives (Bergin 1991, 223). 
The NGO campaign made little impact upon either of them for some time. 
As late as March 1989, Senator Evans was arguing at a meeting with the ACF 
that CRAMRA represented the best achievable regulation of mining, and anyone 
who thought otherwise was "off with the elves and the fairies" (Toyne 1989, 
1). As for Senator Richardson, he conducting an open discourse about his 
thinking. In April 1989 he stated his opposition to mining in Antarctica, but 
insisted that there be an instrument in place to try to make countries "act civilly" 
when they mined. "Some countries are hell bent on exploration and will be hell 
bent on mining...We've got to do the best possible job at looking after the 
environment. I don't think you can do that if there's no instrument in place that 
puts some pressure on the miners to act responsibly." (Oakes 1989, 3). He 
also maintained this stance in the parliament over the next few weeks. 
The ACF moved to step up its campaign of direct lobbying during April with 
approaches to the key figures including Hawke, who had remained outwardly 
an observer of ministerial rivalries in the period from June 1988 (Peake 1989a). 
ACF pointed to the Exxon Valdez disaster and Bahai Paraiso as examples of 
the "inevitable" fate awaiting Antarctica should mining or oil drilling be 
permitted there. (Toyne 1989, 1). There were also indications of growing 
international pressure upon him. One letter to Hawke sent on behalf of 
"millions of concerned citizens world-wide" was signed by the chairman of 
Greenpeace International, David McTaggart, and the influential WWF/IUCN 
figure, Sir Peter Scott, on 10 April. Another came from Jacques-Yves and 
Jean-Michel Cousteau, reminding Hawke of Australia's "unprecedented 
opportunity to save Antarctica from the type of devastation that is at the moment 
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destroying sea life and polluting the Arctic.. .We appeal to you to oppose the 
Wellington convention, to take the lead as a protector of Antarctica, and to set 
an example to the world." (Cousteau 1989, 1). 
NGOs had spent a great deal of time in Canberra directing their lobbying at 
politicians, particularly the relatively powerful faction leaders of the governing 
Labor Party. "We targeted the different political figures with postcards and 
letters, combined with going to see them and pointing out the differing views of 
departments" (Goldsworthy interview, 1993). Environmentalists met figures 
such as the Labor caucus chairman Bob Chynoweth, an Antarctic traveller that 
previous summer, and an example of backbench Labor MPs keenly aware of 
the political importance of the green preferential votes to whom he owed his 
marginal Victorian seat. Early in April, Chynoweth promised to lobby every 
MP to ensure that Australia did not sign CRAMRA (Bergin 1991, 226). 
To this point, the lobbying of the Federal Opposition had borne little fruit. 
The Opposition's Environment spokesman, Senator Chris Puplick, chose to 
move for further debate on CRAMRA when the issue was raised in the Senate 
by the Green Senator, Jo Vallentine, and opposed outright a world park concept 
which he saw to be linked to United Nations governance. (Australia Senate 
1989a 1430). 
Keating's growing opposition was reiterated in a letter to Senator Evans on 
19 April requesting that consideration of his submission recommending that 
Australia sign CRAMRA be held over until Keating returned from overseas 
meetings in late June. By this time he would have had access to a U.S. policy 
document that may have hardened his position. In early 1989, ASOC-NZ 
members obtained under the US Freedom of Information Act a memorandum 
on U.S. Antarctic policy which was passed on to Australian ASOC members. 
This spelt out U.S. policy objective to "facilitate an increase in the global supply 
of [non-living] resources, through (i) defining property rights to Antarctica 
mineral resources ; (ii) ensuring reasonable conditions of investment consistent 
with US interests including environmental protection." (United States, 1975). 
Here ASOC had obtained emphatic proof of the argument they had encouraged 
in the Australian Treasury. 
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So by mid-April 1989, the public NGO campaign had become established. It 
had a clear proposed course that urged the Federal Government to take a lead 
internationally and offer up instead of CRANIRA a world park alternative. 
Pressure from the public appeared to be limited to the concerned environmental, 
rather than the general community, which was nevertheless aware of the issue 
in broad terms, and may even have been strongly in opposition to the prospect 
of Antarctic mining. Lobbying by NCrOs appeared to at least assist in an 
intragovemmental split, and Keating had taken up opposition to CRAMRA, 
adopting partially the NGO line. But they had not yet won a major change of 
heart from the leader of the government. Hawke was yet to show his colours. 
AUSTRALIA CHANGES ITS POSITION 
The agenda for change in Australia quickened in late April with news that 
the French Prime Minister, Michel Rocard, was moving against CRAMRA. In 
a television interview Rocard said that France would not ratify CRAMRA in its 
present state (Darby, 1989). This news passed quickly to Australia and led 
environmentalists in Canberra to immediately call for Australian backing. "In 
the light of support [for deferral] from other countries, Australia should also 
defer its decision," Goldworthy said. ( Goldsworthy interview 1993). The 
French position also undercut concerns of CRAMRA's opponents in the 
Australian government, expressed by Senator Richardson, that this country 
should not stand alone against the regime (Bergin 1991, 227). 
It was at this point that one can say for certain the NGOs' campaign began 
to reap a harvest from both Keating and the Federal Opposition. Referring to 
the French change of heart, Keating moved quickly to explicitly adopt the 
NGOs' line against CRAMRA. In a letter to Hawke on 27 April, Keating 
repeated his concern over the regime's deficiencies in respect of revenue and 
subsidised mining, and then called on Australia to heed environmental 
considerations. "The Antarctic is of enormous ecological importance. It is 
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perhaps the last area on earth that remains untouched by development... I 
believe we should consider carefully, but soon, the establishment of a World 
Park or at least consider declaring Australia's territory a national park." 
(Keating 1989). Two days later the Federal Shadow Cabinet voted to oppose 
the treaty on the ground that it would lead to mining; adopting this NGO 
argument that had first swayed Treasury's CRAMRA negotiators five years 
earlier, and latterly, Mr Keating. (Milburn, 1989) Shortly afterwards in a 
detailed statement the Opposition also fell into line with the NGO proposal for a 
convention to ban mining, stopping short of world park. (Bergin 1991, 227). 
The NGO campaign had at this point effectively promoted a virtually 
irresistible momentum against CRAMRA in Australia. Not only was the 
powerful Treasurer a direct advocate of the environmentalist position; the 
Opposition's Senate stance, backed by the Australian Democrats' balance of 
power in that chamber, meant CRAMRA's ratification was blocked. In these 
circumstances remaining government advocacy began to crumble. On 3 May, 
six days after the Keating letter, Hawke telephoned Rocard to discuss the two 
countries working together on the world park proposal. (Peake, 1989a). Next 
day he told the Australian Mining Industry Council that Antarctic mining would 
be against Australian interests (Seccombe, 1989). On 12 May a delegation of 
16 conservation NGOs met Senator Richardson and he moved further away 
from the signing option, admitting that the debate might have "passed us by". 
(Peake, 1989b), a revealing remark on the speed with which others were 
moving the debate past the pace of the portfolio minister. The same day Hawke 
wrote to Keating suggesting that he establish a working party of officials to 
examine the whole concept of a world park, a course of action that was to be 
immediately followed through. (Houweling, 1989b) 
Meanwhile in Paris at the 9-13 May scheduled preparatory meeting for 
ATCM XV, Australia's changing mood was revealed in the ATS, when it 
4 
informally tabled a proposal for comprehensive environmental protection which 
borrowed some of its components from ASOC proposals. This paper allowed 
for the possibility of CRAMRA entering into force but suggested an accident 
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causing environmental damage could result. It proposed a "catch-all" Antarctic 
Conservation Convention as an integral part of the ATS ( (Australia DFAT 
1989, 4-5). 
This development came more quickly than even the NGO lobbyists hoped. 
"When Foreign Affairs decided to make the announcement , I was surprised. 
To actually put a conservation convention on the table...They hadn't 
caucused very much, except perhaps with France. Everyone was stunned, all 
the treaty nations. So was half the delegation, I might add." (Goldsworthy, 
interview 1993) 
Into this climate also came the 13 May Tasmanian state election, which 
promised during a long campaign - and did yield - a Green Independent 
grouping balance of power in the state House of Assembly under an electoral 
system which guarantees an outcome closely reflecting the balance of the 
popular vote. Neither Antarctica nor CRAMRA were issues during the 
campaign, but some observers, in New Zealand's Department of Foreign 
Affairs particularly, claimed afterwards that this Green dominance finally 
swung the Australian Government against CRAMRA . Whether this is so is 
less certain. Peter Beck commented: "Upon the basis of evidence currently 
available, it seems incorrect to accept the simplistic interpretation linking non-
signature primarily to the Tasmanian election and tactical political reasons." 
(Beck 1990, 114). It is likely however that the Tasmanian election outcome 
contributed strongly to the existing national political atmospherics, emphasising 
through a state electoral system that was very sensitive to minority groups, the 
power of the green vote. 
Hawke's liaison with France continued as that country's position hardened 
against CRAMRA further. Finally the departmental working party reported back 
to the Federal Cabinet, and on 22 May in a joint statement Hawke, Senator 
Evans and Senator Richardson announced Australia's change of position. "Our 
strong commitment is that no mining at all - including oil drilling - should take 
place in and around the continent ...Australia will not sign the minerals 
convention but instead will pursue the urgent negotiation of a comprehensive 
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environmental protection convention [and] specifically explore the prospects 
for the establishment of an Antarctic Wilderness Park". (Hawke 1989a, 1) 
This outcome again went beyond the hopes of environmentalists. "In fact the 
announcement in May came early. We didn't expect it. I knew we had a very 
good chance of blocking at least the first round of the attempt at ratification.. .1 
expected Australia to defer, rather than make such an enormous statement, and 
it went beyond our wildest dreams." (Goldsworthy interview, 1993). 
Though this decision was taken, Australian NGOs did not regard their task 
as over. Ms Goldsworthy wrote to ASOC members on 1 June calling for 
expressions of thanks to the Hawke Government, as did the Australian 
Conservation Foundation's David Westlake later. He also continued ACF's 
work to build a "Save Antarctica from Mining" petition of support, raising in a 
letter to foundation councillors the possibility of the Hawke Government 
backsliding. "Until 24 November, 1989 [the date of ATCM XV] the Federal 
Government may reconsider signing CRAMRA. Consequently the aim is to 
achieve our 100,000 names. Currently 50,000 names have been added to the 
petition." (Westlake 1989). 
Whether this concern was necessary is open to question. Ms Goldsworthy 
was convinced that the government had adopted the NGO view so profoundly 
that the Foreign Affairs department [their initial strong opponent only a year 
earlier] was keener almost than NGOs about world park. "We had a couple of 
meetings with Foreign Affairs where they were asking for our justification of 
why Antarctica should be a world park. They were more fervent than we were 
in some of our discussions." (Goldsworthy interview, 1993) 
Though it was to moderate its proposal away from the NGOs' pure world 
park ambitions, Australia kept up its advocacy of the mining ban and an 
environmental protection system for another two years. During the key 
negotiating periods over that time, environmentalist input on the Australian 
Government continued at a high level. But it was largely a co-operative process 
in negotiating sessions. The public campaign by domestic NGOs declined to a 
point where the main public occasions were events where the government and 
117 
NGOs put on a united front. Goldsworthy became an important member of the 
Australian delegation, and she found that in the ATS sessions her role was to 
bolster the national position, and latterly to chair some PEP annex negotiations 
herself. 
Strong pressure was put upon Australia and France by other nations to 
change its position at the ATCM XV in Paris. At SCM XI-i in Vina Del Mar, 
Goldsworthy felt Australia came close to signing a deal which was considerably 
less than the end result; and at the Madrid sessions the Australian delegation 
slipped from advocating an outright ban to the eventual tight moratorium. But 
the fundamentals of the non-state position held. 
In retrospect environmental NGOs had a profound influence on Australia's 
decision to move from support of CRAMRA through outright advocacy of a 
world park-like mechanism, to a mining ban and environmental protocol. The 
Canberra analyst Anthony Bergin comments: "environmental groups played a 
critical, perhaps vital role in shaping the government's decision...the Antarctic 
minerals issue was not treated by environmental groups as a foreign policy 
issue; it was handled and "sold" by such groups as another domestic issue like 
mining in Kakadu or logging in national forests." (Bergin 1992,237). 
No lesser person than Senator Evans - the minister who had earlier identified 
CRAMRA opponents as "off with the elves and the fairies" - also came around 
to praising the role of NG0s. At a ceremony to mark the signing of the PEP, 
Senator Evans admitted that the enormous amount of work by Greenpeace and 
other environmental groups had played a large part in creating the atmosphere in 
which the Federal Government found it relatively easy domestically to support a 
mining ban in Antarctica. Senator Evans also played particular tribute to the 
"positive and constructive" role played by Goldsworthy in protocol 
negotiations. She was later to be decorated with a national honour. Finally, he 
said the enormous achievement of uniting ATPs on a comprehensive protection 
regime owed much to the role that groups like Greenpeace played in sensitising 
public opinion. (Evans 1991,6) 
To conclude the case study of Australia, let us return to the grid analysis 
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developed earlier in this thesis and examine which attributes of these non-state 
actors came to the fore. We may say firstly that the internal lobbying skills of 
ASOC were central to the success of the non-state effort. It successfully 
employed relationships built over the previous decade in Antarctic politics to 
gain strength in the internal machinations of a national government. Assistance 
came to ASOC with the specific resources support of the large environment 
promotion NG0s. They also put their global weight behind efforts to shift 
Australia. On the ground locally, the value of ACF, a well-connected national 
environment promotion NGO willing to campaign, was apparent. A broad 
spread of strengths among these environment promotion groups in their 
structures and relationships was therefore successfully employed. 
The non-state campaign began to gain ground with the an intragovemmental 
split that showed signs of owing its origins to an ASOC-encouraged argument: 
that Australia should block a previously agreed international position on the 
grounds of state self-interest. The campaign developed over time in a helpful 
external climate with public opposition to CRAIVIRA evident and encouraged. 
Under increasing pressure from an assemblage of strange bedfellows: France, 
the Federal Opposition and the Federal Treasurer, the alternative course 
presented by NGOs was adopted by the Government as its policy, and Australia 
moved its position to become an advocate of the environmentalist cause. The 
NGOs' path clearly therefore proved to have greater legitimacy than Australia's 
original preferred course. Though countervailing pressure was carried forward 
in some Government departments, it came under internal challenge and 
eventually crumbled under the weight of the broad spectrum of support 
gathered behind environmentalist NG0s. 
To nod the head at NGOs by saying they helped to create the atmosphere for 
the change in Australia's position, as did Senator Evans, is to minimise their 
profound effect on this issue. In ideal conditions: a quickly greening general 
political atmosphere, strong framework of environmental lobbyists and public 
pressure groups, and pluralist government structure, they grasped the 
opportunity to push a state into action unprecedented in the particular 
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international regime, through internal lobbying and external public campaign 
building. To do this they employed many of the characteristics and approaches 
described earlier in this work: fanning the credibility of the mineral rights 
argument in state vehicles, transmitting ideas more rapidly than did the state; 
overcoming advocates for compliance with CRAMRA and developing a 
changed perspective with the aid of a public campaign. As non-state actors they 
succeeded in making the state face the legitimacy of their position and adopt it. 
FRANCE 
A TARGET FOR CHANGE 
France's formal political connections to Antarctica are closer than most 
other claimant states, apart from South America's southern cone nations. On 6 
August 1955 an act of the French parliament created Terres Australes et 
Antarctiques Francaises, administratively and financially an autonomous 
overseas territory of the French republic. The territory is divided into four 
districts representing three groups of Southern Indian Ocean islands and Adelie 
land on the Antarctic continent. Its governing authority is the Higher 
Administrator based in Paris, who answers to the Minister for Overseas 
Departments and Territories. (Harris 1984, 124). 
France began CRAMRA negotiations against a possible background of 
interest in mineral exploitation in Antarctica shortly before the discussions 
began. "The recent activities of the French Institute for Petroleum have drawn 
accusations of resource exploitation links. No published account of the 
sophisticated French survey in the Ross Sea and Adelie Land area in 1982 is 
known to this commentator. The French program is exceptional in this respect." 
(Harris 1984, 212) During the course of negotiations its position in Antarctica 
came under a sustained NGO attack over the construction of the Dumont 
D'Urville airstrip. Preliminary engineering studies for this strip began in 1981- 
2, and construction in 1982-3. (Ormerod 1986, 185) The activity was put 
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before CRAMRA delegates at SCM IV-ii in Wellington and remained an irritant 
for the remainder of the talks. For other reasons, such as the bombing of the 
Greenpeace ship Rainbow Warrior in Auckland Harbour in 1986, and the 
continuing program of nuclear testing in the South Pacific, France's relations 
with some regional environmental NGOs were at best uneasy. The delegation 
did not include an NGO representative. 
At the conclusion of CRAMRA the French were seen by one NGO observer 
as "being friends, and yet seriously on the other side of the fence." (Wallace 
interview, 1992) A cocktail party after the signing ceremony in Wellington was 
illustrative of this when the entire French delegation wore Greenpeace Antarctic 
world park badges after France in a statement on the final act was effusive in its 
support for CRAMRA. Delegation leader, Mr Jean-Pierre Puissochet, 
described the text as "a happy balance between concern for the protection of the 
environment and... reasonable exploration and exploitation of Antarctic mineral 
resources", and "a triumph of legal ingenuity" which was "shining proof of 
the efficiency of the Antarctic system". The delegation urged its speedy 
implementation. "It is our wish that the convention.. .will shortly enter into 
force and consequently, that the period which separates us from its application 
is as short as possible." (Antarctic Treaty 1988, France ) 
When ASOC delegates met soon afterwards to choose target countries France 
was not at first on the list. One of the major reasons for this was that there was 
no ASOC connection in France. "After Rainbow Warrior, Greenpeace 
membership surged in places like New Zealand and Australia, but it took a dive 
in France. Greenpeace actually had to close its office there. So ASOC's most 
powerful member was not operating in France at this crucial time." (Hemmings, 
interview 1993) This attitude was to quickly change, however, later in 1988 
when ASOC decided to target France through the Cousteau Foundation, a 
decision that led to an excellent result in the NGO campaign. 
GOVERNMENT RECEPTIVITY TO CHANGE 
The Mitterand Government had taken on a more progressive appearance 
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under the Prime Ministership of Michel Rocard, elected in June 1988 just after 
CRAMRA was signed. The new Environment Minister, Brice Lalonde was a 
former director of Friends of the Earth, now an important friend on high of 
environment promotion NG0s, who showed signs of wanting to involve 
French environmentalists in decision-making. (Hemmings interview, 1993). 
But the most important figure in Antarctic terms was Jacques Cousteau, 
scientist and environmentalist, and the embodiment of the successful marine 
environmental issues advocate, Fondation Cousteau/Cousteau Society, which 
has two main branches, in France and the United States. 
ASOC heard that the new French administration which came to power post-
CRAMRA was concerned to take a "good" initiative in Antarctica, particularly 
as a result of the Dumont D'Urville problem, but not one they would be bullied 
into. "This [world park initiative] was something they could move on, and do 
stunningly the right thing, but not to be seen to be doing it in response to 
pressure from us." (Wallace interview, 1993). The path ASOC claims to have 
taken was to interest Captain Cousteau, who was known to have close links 
with President Mitterand. (Reuter 1989). "Cousteau can do in France what no 
amount of Greenpeace and WWF can do. This is because he is French; a 
national hero." (Hemmings interview, 1993). The course taken is said to have 
been circumspect to deal with the singular nature of the Fondation Cousteau, 
here explained by the U.S.Cousteau Society's Washington representative, Rick 
Schwabacher. "We work hard not to associate with coalitions. We find it is 
confusing for our supporters if our message gets homogenised in a coalition." 
(Schwabacher interview, 1993.) ASOC members suggest their organisation 
got Cousteau 'hooked'. "They never ever wanted to be seen, and in some cases 
didn't even know it was the ASOC influence because of Cousteau being very 
much the 'man alone'. It came about because a couple of ASOC individuals had 
close contact with senior Cousteau people." (Wallace interview, 1993) 
This scenario would illustrate well the success of ASOC as a web of 
linkages in the sense that is described earlier in this thesis by Willetts to be a 
strength of NG0s. The Cousteau Society has a different view of what 
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happened. Though he qualifies his remarks by saying he only joined the society 
later, Mr Schwabacher recalls that Captain Cousteau said his interest was 
roused by seeing news reports that CRAMRA was on its way to final approval. 
"I think there was a distinct feeling CRAMRA had been negotiated behind 
closed doors, that the public had not been involved in this, nor was it really 
aware of it. It should be remembered that Cousteau had personal involvement 
in Antarctica. ..I think he had a particular feeling of reverence for Antarctica." 
(Schwabacher interview, 1993) This "closed doors" argument was heard 
repeatedly from environment promotion groups as they attempted to undermine 
the legitimacy of the decision. In any case there is no doubt that Cousteau's 
involvement came at the right time for the overall NCr0 campaign against 
CRAMRA. "[It was] one of those wonderful combinations where we just had 
the right people making contact with the right senior people in the Cousteau 
[Society] at the right time." (Goldsworthy interview, 1993) 
The domestic political climate in France was also tempered by external factors 
such as the Exxon Valdez disaster, and increasing global environmental 
awareness. As mid-year approached in 1989, the government was dealing with 
elections to the European parliament. They were predicted to produce a sharp 
swing to the left and rapidly expanding European Green parties, according to 
opinion polls. The most dramatic swings were expected to be in France and 
Germany. (Palmer J. 1989,7) Ahead the Mitterand Government also had to 
host a G-7 summit meeting in Paris in July, 1989; a meeting that would be 
noteable for its statements of good environmental intent. 
Some of the elements therefore appeared to be laid out ready for a change of 
position by France, to be facilitated by a single NGO. Despite its original 
position on CRAMRA, the government was regarded as newly receptive to the 
right environmentalist pressure in a greening international political climate. In 
addition, a domestically powerful NGO could pick up a campaign that focussed 
public attention for perhaps the first time against CRAMRA. 
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THE OUTCOME IN FRANCE 
The Fondation Cousteau began in France with a petition campaign in late 
1988 among its national membership network of as many as 100,000. "It's my 
personal feeling that as he raised the issue there was a tremendous public 
response; it was encouragement that this was something the public was 
responding to." (Schwabacher interview, 1993). Little evidence is available 
about the course of the campaign, which appears to have been largely domestic 
in focus. However it can be said Cousteau uses the media of television and print 
with great finesse to convey his messages; the insertion of a petition form in his 
family oriented periodical newsmagazine for foundation members would be 
sufficient to generate a healthy response. It was successful enough for 
Cousteau to claim by mid-April he had gathered 180,000 signatures in France 
against ratification of CRAMRA. (Sinclair 1989, 1) 
It was at this point that Rocard quite quickly announced his opposition to 
CRAMRA as it stood, a move that surprised other treaty nations, and was 
taken in apparent isolation from them. Rocard exhibited some caution. "I cannot 
allow that only France will be satisfied and that 70 or 140 other nations will 
align themselves to a French position. I am happy that Commander Cousteau's 
petition gives this support. But let us not get into mythology. By not ratifying 
this one we should not get the idea we are doing a good job. Things can get 
worse..." (Sinclair 1989, 1) 
Therefore the French Government, although it had taken a position against 
CRAMRA, clearly had not moved in favour of a world park-like alternative. In 
fact, Rocard was advocating "improving" CRAMRA. He is not believed to have 
moved further publicly towards the NGO position until he and the Australian 
Prime Minister Hawke agreed to approach the issue jointly. This course was 
initiated about 12 May, 1989 when in a telephone conversation Rocard told 
Hawke he was reluctant to sign the convention in its present form. Australian 
officials said the French appeared to share Hawke's desire not to see mining in 
Antarctica. (Houweling, 1989a) 
This case was taken further with the Australian Treasurer Keating, when he 
124 
visited Paris on 31 May. Then shortly before Hawke arrived in Paris to discuss 
the proposal with Rocard in June, President Mitterand announced support for a 
wilderness park "as recommended by the marine explorer, Jacques Cousteau." 
(Reuter 1989). Within days Rocard confirmed he "absolutely" supported 
Australia's attempts to create an Antarctic wilderness park. "We are both now, 
Australia and France looking at what could be a current position to have a 
general and definitive protection of the Antarctic." (Cockburn, 1989a). 
This position was to moderate over time away from the wilderness park - 
which was a substitute for the NGOs' world park name - to the eventual Nature 
Reserve/ Land of Science, a position that the Fondation Cousteau advocated 
directly and in contrast to other NGOs (Schwabacher interview 1993). But 
essentially the goals were similar, and the unity between Australia and France 
was to survive without any apparent need for public bolstering by Egos until the 
final stages of negotiation for the PEP. 
The weight of having France join Australia in the campaign against 
CRAMRA cannot be under-estimated. As ASOC's Jim Barnes said: "I would 
say that if Australia had been alone it would have been very difficult because (a) 
it was only one country, and (b) it's not a G-7 type country. To have France 
with Australia was very crucial. Then a world-wide lobbying movement, led to 
some degree by ASOC but certainly in very close co-operation with the 
Cousteau Foundation, resulted in country after country being turned around by 
public pressure." (Barnes interview, 1992). We recall what Oran Young said 
earlier in this work: compliance with international regimes is ignored by state 
actors only at the risk of great cost: that they may be stigmatised as rule 
breakers. (Young 1989a, 74) 
As an exercise in NGO influence it was a further emphatic example of the 
adoption of an environment promotion doctrine by a state which turned its back 
on the previously agreed international convention. Much less is known about 
the mechanics of this change. But statements by the French leadership clearly 
attribute an NGO with the original idea, and this NGO, Fondation Cousteau, 
may well have been brought into the arena at the urging of others through 
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ASOC. In an analysis of valuable attributes possessed by NG0s, there are 
strong indications that the web of NGO linkages possessed by ASOC - its 
aggregated form - were important in reaching through to Cousteau and to the 
newly receptive government. Likewise Cousteau's strengths were invaluable in 
campaign in France. An independent organisation with great control over its 
strong popular membership, its activities were focussed strongly on France 
where its head had a widely esteemed position and access to the top levels of 
government. 
NEW ZEALAND 
A TARGET FOR CHANGE 
New Zealand held a unique position in regard to CRAMRA because of the 
role of senior diplomat Chris Beeby as chairman of negotiations from start to 
finish. As a result this country tended to be seen as one that was pushing the 
establishment of a regime, though national observers say it was more of a 
mediating role. (Dingwall interview, 1992) The amount of work NZ diplomats 
undertook - the regime underwent development as a succession of "Beeby 
drafts" - and its control of the agenda also meant that the state retained 
considerable prestige and identification with the end product among other 
nations. In a more general sense, New Zealand also has close geographic and 
logistic links with Antarctica, and historically it had in the past been an advocate 
of a world park. For these reasons many of the New Zealand population are 
argued to have been more familiar with CRAMRA and the environmental 
arguments in relation to Antarctica than were the populations of European 
countries. 
In ASOC's assessment, a campaign against the minerals regime in New 
Zealand presented a double-edged sword. "We knew that Beeby was really 
important, and there was a lot of country personal pride, but we also knew that 
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there was a lot of dissension in the populace. We had a very strong ASOC 
group, a very strong connection with Antarctica, and a very strong concern 
about there being no conflict there." (Goldsworthy interview 1993). 
INT RAGOVERNMENTAL MOVEMENT TO CHANGE 
The NGO campaigners in New Zealand strongly believed that the 
CRAMRA agenda had been captured and held by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs to the exclusion of other departments since negotiations began. In the 
normal course of events, it must be the case with international treaty talks that 
the lead is taken by diplomats. But these campaigners were convinced that other 
departments were in practice almost totally excluded. The immediate task many 
of them saw was to break this hegemony as quickly as possible, and to engage 
other departments in the debate. Wallace recalls: "We had been for years trying 
to drag the debate out of the back rooms of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. We 
had the devil of a job getting the Ministry of the Environment or Department of 
Conservation to take the thing seriously. For years we had just been petitioning 
at Foreign Affairs' door. We had been allowed to go up and see Chris Beeby 
from time to time, and he would listen to us, but that's how it was. There was 
no sense that this was a robust governmental process." (Wallace interview 
1993) Here is stark evidence of Oran Young's view of foreign ministries as 
impulsive defenders of the status quo (Young 1989a, 75). 
As in other countries in this era, NGOs in New Zealand were advantaged in 
that the normal course of events leading up to domestic ratification now meant 
that there should be a legitimate involvement by other departments such as 
Environment, Conservation, and the Antarctic agency, the Department of 
Scientific and Industrial Research. However they regarded a key breakthrough 
as being the emergence of a skilled new Director-General of Conservation, 
David McDowell. Now in 1994 executive director of IUCN, he was appointed 
to the DG's post in late 1988 upon return from a posting as UN Ambassador. 
Wallace recalls McDowell successfully persuaded the Environment Department 
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to raise the seniority of its negotiator; to set up a round of meetings with other 
agencies - and include NG0s. 
The real importance of the French-Australian initiative seemed to impact only 
slowly on New Zealand's official view. Poorly regarded in Wellington because 
of its recent regional history, France was portrayed by officials and then by 
politicians as merely opportunist. (Wallace interview, 1993.) Likewise, 
Australia was painted by Foreign Affairs Minister Marshall as having given a 
short term response to the Tasmanian election result. (Palmer, 1990a) New 
Zealand was also preoccupied with a leadership crisis at the time in the contest 
between Prime Minister David Lange and Finance Minister Roger Douglas. 
This culminated with the resignation of Lange on 7 August 1989, and the 
elevation of Geoffrey Palmer to the leadership. Palmer took his old portfolio, 
Environment, with him to the Prime Minister's department. Two days later the 
government released its White Paper on the Antarctic Environment. This paper 
"sets out elements of an integrated and binding environmental protection regime 
for Antarctica that is to be promoted by New Zealand" (Antarctic Treaty 1989, 
215). It represented an acknowledgement that the international position was 
shifting, but did not commit New Zealand to a specific national response. 
"Ultimately, changing world opinion may lead the treaty nations to reach a 
consensus that Antarctica should be accorded permanent protection from 
extractive industries in toto. Such a consensus, if reached, would be in accord 
with New Zealand's policy goals" (Friends of the Earth 1989b). The White 
Paper was accompanied by a directive that NZ Government departments consult 
with NGOs to develop policy advice, improving the "atmospherics" 
(Hemmings, 1989). But it was seen by NGO members as extremely 
ambiguous. "It was designed to be read in New Zealand [as if] they were going 
to give up the minerals thing, and in the rest of the world as absolutely no 
change in position." (Wallace interview, 1993). Wallace and others spoke out 
publicly in New Zealand against this position. 
Despite this the White Paper was evidence that the issue was opening up in 
New Zealand, and NGOs maintained their campaigning pressure. They were 
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assisted by a decision by Palmer to recruit McDowell to head the Prime 
Minister's department. ASOC access in the Government improved markedly. 
Wallace cites instances from August 1989 onward in which NGOs received 
and exchanged information with elements of the government in Wellington 
about movement in other ATCPs, and acted at times as information provider on 
these international movements. For instance Wallace cited an E-Mail bulletin 
from Washington: "USA has signed CRAMRA, ratification procedures deferred 
indefinitely following a request from the Council on Environmental Quality and 
the EPA for a review of US Antarctic policy and interests prior to submission to 
the Senate" (Wallace interview, 1993). By giving this information to New 
Zealand politicians, NGOs were able to argue from a position of strength 
against the idea that most forces internationally were unwaveringly committed to 
CRAMRA. NGOs used their information to rebut claims by NZ officials that 
the French and Australian positions were temporary aberrations and show that 
in fact there had been a sea change in these countries' policies. This is a 
striking illustration of the abilities that NGO actors can exert as information 
brokers, affirming Willetts' observation of pressure groups' unique strength in 
this role. 
As ATCM XV approached, the New Zealand NGOs saw their priority 
domestically as being to "create space" in the national position. A "roadshow" 
around the country using video and speaker presentations in many towns was 
organised by Greenpeace. (Weeber interview, 1993). NGOs lobbied MPs as 
well. The discovery of the United States Policy and Program document which 
confirmed its interest in mineral rights was seen as instrumental in changing the 
view of some Government backbenchers. "The importance of the US Document 
should not be under-stated," said Hemmings. "We had presented the property 
rights argument before, but that was just an opinion until we found the 
document. This pulled the rug out from under the advocates of CRAMRA to 
some extent. It was something New Zealand MPs could understand." 
(Hemmings interview, 1993) 
Eventually the New Zealand government took a proposal for protection of 
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the Antarctic environment to ATCM XV, based on the White Paper and 
consultation with NGOs in which the delegation says "a measure of agreement 
was reached." (Antarctic Treaty 1989, 215) New Zealand maintained implicit 
support for CRAMRA, saying an environmental protection instrument should 
not "duplicate or replace the work of the past thirty years". 
GOVERNMENT POLICY CHANGES UNDER PRESSURE 
Early in 1990 the New Zealand Government moved significantly away from 
CRAMRA only the day before Cousteau arrived on a well-publicised lobbying 
tour. Palmer said that New Zealand would "set aside" consideration of the 
ratification of CRAMRA and seek a "creative solution" to try to "break the 
impasse among treaty nations." (Palmer 1990a, 1) At a subsequent press 
conference Palmer qualified the New Zealand position by saying CRAMRA 
was set aside "for the moment". He also put New Zealand forward as a broker 
at a time when the treaty system itself was in peril (Palmer, 1990a 3-5). 
This position did not satisfy NCrOs who saw "setting aside" to be temporary. 
They continued to pressure Palmer to announce the abandonment of CRAMRA. 
They consulted with his government on the solution to the CRAMRA impasse 
and were acknowledged as participants by Palmer when the government moved 
again in July, with promotion of a new Protocol on Environment Protection, 
and moratorium on mining "independent of the minerals convention." (Palmer 
1990b, 1). 
In this statement he rejected unspecific claims that the government had a 
hidden agenda on CRAMRA. However within days, the New Zealand NGOs 
were alleging just that in a meeting before him. ASOC NZ alleged that, at a 
conference held by the Nansen Foundation in Oslo in May 1990, Beeby had 
taken part with other senior ATS diplomats in the preparation of a non-paper 
inimical to the mining ban/world park stance. At a subsequent meeting with 
Palmer the NGOs directly tackled the Prime Minister. "It was just a classic 
statement of bureaucratic capture of policy," Wallace said. "We said, 'you've 
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got to give us a form of words which give us a permanent ban'. It was my view 
that it was this meeting where he changed his mind." 
The following month Palmer addressed the annual conference of the peak 
environmental organisation ECO, and used the words "permanent ban" on 
mining. That evening he said on television that the government's policy was a 
permanent ban. (Wallace interview, 1993.) New Zealand subsequently carried 
this position forward in the ATS, modifying it only at the final negotiation of 
the PEP. 
On reflection it appears that the real scene of battle for New Zealand non-
state actors was inside Wellington's bureaucratic apparatus. There was a 
thorough public campaign and for a time it was a divisive partisan issue, with 
the Opposition National Party favouring a world park and permanent ban as 
early as May 1989. But it took the New Zealand Government two years to 
change its mind thoroughly and come out for a mining ban; a pace that on the 
surface seemed to have been dictated by concerns about the safety of the ATS, 
but behind the scenes was argued by NGOs to be the result of attempts to 
overcome the authority and control on the policy held by the Department of 
Foreign Affairs. Eventually the NGO argument prevailed. They were assisted 
in doing so by fortuitous political events such as the rise of more amenable 
bureaucrats and politicians. But they advanced their own cause by obtaining and 
providing information to these decision makers that countered the view 
presented by Foreign Affairs. This bureaucratic actor's position held sway 
against a growing international isolation and national public opposition to 
CRAMRA. Eventually with these factors undiminished, its legitimacy was 
brought into question by non-state actors who established their authority with a 
credible information-broking capacity. ASOC's attribute as an expert in the 
Antarctic field clearly made a difference in turning the bureaucracy around. Its 
ability to gain standing from an important diplomat in McDowell demonstrated 
the importance of such relationships with reasonably like-minded bureaucrats. 
Some resources were devoted to a public campaign, and the appearance of a 
reasonably high profile international environmentalist in Cousteau may have 
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been of assistance in bolstering the national campaign. NGOs can claim to have 
done much to prise New Zealand free of CRAMRA advocacy and bring it into 
line in the campaign against minerals exploitation. 
UNITED KINGDOM 
STRENGTH OF SUPPORT FOR CRAMRA 
In Antarctic politics Britain held an influential position long before the 
negotiation of the 1959 treaty. This standing was due to its former role as a 
powerful maritime nation and explorer of Antarctica, continuing South Atlantic 
interests including territorial claims, high prestige of its science in such works 
as the discovery of the ozone hole by Farman et al., and the clear leadership of 
its diplomats. In the period under examination this influence was personified in 
the Head of the Polar Regions Section, South American Department, Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office, John Heap. A junior officer at the time of the 
negotiation of the treaty, Heap's seniority and expertise in the ATS made him 
and his country a key negotiator of CRAMRA. When it came under challenge 
he gave a powerful warning about the effect of scrapping CRAMRA on the 
treaty system as a whole. "It would be a tragedy if CRAMRA, the flower of 30 
years of development of the ATS - not just six years active negotiation - were 
now to be lost," Heap warned after the Australia-France initiative began. "Its 
survival, like all else in the ATS, will depend on no-one pushing anyone else 
into an intolerable position." (Herr 1990, 187.) Britain's attitude toward the 
Antarctic was summed up by the senior WWF member, Cassandra Phillips, as 
conservative. "An old exploring country, very much involved with drafting the 
treaty and very much aware of how that stops fighting breaking out, because it 
was a very tense situation in the 1940s and 1950s. The Falklands [war] 
reinforced that." (Phillips interview, 1992). Domestically in Britain, the 
Foreign Office held a dominant role in determining government policy. 
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Representatives of Trade and Industry, and Energy ministries took part in 
CRAMRA delegations; however NGOs had no place in them. 
After the conclusion of CRAMRA, Britain proceeded to back it strenuously. 
Prime Minister Thatcher rejected a request by Hawke to join an anti-CRAMRA 
campaign. At ATCM XV, Britain joined the United States in a concerted attack 
on the French-Australian initiative, and particularly the wilderness reserve 
proposal. Heap went so far as to suggest minerals activities were not 
necessarily environmentally unsustainable. (Grutzner, 1989c). In 1990 despite 
the question marks the wilderness reserve campaign raised over the viability of 
CRAMRA, the government attacked the Australian position. As the Antarctic 
Minerals Bill passed through the House of Commons, a junior Foreign Office 
minister, Tim Eggar, said a complete ban on mining activity would be 
impossible to enforce and could lead to uncontrolled exploitation. (Press 
Association, 1990) Soon after in a background document the British Foreign 
Office described the initiative as "outside the realms of practical politics". 
(Porritt, 1990) 
Later in the year at SCM XI-i in Vina del Mar, Britain continued to hold 
out. "The United Kingdom continues to believe that the minerals convention 
already in existence provides the only mechanism on offer that has the capacity 
to defuse an otherwise explosive political issue, and regulate mineral activities 
in a way that meets all reasonable environmental demands." (Antarctic Treaty 
1990, UK). 
This, then, was the determined policy position NGOs in Britain faced in 
their efforts to force this leading country to change its mind. Unlike other 
countries, it did not start either from the base of an amenable government; nor 
was there even a partial split in the bureaucracy. Instead there was a firm and 
internally powerful advocacy of CRAMRA to overcome. 
GROWTH OF DOMESTIC LOBBYING CAMPAIGN 
A factor in NGOs' favour in the surrounding political atmosphere was 
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Britain's poor reputation on the environment at the time. It was under pressure 
from many environmental NGOs for failing to comply with European 
Community directives, and for defending the rights of industry above the 
general population. The "Dirty Man of Europe" was an epithet these NGOs 
extended into the Antarctic campaign. Along the lines of the Cousteau 
Foundation's work, Greenpeace and WWF in Britain in 1989 began jointly 
organising a world park petition that eventually gained in excess of one million 
signatures. (Martin-Jones, interview 1992). Likewise there grew a campaign of 
letter writing to British MPs. Phillips believes eventually this had a telling 
effect. "Virtually every MP got tens if not hundreds of letters. The system (at 
Westminster) is that they pass them straight on to the relevant government 
department and say, what is the answer to this? So in this case the Foreign 
Office felt enormous pressure from this direct source. That undoubtedly had an 
effect on why Britain changed." (Phillips interview, 1992). But it must be said 
that the campaigns by these organisations were little different from what was 
occurring in many other countries, particularly those in Europe. 
In the face of the specially conservative approach to the issue taken in 
Britain, one of the fortunate facets of the public campaign was the decision by a 
venerable and quite powerful conservative NGO to join in advocacy of a world 
park. The National Federation of Womens Institutes' 300,000 members are in 
branches in many rural towns and villages of Britain. "They tend to be middle-
aged or elderly ladies, largely housewives rather than working women, and 
mostly staunch Tory voters." (Phillips interview, 1992). Each year the WI 
takes up several resolutions from its grassroots to be debated at the annual 
meeting. It was an important indication of the extent of public feeling on the 
issue in Britain that in 1990 backing for a mining ban and world park came up 
as such a resolution for debate, and approval, before the 75th anniversary 
meeting of the WI attended by Queen Elizabeth. Already Prince Phillip, the 
president of WWF, had supported a world park. The imprimatur of the royal 
family on the issue was important to that group of Britons. "Having the 
Women's Institute was a wonderful coup," said Phillips. (Phillips interview, 
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1992.) It meant that when the NGO case was put before the governing 
Conservative Party conference later in 1990, WI lobbyists were there alongside 
the regular green groups. (Porritt, 1990). Through such means the NGO 
campaign thereby gained a legitimacy in Britain that began to counter even the 
entrenched hold of the Foreign Office. 
But the traffic was not entirely one way. A view emerged from some British 
scientists that a world park campaign would conflict with science in Antarctica. 
This was expressed at a Royal Geographical Society technical meeting entitled 
"Antarctica: Conflict or Consensus", in London in March 1990. Three months 
later the science-based government arm, the British Antarctic Survey, claimed 
some NGOs were, through their campaign, posing a direct challenge to the 
activities of people generally in Antarctica. "The total banning of all human 
activity in this region, as promulgated by some groups, has to be seen against 
the possibility of using the unique natural observatory conditions of Antarctica 
to address questions of global relevance," wrote Dr David Drewry, BAS 
director. (Drewry, 1990). 
This kind of counter-attack on world park advocates, which centred in 
Britain, forced NGOs to respond in material such as the Greenpeace  
Background Paper For An Eighth UN Debate.  There was also a specially 
prepared booklet, clarifying how the objectives of NGOs could work in parallel 
with science.(Greenpeace International, 1991c) 
A LEADERSHIP CHANGE AND AN OUTCOME 
At the end of 1990 the door that had been closed to NGOs began to swing 
ajar with the ousting of Thatcher from the Prime Ministership. Under domestic 
pressure in the face of a forthcoming 1991 election, the Conservatives 
overthrew her in favour of John Major. "It wasn't until Mrs Thatcher had 
gone that the change came," said Phillips. "We'd probably still be struggling if 
she was still there.. .It was the US of course who held out for the very longest, 
and Margaret Thatcher was always hand in glove with them." (Phillips 
interview, 1992). One of the key figures in Thatcher's overthrow was Michael 
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Heseltine, who lost the subsequent leadership contest and was relegated to the 
Environment portfolio. "He was keen on the dramatic gesture, and [the 
Antarctic initiative] appealed to him. His officials were perfectly happy with the 
idea of overturning CRAMRA and having the protocol." (Phillips interview 
1992) 
This change coincided with the Vina del Mar meeting, and also with the 
General Assembly of IUCN in Perth, Western Australia, which provided a 
good illustration of the implacability of Britain in the presence of the world's 
peak environment promotion forum. The IUCN assembly passed a resolution 
calling for a comprehensive environment protection regime and a permanent ban 
on mining. In debate the UK opposed this, and it appeared that a vote may be 
necessary; a poor outcome for a body that likes to operate consensually across 
a broad spectrum of opinion. "In the end, the UK managed to get slightly 
changed instructions from London which allowed them to let the resolution 
through by consensus, although they made a statement for the record saying 
that, had a vote been necessary, the UK delegation would have abstained." 
(Phillips 1990, 4). 
By early 1991 as the new political leadership bedded in and the changed 
Antarctic wind blew in from Vina del Mar, a slight shift in Britain's position 
became apparent. On 25 March the Foreign Office announced that in an effort 
to find a new consensus, the UK was proposing a moratorium on Antarctic 
mineral prospecting and exploitation. "The length of the moratorium and the 
mechanism for its termination or extension are issues which we hope will be 
taken forward by ATPs at their next meeting in Madrid." (United Kingdom 
FC0 1991, 1). Though outwardly a significant step away from mining, in fact 
the detailed proposal still clung to CRAMRA. "The proposal is for a fixed term 
moratorium.. .which is to be kept under constant review and requiring, prior to 
its expiry, compulsory negotiation of a minerals resource regime...The UK 
proposal would create expectations of the inevitability of mining and does not 
take adequate account of the views of many countries and international public 
opinion that mining should not take place in Antarctica." (Australia DFAT, 
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1991a, 3). 
WVVF-UK then deliberately attempted to raise pressure on the government 
ahead of the forthcoming general election. It invited Gerald Kaufman, UK 
Labour Party spokesman on Foreign Affairs, to Madrid. Kaufman held a press 
conference there in support of the environmental NGOs' proposal. "Kaufman 
said his party, if elected, would support a permanent ban on mining and a 
comprehensive environmental protection regime." (ASOC 1991b, 1). It is 
unclear how important this partisan move was in shifting the government. It 
certainly has worth as an indication of the strengthening debate on this issue 
domestically in Britain. 
At this session, where Japan and Germany announced major shifts towards 
the mining ban and protocol, the hold-out countries were left at just two. The 
UK moved further by agreeing, with the other parties, to consider a draft text 
of the protocol with its exclusion of CRAMRA and a 50 year mining ban. A 
question still remained in the minds of UK NGOs however, about whether the 
British Cabinet would endorse this position. "We assumed they would. [Heap] 
must have had clearance to do what he had done in Madrid. Nevertheless other 
ministries wanted to keep the Antarctic available for mining. They were 
blinkered. So a discussion still went on in Cabinet..." (Phillips interview, 
1992). Finally in the week after XI-SCM Second Session in April, the British 
Government announced support for the emerging consensus, and backing for 
the protocol. "The story is that John Major said: 'oh, I'm fed up with this. Cut 
the cackle. We'll sign this. We won't stand out against it'." (Phillips interview, 
1992). 
Though NGOs appear to have mounted a strengthening campaign in Britain 
which partially undermined the long-held power held by the Foreign Office, it is 
less clear whether they were decisive in winning this issue domestically. Once 
again non-state actors tackled the foreign affairs agency as a staunch advocate of 
compliance, and through a public campaign that crossed traditional political 
barriers built themselves a strong momentum at Westminster against Whitehall. 
Phillips is convinced the NGO-organised petition and letters to MPs were of 
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great importance in demonstrating that the popular will had moved in favour of 
the main environment promotion group, WWF. Its attributes of an international 
standing, strong resource base and popular membership were no doubt 
important in its capacity to influence. But the lack of an intimately connected 
Antarctic environmental NGO presence such as was held by ASOC may have 
counted against non-state actors when dealing with such a prestigious Antarctic 
state. 
Certainly BAS's entry to the debate represented a stinging attack from the 
bureaucracy on the environmentalist campaign. Because of the strong presence 
of Antarctic scientists in this country, it also represented SCAR's best chance of 
influencing a course of events. But it did not. Instead its ineffectualness 
demonstrated Boulding's observation earlier in this work that in the NGO 
world, the time of the educated elite has passed, and the non-government world 
is now opening up to the local activist. 
When Britain moved, it did so relatively quickly. In six months it shifted 
from solidly backing CRAMRA to supporting the mining ban. There is little 
doubt that the mood of the electorate was greening generally, and in a pre-
election atmosphere there was additional reason for the British government to 
adopt the changed circumstances. In addition, by the time Britain came around, 
the international consensus was well and truly swinging away from CRANfRA 
and in favour of the protocol. It would be wrong to consider this shift in the 
domestic contest in Britain in isolation from a sea change in international 
Antarctic politics, though this owed much to the mass of NGO-inspired 
campaigns internationally. 
THE UNITED STATES  
A TARGET FOR CHANGE 
Despite its dominant position in world politics and key role in negotiation of 
CRAMRA and any future exploitation of Antarctic minerals, the United States 
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was not a first round choice of ASOC members planning a strategic approach to 
defeating the minerals regime (Goldsworthy interview, 1993). Though 
commonsense says the above factors made it essential to carry out a determined 
campaign in the United States if the overall strategy was to succeed, they also 
made it too ambitious a target for a campaign that had as its initial goal only 
stalling ratification. However it was a second round choice, (Goldsworthy, 
interview, 1993) and the campaign that unfolded over three years was fought 
long and hard through several theatres. 
The Washington Administration at the time was not regarded as responsive to 
US environment promotion non-state actors. "Bush promoted himself as an 
environmental president, but I don't think he had the support of Greenpeace, 
ASOC, The Wilderness Society or other groups active on this issue." 
(Schwabacher interview, 1993). The US had continually taken a strong interest 
in negotiation of CRAMRA as part of its dedication to the ATS. It clearly had 
long valued the system as a means of ensuring multilateral international co-
operation in the region. "The United States will firmly resist any effort to 
weaken, undermine or replace the system," the UN was told by the US 
delegate in 1983, and this is typical of the attitude that continued through the 
course of CRAMRA negotiations. 
Washington's chief Antarctic negotiator Tucker Scully was seen as one of the 
influential core group who did much to determine general Antarctic policy, as 
well as the direction of CRAMRA. The size of the task environment promotion 
NGOs faced is sharply delineated by an example such as Scully's testimony 
before a congressional sub-committee in which he dismissed the French-
Australian initiative's likelihood of success in one word: "no", and said it posed 
a danger to the Antarctic environment because it was unlikely to achieve a 
consensus. (Hope, 1989). There is no evidence that the policy-making 
represented by such remarks came under substantial internal challenge until well 
after campaigns had begun to reap success in other countries. 
Environmental NGOs were additionally handicapped by their lack of a place 
in the US delegation, and therefore a means to influence or know closely the 
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mechanics behind the development of its policy. NGOs' place on the delegation 
was held throughout the CRAMRA negotiations by Lee Kimball, representing 
the balanced development promotional NGO, the World Resources Institute. 
Kimball, a long-serving representative, was closely familiar with the State 
Department's position. Against the environmental NGOs' trend she continued 
to advocate CRAMRA as the best means of ensuring environmental protection 
for the continent. 
Such factors as these represented serious obstacles to NGOs' viability as 
political actors in the US sphere. At the outset in 1988, the legitimacy of the 
US position on the ATS was well established and under no bureaucratic or 
Congressional challenge. On the other hand, US democratic processes offered 
ready means for starting a campaign of change, particularly through the 
mechanics of Congress and the receptivity of the media and the general public. 
THE PUBLIC CAMPAIGN 
A small number of NGOs including ASOC and Greenpeace was always 
ready to educate the public about Antarctic issues, and CRAMRA in particular. 
Among wealthier US citizens, the growth of Antarctic tourism in the late 1980s 
was an indication of broadening interest in the natural values of the region. But 
not until the loss of the two ships, Bahia Paraiso and Exxon Valdez, were 
environmental NGOs able to link the concepts of environmental damage and 
Antarctic minerals exploitation in the minds of a wider public. 
The grounding and subsequent capsize of the Argentine supply/tourist ship 
Bahia Paraiso off the US Palmer station on 29 January 1989 presented the US 
Government with a logistical challenge that obtained widespread publicity at 
home. The Government sent from South Carolina an airborne task force with 
the aim of cleaning up 950,000 litres of fuel oil spilled. Despite the scale of this 
operation, the difficulty of achieving a successful clean-up became apparent 
when it took another week's steaming from South America for the task force to 
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reach the site. The flavour and extent of reporting of the event is indicated in 
articles like the following: "Sunken ship's oil spill held a peril to antarctic 
wildlife" -The New York Times, "Antarctic oil spill takes heavy toll on animal 
life" -The Miami Herald, "Scientists fear rise in visitors to Antarctica will hurt 
ecology" -Detriot News, "Not-so-isolated Antarctica suffers growing 
pollution" - The Oregonian.. 
Two months later, the super tanker Exxon Valdez ran aground and was 
holed, spilling about 50 million litres of crude oil in Prince William Sound, 
Alaska. Not only did this rate highly as a world environmental catastrophe, it 
involved US corporations, government and environmentalists in a drawn-out 
and very public argument nationally about an event that had as its visual focus 
a previously rich sub-polar ecosystem. It was as near as the Antarctic NGOs 
could get to proof of their dire warnings. Said the US campaigner Beth Marks: 
"It had big importance. It alerted the public...of what could happen if you had 
oil spilling in a polar environment. It really made people sit up and take notice." 
(Marks interview, 1993). This increase in the level of general awareness was 
important to NGOs trying to establish their credibility on the Antarctic issue. It 
ameliorated the difficult task of growing the anti-CRAMRA public campaign in 
the United States. 
"Working on public opinion is much harder in the US," said WWF's 
Phillips. "It's so huge and diverse and parochial. There are virtually no national 
newspapers, the quality of the television is so low." (Phillips interview, 1992). 
At the same time Marks, formerly of the long standing US environmental NGO, 
the Sierra Club, succinctly showed both the vital importance of reaching the 
public, and how that was made to count: "The way people like (Senator Al) 
Gore and so on work is that they need to know their constituents are pleased 
with what they do. They need to know the people back home support them. 
Groups like us can get letters coming from back home. In the Sierra Club we 
have each [Congressional] member's district as well as their name. So if we 
want to reach a particular Congress person we can focus on particular [Sierra 
Club] members in that district. It doesn't take a lot of letters." (Marks interview 
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1993). 
The decision by a group of leading domestic NGOs to band together in an 
"Alliance for Antarctica" was a further indication of the growing strength of this 
campaign. "In the States everyone wants their identity; a coalition is very 
fragile. With a coalition your members don't see you as setting a lead. But on 
this one issue it was felt that it was bigger than any of us, so we did work 
together." (Marks interview 1993). ASOC commenced the alliance building, 
which emerged as a viable step in September 1989 when joint action was put 
on the agenda for a "Group of 10" meeting of large environmental NG0s, 
including Environment Defense Fund, Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth, The Wilderness Society, the Audubon 
Society and National Parks and Conservation Association. "We have prepared 
another briefing document for them, and [FOE] president Mike Clark will be 
urging that everyone join us in opposing CRA.MRA and supporting the 
Australian initiative." (Barnes 1989, 2). By early the following year this 
alliance was writing to seek a meeting with the Secretary of State, James Baker, 
on what it described as "one of the most important global environmental issues 
of the day"; (Clarke 1990, 1). 
Operating separately were other important NGO components, especially the 
Cousteau Society. "We work hard not to associate with coalitions. ..But from a 
policy perspective of course we're all working towards similar goals. There is a 
lot of information sharing for those participating in the campaign..." 
(Schwabacher interview, 1993). The petition campaign begun in France 
spread significantly to the US, where Schwabacher claimed eventually 600,000 
signatures were taken. In a move to reach mass audiences, Captain Cousteau 
also took to Antarctica six children, one from each of the other continents, to 
film a television production that was released in France and the United States. 
"With that came key appearances on network morning shows and late night 
shows with Captain Cousteau and [his son/successor] Jean Michel to promote 
the campaign message." (Schwabacher interview, 1993). 
The public campaign by NGOs in the United States was, therefore, 
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widespread through the membership. Part of its importance lay in the unusual 
NGO alliance building, which alerted members to the special nature of the 
issue. NGOs had clearly begun to establish their credibility among the public 
on this issue. It moved at times into mass media, with the Exxon Valdez and 
BahiaParaiso losses proving to be consciousness raisers. Yet signs were few 
that the NGO position gained greater public acceptance than the entrenched 
government position. In October 1989 when the Los Angeles Times 
editorialised urging a US reassessment and world park designation (Los 
Angeles Times, 1989), it was one of the very few signs of progress. 
WORKING THROUGH THE CONGRESS 
The passage of the CRAMRA/PEP issue through the US Congress provides 
a key demonstration in the context of the current work of the access to formal 
democratic processes so important to non-state actors in their attempts to raise 
pressure for change. Authorities referred to earlier commented that in pluralist 
systems, states can provide vehicles for NGO achievement in bureaucratic and 
political organs. In the case of the United States, this was amply demonstrated 
as the environment promotion NGOs engaged themselves with as many 
vehicles for achievement as possible. They allied themselves with a 
serendipitously useful senior politician, took on the Congressional committees 
process, and enmeshed themselves in legislative drafting. All of these moves 
helped to build a momentum against the US Administration's solid backing of 
CRAMRA. 
One of the happy coincidences of the environmentalist campaign was the 
decision by the then US Senator Al Gore to take up a VIP tour to Antarctica the 
National Science Foundation offered to prominent Americans. This trip 
spurred his interest in the region, at a time when these NCrOs needed a powerful 
ally. Clearly, though Senator Gore had failed to become Democratic nominee 
for the presidency in 1988, he was an obvious force to be reckoned with in the 
following electoral cycle. He travelled to Amundsen-Scott station at the South 
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Pole in the last quarter of 1988, and later described his concern about global 
damage being caused to the Antarctic environment by US CO2 emissions, yet 
"two continents away from Washington". (Gore 1992, v). 
"Al Gore came to [the campaign] on his own," said Marks. "The NSF took 
him down there [to Antarctica] and he just fell in love with the place. He's 
always been useful; he's always been our friend." (Marks interview 1993). 
"Also around the same time he was president of an organisation called GLOBE, 
Global Legislators for the Environment. They came out with a proclamation 
about the importance of the Antarctic, and how mining should be excluded." 
Australian Prime Minister Hawke made contact with Senator Gore soon after 
committing against CRAMRA (Greene, 1989) and maintained contact as the 
campaign developed (Gordon, 1989). However Gore's involvement in this 
campaign was national in focus, rather than international, a factor that gave 
domestic US NGO members important access to the Congressional process. 
With their sometimes close help, he and other like-minded legislators worked 
through Congress to block CRAMRA and encourage an environmental 
protection regime. 
The first step in this direction came in September 1989 when Senator Gore 
introduced a "Sense of the Senate" resolution calling on the US to encourage 
immediate negotiations toward a new agreement among ATCPs for the full 
protection of Antarctica as a global ecological commons. Though not binding, 
such a resolution was regarded as very useful. "Although the resolution is not 
quite as strong as we would like, it is a very good first step," Barnes 
commented (Barnes 1989, 2). The language chosen by Senator Gore again 
avoided the use of the term "world park". But it was a clear indication NGOs 
and Senator Gore were travelling on close parallel paths. 
The next phase of congressional activity came in 1990 when debate focussed 
on two issues which, the government's National Science Foundation later 
conceded, were driven in the Congress by environment promotion groups. 
"First, environmentalists, concerned about perceived weaknesses in CRAMRA, 
pushed for legislation to ban permanently mining.... Secondly they advocated 
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extending the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) to Antarctica, 
including the NSF's... research program." (Reuning 1991a, 8) Consideration 
of this legislation involved hearing testimony before congressional committees; 
a process that NGOs focussed upon closely. Marks testified during that period. 
"When you testify you are basically going on the record stating the facts. Some 
people will tell you it's tokenistic, but I don't believe that. If you have enough 
sway with those who are writing the bills, you usually get your objectives into 
that bill. In fact most of the law passed on the Antarctic are bills that we had a 
large part in, or at least in working with people ]in Congress]." (Marks 
interview 1993) 
Adding political weight to this set of congressional considerations was their 
timing: near the mid-term elections in November 1990. This is not to suggest 
Antarctica became a major election issue. But in the context of growing 
environmental awareness generally, it was a relatively cost-free option for the 
environment promotion NGOs to urge upon electorally-sensitised legislators. 
These NGOs represented by Barnes, Cousteau and others gave testimony 
calling for the abandonment of CRAMRA and negotiation of a world park or 
similar at two separate hearings: before the Congressional sub-committee on 
Oversight and Investigations in March 1990; and US House of Representatives 
sub-committee on Human Rights and International Organizations in May and 
June of 1990. 
Not all non-state testimony was in favour of environmentalists' ends. The 
World Resources Institute's Kimball addressed both hearings seeking the 
maintenance of CRAMRA and warning that its collapse would leave the whole 
ATS endangered. The mining lobby also made an appearance that consisted 
mainly of an attack upon CRAMRA as a mechanism. Keith Knoblock of the 
American Mining Congress claimed it would "spawn a huge bureaucracy". He 
objected to consensus provisions and to the CRAMRA commission's possible 
role in "foisting" joint venturers onto operators. (United States of America 
1990a, 249-256). 
These non-environmentalist positions carried little weight in the Congress 
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where two laws subsequently passed unanimously. The "Antarctic Protection 
Act of 1990" sponsored by representative Silvio Conte (R-MA) and Senator 
John Kerry (D-MA) imposed an indefinite ban on Antarctic mineral resources 
activities by American citizens. It also urged other nations to join the United 
States effort to develop comprehensive environmental protection for Antarctica. 
This was the most contentious piece of legislation for the NG0s. As 
originally drafted it would have obliged the State Department to enter into an 
agreement internationally to ban mining in Antarctica. "That bill was very 
difficult. Up until the last minute we were negotiating with words people could 
live with...We had to give up a little," Marks said. "It banned US nationals 
[from mining], but it suggested the Secretary of State enter into an international 
agreement." (Marks interview, 1993) This was much less forceful language. 
The NSF also took exception to the bill as drafted, claiming that by extending 
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) to the US program, private 
litigants - presumably environmental NGOs - would have been given the 
authority to seek injunctions and halt important research projects, regardless of 
NSF's compliance with environmental assessments or impact statements." 
(Reuning 1991a, 8). 
A second piece of legislation passed as a resolution in 1990. Resolution 
206, sponsored by Representative Wayne Owens (D-UT) and Senator Gore 
encouraged immediate negotiations towards a new agreement among ATCPs on 
comprehensive environmental protection and indefinitely clOsing Antarctica to 
commercial minerals development by Americans. They were signed into law by 
President Bush in late November 1990. 
This was by no means the end of the road for the Administration, and 
particularly the State Department, in its desire to keep open the mining option. 
However this signing did mark an important milestone for the NGOs nationally. 
Working co-operatively with like-minded politicians, they were able to gain a 
political momentum towards their Antarctic objectives and additionally, heavily 
circumscribe Administration options. Through a concerted campaign, 
environmental NGOs in alliance had visibly proved their cause to be more 
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acceptable to the Congress than those advocates of CRAMRA either in, or out, 
of government. Timed as this result was ahead of SCM XI-i, it also tied a great 
millstone around the neck of the minerals regime internationally. 
WORKING ON THE ADMINISTRATION 
There was early help from within the apparatus of the US Administration 
for NGOs that provided evidence that in the long-run they might succeed too. 
This came from people that the environmentalists describe as "friends" of their 
work. According to Phillips of WWF, such people included the head of the 
Environmental Protection Agency, Bill Riley, who was previously an employee 
of WWF, and E.U. Curtis "Buff' Bohlen, who worked for WWF for 20 years 
and was the Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and Environment and 
International Affairs. He became the chief negotiator for the State Department 
on Antarctic matters. "Things like that were a great help", she said. (Phillips 
interview, 1992) 
Valuable time for the environmentalist campaign was bought when in 
September 1989 Riley's EPA took formal steps that effectively blocked the 
Administration from submitting CRAMRA for ratification quickly. The EPA 
compelled a legislative Environmental Impact Assessment, and also called for a 
complete review of US policy regarding minerals development in the Antarctic. 
(Barnes 1989, 1). This is not to suggest that Riley complied because of his past 
association with WWF. But this past linkage does indicate that important 
members of the bureaucracy and environment promotion groups may have been 
like-minded. 
At the same time the State Department was maintaining the correctness of 
CRAMRA both in Congressional forums and externally. It told ATCM XV in 
Paris that a total ban on mineral resources activity was not negotiable, and the 
instrument offered adequate environmental protection. "The Wellington 
convention is being misrepresented," Scully told the media there. "It is being 
misrepresented as an agreement that calls for exploitation and that is simply, 
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absolutely, not true." (Grutzner, 1989b) Despite the developments in 
Congress, the Administration held to the regime and opposed a wilderness park 
concept through early March 1990 after New Zealand's change of course 
(Legge, 1990) and into Congressional hearings. 
It was at these hearings that Bohlen, representing the State Department, 
began to give indications of both a possible future inclination against CRAMRA 
and the internal dispute in the Administration, under lively questioning from 
Representative Owens. Bohlen began by saying the US needed the minerals 
treaty, presenting the argument that it prevented the chaotic prospect of nations 
determining their own approach to minerals exploitation. (United States of 
America 1990b, 124). Yet in testimony he also agreed public opinion in the 
world was changing that the US had not foreclosed on any option , and that 
there was no possibility of CRAMRA going into effect as it was currently 
conceived. Finally, the Congressman's questioning opened a door on a split 
among agencies of the Administration. 
"Mr Owens: So you know of no substantive support, then, for a 
permanent ban in Antarctica within the administration?" 
"Mr Bohlen: Oh, I would say there is probably support, but there are 
also other agencies which are strongly opposed, and that's why we 
have been equivocating today, because we have to... find a 
consensus among the agencies...Up until now, on all Antarctic 
issues there has been consensus, and before we can move forward 
with any change of policy, we have to have consensus on this 
particular issue." 
Shortly afterwards he elaborated this position further. "If the US is to 
maintain leadership in this area, and we intend to, we have to look at all 
options, and we have to take what will be a negotiable position to avoid an 
impasse. But we aren't prepared to signal internationally at this time where we 
are headed." (United States of America 1990b, 146-157). 
Through much of 1990 this was the way that things stood outwardly. While 
the Congress moved further toward the non-state position, the Administration 
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fought back through the NSF and State Department. They became what the 
Australian Foreign Minister, Senator Evans, described as "the most important 
hold-outs" (Evans, 1990). International lobbying of the United States by the 
growing number of countries favouring a mining ban was strenuous. For 
instance Senator Evans said to reporters after his speech: "We've been talking 
regularly to the US Administration. I've spoken to Secretary of State Baker 
three times now..." (Evans 1990, 8). 
Approaching SCM XI-i, NGOs also tried to raise some pressure for 
movement. ASOC's Barnes made a specific attack on instructions from the 
Bush Administration for the meeting which had "refused to authorise its 
negotiators" to take an active role in considering an indefinite minerals ban or 
achieving a permanent ban. "Its most recent set of instructions only allows the 
Secretary of State to remove objections to the Minerals Convention, which is 
interpreted to mean that the question of a moratorium may be discussed with 
other governments only if the subject is raised by them first... If nations come 
to Santiago [sic] with such a limited possibility, not much can happen." (Barnes 
1990b, 5) 
Six weeks later President Bush had signed into law the Congressional bills, 
and Bohlen, US delegation leader to SCM XI, came to Chile agreed to consider 
a moratorium (Anonymous 1990, 12) and with the objective of obtaining a 
new environmental protection agreement that was "practical, enforceable and 
has the unanimous support of of Antarctic consultative parties". (Greenpeace 
International 1990b, 1). 
By the end of the conference Bohlen said the US was backing a finite mining 
ban. "The essential outcome is that mining be prohibited for a long period and 
that if the ban were lifted, there should not be a legal vacuum that would leave 
mining unregulated." (Anonymous 1990b). This fell far short of what NGOs 
wanted, which was permanent prohibition, and what was actually placed in the 
draft protocol, the Andersen text. Its Article 6 read simply that: "any activities 
relating to mineral resources, other than scientific research, shall be prohibited". 
This statement was placed in ellipses in the text by the conference, signifying 
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that further elaboration and/or modification may be necessary. 
In the final analysis it appears the environmental NGOs had important allies 
in the Administration who may have helped with communications and taken a 
more moderate stance than the original State Department negotiators. This could 
have assisted NGOs in progressing their position generally. But the US 
Administration moved only slowly, insisting on maintaining a mining option, 
and holding the NGOs at bay. While it did so, pressure was rising from the 
weight of countries shifting ground against CRAMRA. So far though, NGOs in 
the United States were unable to prove themselves more powerful actors on this 
issue than the State Department. 
THE WHITE HOUSE HOLDS BACK 
The exact role of the upper echelons of the White House in the final six 
months of negotiations leading to the Madrid protocol is unclear. What is 
known, is that Washington held out to the last on the draft, and nearly enforced 
a watering down of the protocol. It is also known that the issue became highly 
charged at top levels of government. (Joyner 1992, 9). 
It is possible to obtain some indications for the outcome by examining the 
relationship, or lack of it, between NGOs and the White House. Only one 
meeting between an NGO and President Bush is recorded to have taken place 
on the issue. At an important time in the development of the US position, 
Jacques and Jean Michel Cousteau, on October 24 1990, stressed at their 
meeting with the President the need to obtain international consensus on 
efficient measures for protecting the ecosystem, including a prohibition of all 
exploitation of mineral resources. (Cousteau Society 1990c, 11). Though not 
altering the White House's position, this meeting at least demonstrated that the 
President was prepared to recognise the public credibility of a non-state actor's 
argument. 
The Alliance for Antarctica did see members of the National Security Council 
and others within the White House framework, but it was not felt that this had 
much value. "There was a lot of polite listening," said Marks. (Marks interview 
1993). On the other hand some environmental NGOs had suspicions the oil 
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lobby may have been making a mark on events at the White House, even 
though the American Mining Congress was not an active public lobbyist on this 
issue. President Bush's political roots were closely tied to the lobby which was 
regarded as having ready access to the White House. "This may have been part 
of a reluctance [by the US] to come forward at the first Madrid meeting," said 
Schwabacher." (Schwabacher interview 1993) These remained suspicions. At 
no point did the mining and environment lobbies come into open conflict over 
this issue in the US. 
At least until the end of the Vina del Mar meeting, it was generally believed 
that decisions were being made at the lower levels of the White House, and 
broadly reflected US feeling that, as a superpower, it did not have to budge on 
this issue if it didn't wish. Some NGO members laid the blame for this at the 
feet of the then White House chief of staff, John Sununu, who they regarded 
as taking an increasingly close interest as the issue became more sensitive. 
"Sununu was not only powerful as Chief of Staff at the White House but 
believed himself competent to take an interest in environmental questions," said 
Hemmings. "He pulled the rug out from the US position." (Henunings 
interview 1993). Joyner confirms that Sununu had input into framing the 
discussion (Joyner 1992, 9). But NGOs in Washington also saw themselves 
facing a mindset similar to that which kept the US from signing the Law of the 
Sea convention and shutting off a mining option there. "I think a lot of the same 
players were involved," Schwabacher said. To a certain extent it may also 
have reflected a negotiating strategy to get as much as possible out of the final 
agreement. "[The USA] tended to do that as well on the climate change 
negotiations; stand up against the world until we've got what is found to be an 
acceptable position." (Schwabacher interview 1993). 
Whatever the reason, in the run-up to Madrid, US environmental NGOs 
found themselves "under siege", in the assessment of ASOC (Greenpeace 
International 1991a, 1). The reason came to light when Senator Gore and 14 
other Democrat Senators wrote to President Bush expressing "grave concern" 
that the Administration planned to advocate a limited moratorium to be followed 
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by the subsequent imposition of CRAMRA. (Gore 1991, 1). The Bush 
administration was expressing serious doubts about the wisdom of the Protocol 
for US national interests, particularly future mining interests. "Reservations 
were expressed by Interior and Treasury over the length of the moratorium, 
especially whether it was to be . a 'permanent' or 'indefinite' ban on the mining 
of minerals in Antarctica." (Joyner 1992, 10). 
There is no evidence that after their long campaign, these NGOs were able to 
lift the siege in order to play a substantially influential part by themselves in this 
climactic stage. They continued to point out the growing isolation of the United 
States. But when Japan, and shortly after SCM XI-ii, Britain, joined the ATS 
majority it seemed many in the United States - even NGOs - were surprised to 
find Washington standing alone. "They didn't believe they were getting more 
and more isolated," said Marks. "In the end they were very surprised when 
they were alone... We hadn't expected that at all. When we came away from the 
Madrid meeting that was a real shock; that the US was the one holding up the 
signing." (Marks interview, 1993.) At SCM XI-ii, the United States agreed 
"tentatively" to the PEP, including a 50 year mining ban. 
Shortly before the session re-opened in June it became apparent that the US 
Administration was beginning to draw increasing national attention to itself 
domestically as it hardened its position even further. In an editorial the powerful 
newspaper, The New York Times, described the Administration as the "one 
big threat to final agreement on Antarctic environment protection". "Forces 
inside the State and Interior departments oppose final ratification...That position 
is risky, ecologically and politically...For the Administration to reverse itself 
now would infuriate Congress, damage Mr Bush's credibility and anger allies." 
(New York Times 1991a). Nevertheless in a non-paper circulated before the 
meeting, the US delegation proposed to include an "opt-out" clause for any 
nation unable to persuade others to let it mine after a fixed term moratorium. 
NGO members such as Schwabacher who went to Madrid to focus on the US 
delegation maintain their presence had a strong effect. "We communicated freely 
with Congressional staff [also attending] we had worked with over the years. 
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Delegations have a feeling NGOs are watching, know maybe not everything but 
have a feeling for what is going on. They are ready with information to get back 
to the public and that opens up the process, helps influence the outcome." 
(Schwabacher interview 1992). But this is a description of skilled NGO input 
at any such meeting. There is little evidence that they were able to build up their 
campaign to make the Administration bend. 
Instead at a bargaining session in Madrid, the ATS partners expressed their 
disappointment at the change of course by the United States, and appeared to 
decide on a compromise the US may have been able to live with. ASOC in its 
report of the meeting records a scramble by countries towards this compromise 
and an abandonment of previous coalitions. The essential outcome in relation to 
the mining ban was a prohibition on mineral resources activities other than 
scientific research (Antarctic Treaty 1991c, Article 7). Provision also was made 
for a review conference after 50 years at which modifications to the protocol 
would require a three-quarters majority; and the further necessity for a binding 
legal regime if a change was to require mineral resources activity. (Antarctic 
Treaty 1991c, Article 25.) It should not be forgotten either that the protocol 
agreed by the ATS extensively covered human activity in Antarctica. ASOC 
claims it made substantial input to this agreement, including much of the basis 
for the protocols. (Marks, Goldsworthy interviews 1993). 
Despite having two days to consider this compromise PEP, the United States 
asked for further time. It had insufficient instructions from Washington, saying 
it was "not in a position to accept any text other than that which they had 
proposed the previous week." (ASOC 1991c, 6). This quickly gained the US 
the opprobrium of environmental organisations internationally. "It is obvious 
the Bush Administration has no intention of contributing to environmental 
protection - in fact the two phrases should not be used in the same sentence," 
said Greenpeace in a news release. (Greenpeace International 1991d) WWF 
accused the US of putting its future energy interests ahead of Antarctic 
protection. (Barker, 1991) 
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Pressure was also exerted by other nations. In late June legislators from the 
US, Japan, the EC and the Soviet Union meeting in Tokyo jointly wrote to 
President Bush urging him to change. (Seccombe, 1991). Other letters came 
from individuals like Australia's Hawke. (Peake, 1991). 
With the issue coming to a head publicly a trenchantly critical editorial, again 
in The New York Times , was a prime example of media pressure leading to a 
breakthrough. Marks indicated that this editorial was a response to lobbying of 
the Times by environmentalists (Marks interview 1993). "The now-you-see-
him, now-you-don't 'environmental president' has struck again," it began. It 
claimed Mr Bush had allowed himself to be persuaded the PEP threatened 
America's energy supply and its sovereignty. "That is an empty posture with 
no serious constituency beyond a few people in the Administration... .The US 
position also threatens the principle of unanimity that has held the treaty together 
since 1961... Washington's insistence on the right to walk away from any 
agreement is not reasonable..." (New York Times, editorial 1991b). 
President Bush announced three days later, on 3 July 1991, that the US 
would sign. In Joyner's assessment: "very likely he did not wish to provoke a 
negative issue that might rebound against him in the 1992 presidential re-
election campaign." (Joyner 1992, 10). He offered "strong support" for 
environmental control measures contained in the protocol, and "support" for 
restrictions on mineral activity. "The alternative to our proposal offered in 
Madrid for lifting or amending the ban addresses our concerns and provides 
effective protection for Antarctica without foreclosing options of future 
generations." (Bush, 1991). 
Non-state actors can only claim to have made a limited impact on the White 
House's final position, which actually wound back from what was tentatively 
agreed at Vina Del Mar. When it came to dealing with the Administration's 
processes, environmental NGOs were able to make only limited in-roads 
towards their best option of a mining prohibition inside a world park. The 
White House held out for mining to stay open against a growing international 
weight from other countries. State actors were by this time strenuously 
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attempting to persuade the US that it should rejoin them, and reaffirm state 
authority over the future of Antarctica by agreeing the PEP. Ironically, it was 
the United States, advocate of the former status quo, that was now being 
stigmatised as a rule breaker. This weight grew to a point where, combined 
with the internal pressure in forms such as that illustrated in The New York 
Times, it tipped the balance toward the protocol. 
In the case of the United States then, non-state actors allied under the urging 
and leadership of of coalitions such as ASOC. They could claim important 
successes in helping to undermine the legitimacy of the US position. Typical 
strengths of environment promotion groups came to the fore: domestic pressure 
through targeted letter writing, a nationally coordinated media campaign 
exploiting the surrounding political climate, use of the legitimate avenues of 
political pressure in Congress, and the seeking of aid from amenable senior 
bureaucrats and some Congressional leaders. 
This bought significant time for the anti-mining cause, which meanwhile 
continued to grow internationally among the ATS states. It also encouraged 
strong Congressional opposition to the pro-CRAMRA position that had been 
captured largely by the State Department. In this atmosphere, special interest 
NGOs such as WRI and the American Mining Congress were simply out-
paced. Not only were international events moving against them, they carried no 
popular constituency, and in any case, the issue was probably peripheral to 
them. 
Once again, one can see the value of cohesive action by the broad range of 
environment promotion non-state actors: there is ASOC's international web and 
intimate knowledge of the issue, domestic NGOs' local popular support bases, 
and the access, resources and weight of the big international groups. 
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(III) CHAPTER CONCLUSION  
The value of these case studies to this thesis lies in their demonstrations of 
the tools and mechanisms used by non-state actors in their attempts to change a 
state-based decision. They show particularly how environment promotion 
NGOs operated within, and upon, governmental processes and public opinion. 
In large measure these actors successfully substituted their own agenda for 
Antarctica's future. Time and again they proved that when public and 
democratic processes were available to be engaged, the non-state position held 
greater legitimacy with the public than a decision the ATS took in isolation to 
approve CRAMRA. It is no coincidence that the five case study states 
examined represent key moments of change on the issue are all industrially 
sophisticated pluralist democracies, nor that several of these countries were first 
choice objectives of the ASOC strategy to turn individual countries around. The 
mechanical strengths available for raising pressure in such countries were of 
obvious importance. 
Without doubt the ability of non-state actors to accomplish these outcomes 
was enhanced by a series of external circumstances. In addition to the absence 
of viable countervailing non-state forces, there was a rapidly developing 
international environmental awareness as issues piled up, ozone depletion and 
climatic change being chief among them. Specific incidents such as Exxon 
Valdez and Bahia Paraiso served to emphasise the dangers NGOs believed 
were associated with Antarctic minerals exploitation. They may also have 
served as serious obstacles to counter-campaigns by non-state advocates of 
CRAMRA. 
But the extent to which the states examined here repeatedly adopted non-state 
campaign objectives showed that, in the ratification phase, CRAMRA could not 
hold up under their pressure. It is important to note that in these case studies 
there were two separate but linked theatres of activity. Firstly, many of the key 
battles were won inside internal bureaucracies and government processes which 
were persuaded to adopt the non-state line. Secondly there was extensive and 
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visible public support for this same line, fostered by a range of environment 
promotion NGOs who co-operated on the campaign internationally. 
In the internal contest, these NGOs repeatedly moved to open up what they 
portrayed as a "closed door" process in CRAMRA's negotiation, and to prise 
control over the debate from negotiating diplomats, instead involving more 
amenable bureaucracies. Despite their own environmentalist credentials, these 
NGOs went so far as to help further the cause of bureaucrats who backed 
CRAMRA for other than environmental reasons, as in the case of the Australian 
Treasury. In other cases it was a more straight forward matter of working 
within government to break the hold on policy held by the foreign affairs 
departments involved, as was the case in New Zealand, Britain and the United 
States. NGOs were aided in this task by the knowledge and credibility they built 
up through the vehicle of ASOC in the negotiating years of CRAMRA, and in 
the case of France by prestige and personal contacts of the leading non-state 
activist. The information broking capacity NGOs were able to muster made a , 
significant difference in these internal battles, and provision of the de-classified 
US policy goals was a striking example of this information. A further strong 
"tool" in the NGO kit was the personal links it had with like-minded friends in 
government. These people were likely to be sympathetic because at other times 
they themselves had worked as highly placed NGO representatives. Examples 
include the US State Department's Bohlen (WWF), French Environment 
Minister Lalonde (FOE), and New Zealand's McDowell (now IUCN). 
Things did not all go the non-state way. Foreign affairs bureaucracies held 
strongly against NGOs in several case studies, despite changing circumstances 
around them. In the cases of Britain and the United States, it appears that the 
weight of international state-based pressure, rather than activities of these non-
state actors, finally made the difference in overcoming these positions. In the 
former, Westminster went so far as to enact CRAMRA before Britain could be 
turned around. But in the latter case, engagement of the bureaucratic and 
democratic processes by NGOs helped to slow approval through the EPA 
decision to compel an Environmental Impact Assessment, and in the mechanics 
of the Congressional processes non-state actors pursued legislation against 
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CRAMRA. 
The public campaign was efficiently coordinated internationally and devolved 
to alliances or individually powerful environmental organisations in the 
countries analysed. Such campaigns provided a powerful reminder to 
legislators of the spread of public awareness, demonstrating the strength of 
these actors' arguments when they were put to government. Perhaps the best 
illustration of this came in the assortment of organisations that banded together 
in Britain to oppose CRAMRA. It was helpful that legislators were doubly 
sensitive to public feeling at important times, under the heat of elections such as 
those for the New Zealand government, with France to the European 
Parliament, to the US Congress, and for the British Government. Movements 
among leading politicians such as the push for national prominence by Senator 
Gore, the power contest in the Australian Government leadership and the 
emergence of new, more amenable regimes in France and Britain, all provided 
opportunities for environmental campaigners to put forward to important 
individuals within these countries the option of a popular and essentially cost-
free new policy that legislators could pick up. The quick emergence of 
bipartisanship on the issue in most legislatures under examination is an 
indication of the relative domestic ease of the Antarctic protection option. The 
small amount of open high level bilateral or multi-lateral criticism is another. 
By the time of SCM XI-i in Vina Del Mar it was clear CRAMRA was dead 
under the weight of internal and external pressures on member governments, 
and that the consensus had shifted so much that those states which only a a year 
earlier were advocating a "status quo" were now effectively the dissidents. 
Legitimacy had transferred away from their positions, inspired and encouraged 
by NGO activity, and the non-state position in the shape of a world park-like 
Nature Reserve and Land of Science with a mining prohibition was near to 
adoption. The doctrine of the heretics - the NGOs of whom the British analyst 
Sir Geoffrey Parsons warned in 1986 - had become accepted as orthodoxy. 
Indicators for these successful NGOs earlier in this thesis show repeatedly 
that the alliance-building and information exchanging capacity of ASOC was 
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vital to progressing the campaign, that strong control over large resources and 
wide popular appeal of the major groups like Greenpeace and WWF was vital in 
spreading the campaign, and linkages with nationally focussed NGOs counted 
in moving individual countries. Conversely, a lack of intimacy with the ATS 
made little difference to most of these campaigners, and those groups that 
lacked a strong popular base made little or no impact upon the course of the 
debate. 
The resulting PEP reaffirmed the control of state actors over the ATS's 
destiny. A complex, state-based process, the 50 year mining ban achieved 
something less than the NGOs' aim of a permanent ban. But overall, this 
vigorous period of Antarctic politics showed that non-state actors, aided by 
favourable circumstances, were able to build and sustain a campaign of change 
based on the increasing legitimacy of their position. They fractured the ATS's 
original consensus, and filled it with their own goals before it was restored. 
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CHAFTER FIVE 




(I) CHAFFER INTRODUCTION 
From the detail of the case study we now return to the preoccupation of this 
work: the lessons it offers on the influence of non-state actors over states. As a 
starting point it is worth recapping on the central events under consideration. A 
group of states negotiated among themselves a convention to regulate mineral 
resource activities, and agreed on its form. They established a fixed position. 
Subsequently this agreement was shelved, and replaced by a protocol that 
contained a mining ban, something previously rejected outright by the states 
concerned but promoted directly by environmental NG0s. 
This about face was extraordinary for the regime. It cannot be argued in 
hindsight that such a change was ATS-inspired. The perturbation was much 
greater than it might have been if these non-state actors had simply presented an 
addendum to the catechism of Antarctic politics. Instead, to continue the 
metaphor, non-state actors independently presented a contrary doctrine 
containing their own long-held goals. Then with the backing of the public these 
non-state actors persuaded the leaders to adopt this new doctrine. 
Several lessons have been drawn by the current study from this experience. It 
is the intention of this concluding chapter to elaborate on these lessons by 
starring with the mechanics of the change, to next examine what made these 
non-state actors influential, and then consider the value of this change as an 
illustration of the broad effect that non-state political forces can have on a late 
20th century international regime. In this sequence, conclusions are first drawn 
about the methods used by non-state actors to effect change. Next to be 
considered are the individual powers of non-state actors that may make them 
capable of, or unable to show, influence. Finally this thesis will consider the 
actual broad influence non-state political forces can have, and offer a conclusion 
about the potential cost to an international regime of ignoring non-state input. 
As we approach this point, it is worth mentioning an insight of the American 
essayist Helen Keller who commented at the last change of century : "the 
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heresy of one age becomes the orthodoxy of the next." (Keller. H in Tripp 
1970, 256 ) 
(II) METHODS OF CHANGE 
In order to succeed in their aims environment promotiuon NGOs had to 
persuade governments of the legitimacy of their non-state position before the 
wider public, in contrast to the state-based decision. In doing so they vividly 
expressed the unique power of pressure groups as proposed by Willetts: an 
ability to rapidly communicate political ideas and put issues on the agenda so 
that others, such as state actors, are forced to respond. (Willetts 1982, 194.) 
In an assessment of methods used by environment promotion NGOs one can 
see common threads in their deliberate approach to undermining the legitimacy 
of the ATS position. There appeared to be four main paths followed by these 
non-state actors in their engagement with the states. These were: 
. educating the wider public and then encouraging it to bear witness to the 
environmental view; 
. joining battle with bureaucrats in order to open up and change the debate; 
. cultivating and co-operating with sympathetic, or electorally sensitised 
legislators; • 
. and directly negotiating within ATS forums to place the environmental 
agenda on the table. 
The public campaign by NGOs began with some conflicting ideas of their 
world park goals and was at first loosely coordinated. Education of the wider 
public began in the early 1980s, exemplified by a series of books, and it 
broadened during the decade with the benefit of attention-capturing projects like 
the World Park Base and participation in the UN debate. This consciousness-
raising drew attention to the perceived problems facing the continent under its 
exclusive guardianship by ATS members, and at times directly challenged the 
way that guardianship was being exercised. 
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With the settlement of CRAMRA, NGOs who had begun with conflicting 
ideas coalesced, as Boardman observed they do, over an immediate question. 
(Boardman 1981,6) NGOs increased the global lobbying effort, joint action 
devolved from large international NGOs through coalitions and national 
alliances, to be pursued state-by-state. The general public was encouraged, with 
some striking success, to register a personal stake by signing petitions or 
writing to legislators. In this effort, NGOs were able to increase doubts within 
governments about the legitimacy of the ATS's position as exemplified by the 
minerals agreement at a time when environmental issues generally were 
becoming increasingly linked to Antarctica. This effort was, as a result, an 
impressive success for NG0s. 
Joining battle with the bureaucracy was essential if NGOs were to break the 
grip held on the issue of Antarctic environment protection by CRAMRA's prime 
negotiators, foreign affairs diplomats, whose own success in protecting turf 
and competing for resources depended in part on their ability to portray the 
regimes they work with as important and successful international arrangements. 
(Young 1989, 92). A tight hold was retained on Antarctic Treaty matters by 
many of the key foreign affairs departments, and assaults by the NGOs were 
needed to involve the more domestically-oriented environment departments 
before the question of ratification could be cast into doubt. Various techniques 
were used toward this end. In some cases it meant filling a bureaucratic 
vacuum with an idea the department could use [putting an issue on the agenda, 
as Willetts said]; in others, NGOs could rely on bureaucratic "friends" to help 
by using their natural inclination to delay consideration of the issue, or opening 
lines of communication with government decision-makers. It was Caldwell who 
cautioned earlier in this work that the personal factor of environmental 
negotiations tend to take people around the globe on negotiating teams, or 
interchanging between NGO organisations and inter-government programs. 
"The personal factor should not be under-rated." (Carroll 1988, 26) The 
examples of New Zealand and the United States showed particularly the 
importance of operating with agreeable bureaucrats. Again this general 
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approach by the NGOs was a clear challenge to the legitimacy inside the internal 
governmental processes of the position reached by the chief negotiators from 
the foreign affairs world. 
Cultivating legislators was a necessary next step, building upon both the 
public campaign, and engagement with the bureaucracy. The legislators were 
encouraged to respond to public feeling at handily important times, such as the 
approaching elections for the New Zealand and British Governments, the mid-
term Congressional elections, and the European Parliament poll in France. In 
additional, powerful individual politicians also seized on an issue advancing 
their personal agendas, such as the then US Senator Al Gore and Australian 
Treasurer Paul Keating. 
Many legislators must have considered the mining ban and linked 
environmental protection as an electorally favourable and essentially cost-free 
policy. As Parsons pointed out, the absence of an indigenous population and 
evocative beauty of the continent gave an unparalleled opportunity for political 
adventurism by NGOs (Parsons 1987, 34). For state actors dealing with 
domestic constituencies the option was similarly easy. Bipartisanship on this 
issue was characteristic of many legislatures and there was a paucity of open 
government-to-government criticism. The clear absence of a pro-mining 
campaign [because of the probable economic irrelevance of Antarctic minerals 
and dissuasive events such as Exxon Valdez] must also have reassured the 
faint-hearted. But whether it was easy or not, the NGO position became 
accepted by a snowballing number of governments. To these states, it was 
legitimate. 
Direct negotiation within the ATS  was made easier for key NGO members 
because over a period of time they became as familiar with its processes and 
dynamics as most state representatives. The long time line in CRAMRA's 
negotiations gave their meagre resources breathing space to develop credibility 
within these forums. Gradually they gained official standing too. The official 
position ASOC gained for the first time as an observer at Vina del Mar was an 
important symbol of this potency at a critical time, an affirmation that constant 
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pressure exerted by these NGOs outside meeting halls throughout the preceding 
decade had paid off. It was a necessary official recognition by states of their 
viability as actors, and cannot be dismissed as a simple co-option by amenable 
states battling inside the system. ASOC's goals remained different from these 
states even when the PEP was concluded. Meanwhile it was using what Willetts 
described as a state-provided vehicle for NGO achievement. 
(III) INFLUENTIAL NON-STATE ACTORS  
What did environment promotion NGOs have that made them so influential in 
this case? Why were the other non-state actors of so little relative consequence? 
And what useful insight did this provide on the direction for non-state actors in 
Antarctica? 
The great advantage held by successful NGOs in overturning CRAMRA and 
achieving their goals was the broad spread of strengths they possessed, which 
were combined successfully in alliances of these actors.The resources and links 
they had gave environment promotion NGOs a capacity for autonomous 
individual action. When combined in the different alliances, they were able to 
put their objectives on the environmental agenda, enter the processes of the 
regime, and devolve a cohesive international campaign to national-based 
groups. The great disadvantage to the unsuccessful but expert NGOs was that 
their influence was largely circumscribed by the boundaries of the regime. They 
held little of the popular appeal or resources of environment promotion NG0s. 
In the typology developed for this thesis, we recall that the individual 
characteristics of the non-state actors involved in the ATS were illuminated by 
analysing both their structures and relationships. The main environment 
promotion NGOs were attributed with centrally-directed policies, together with 
extensive apparatuses and finances that meant they had a high degree of 
resource capacity and flexibility to impact on a debate, which indeed they used. 
Equally important was their capacity as global non-state players to repeatedly 
draw together in alliances, in order to obtain the maximum effect for their 
resources and show the breadth of their support for a common cause. As Young 
165 
cautioned earlier in this work: - it would be a serious mistake to overlook the 
role of trans-national alliances among influential interest groups in developing 
and maintaining regimes at the international level." (Young 1989b, 364) 
We saw these attributes and methods in use through different phases of the 
campaign. It was in the broad, well-resourced church of 1UCN that the idea of 
a world park first emerged. Through the coalition of ASOC, funded by larger 
NG0s, these actors began to engage in the ATS's negotiating processes, to 
learn the dynamics of the system and present an alternative viewpoint. When an 
opportunity came to campaign through individual governments in the ratification 
processes, ASOC's expert members approached this strategically and involved 
a wide range of environment promotion NGOs in both national and international 
alliances. Work at national levels by co-campaigners such as ASOC, ECO[NZ], 
CODEFF and the Alliance for Antarctica [US] came into its own as they 
executed the aims earlier articulated by ASOC. By this stage, the breadth of 
popular constituencies engaged was remarkable: everything from newly 
articulate Chilean environmentalists to sophisticated Washington lobbyists, a 
British country women's group and a charismatic French septuagenarian. 
The successful knitting together of a campaign between two branches of 
environment promotion NG0s, the popular and the aggregated, also gave these 
NGOs an extra advantage. While direct pressure was being placed on the ATS 
through ASOC's operations in a formalised relationship, the same campaigners 
maintained a diplomatic separation of identity from the crowd howling outside 
the gate in the shape of Greenpeace. 
Linked closely to the campaign's success was the influence of Greenpeace. 
Possessor of strong, independent financial resources and a wide international 
support base with an open, popular membership, Greenpeace used these assets 
extensively to become a formidable actor, openly challenging the legitimacy of 
the ATS as guardian of the continent. Its world park campaign of establishing a 
base and conducting inspections, and involvement in the UN debate, produced 
strong criticism of the ATS, criticism that cast doubt upon the legitimacy of the 
state system as an actor in the best interests of the general public. 
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In this world, the sectionally-interested expert NGOs were ill-equipped to 
compete. The orthodox points of view they expressed from time to time largely 
failed to make an impact upon the debate. Though they had demonstrable 
expertise in the confined world of their ATS, little regard was paid to them by 
state actors when they began to feel the forces behind the popular campaign. 
The professional association SCAR appeared to have little profile before the 
wider public and outside the ATS was marginalised. Its lack of a popular base 
or recognition, lack of independent resources and decision-making processes 
that were limited to the periodic assemblies, not to mention an overt apolitical 
stance, meant that it could not make a difference. No SCAR contribution was 
made to the public debate on the loss of CRAMRA and rise of the PEP. The 
closest it came was when some of its main figures, acting as British scientists, 
forced Greenpeace to respond to criticisms about the scientific veracity of their 
proposals. 
Likewise a fairly ineffectual position was held by the Washington-based 
World Resources Institute. An environment and development promotion NGO, 
its direct control over policy formulation is circumscribed by major US 
Government funding, while exclusivity of membership gave WRI no popular 
connection. It openly backed the adoption of CRAMRA and continued to do so 
with dire warnings of the consequences of failure, presenting this view in ATS 
academic and diplomatic forums, and at hearings of US Congress. WRI did 
not recant or espouse a new path after its failure, and its representative 
subsequently departed from the ATS world, though it continues to take a lower 
level interest in funding some continuing academic work. 
Finally, in the formation of another professional association at a time when 
environment promotion NGOs were campaigning most strongly lies evidence 
that some economic interests heeded the lesson for the future in this new era of 
Antarctic politics. To reiterate from Chapter Two, the International Association 
of Antarctic Tour Operators (IAATO), was formed by the industry in the period 
1988-91 to provide self-regulating mechanisms. With the PEP taking shape, 
these tourism operators were warned by the US to form their own 
environmentally considerate regulatory mechanisms or be governed through an 
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adversarial system. It is not suggested that formation of IAATO was a direct 
attempt to counter the influence of environment promotion NGOs at the ATS 
bargaining table. The indications are that tour operators themselves well-realised 
the value of good environmental practice to their clients. But one may conclude 
that a "green" emphasis thrust upon the ATS by these environment promotion 
NGOs was being taken aboard by state actors and through them the industry 
group when they looked ahead to Antarctica's tourism future. It showed the 
ATS to be capable of developing to embrace new relationships with NG0s, and 
especially those focussed on Antarctic issues. But it was under the influence of 
environment promotion NGOs that the climate changed. 
(IV) THE INFLUENCE OF NON-STATE ACTORS ON 
STATES IN THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM  
It is well recognised that international regimes are not static. Forces at work 
in their evolution are said to include their own inner dynamics, as well as 
changes in the political, economic and social environments around them. 
(Young 1989a, 74). It is clearly the argument of this work that external forces 
achieved change in the ATS, in the shape of environment promotion non-state 
actors. As we move to conclude what lessons this example may provide on the 
nature of non-state influence, it is necessary to first consider what difference 
other factors may have made. 
The slow but continuous rise in public consciousness of environmental 
issues during the 1980s paralleled the development of CRAMRA. Antarctica 
gradually became attached to the menu of global environmental issues in this 
period, particularly through the images of ozone depletion and postulated global • 
warming. In other international regimes and forums separate discussions about 
the continent came onto the table. Through negotiations such as UNCLOS, 
issues of common heritage gained prominence, and this was carried forward in 
a UN debate where the ATS was periodically attacked in the General Assembly 
by other nations for the way it wielded exclusive control of the continent. This 
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happened as a possible 30 year review approached for the Antarctic Treaty, a 
review that was never called, but argued by some to have been signified in a de 
facto sense by adoption of the PEP. 
After CRAMRA was signed and the campaign to overthrow it changed gear, 
the global atmospherics only improved for NG0s. This period coincided with a 
peak in growth of environmental consciousness in pluralist western countries 
where the campaign was strongest. Environmental disasters occurred that could 
be linked either directly or indirectly to the NGOs' claim that "oil and ice don't 
mix". 
It must be said that the above external social and environmental factors 
assisted NGOs to influence change by the regime. But none of these events, 
either singly or combined, can be said to have presented an irresistible force 
which, in the absence of the non-state pressure, would result in the scrapping of 
CRAMRA and adoption of the protocol. It is simply not credible enough to say 
"serendipitous" events such as the Exxon Valdez disaster, timing of specific 
national elections, or general rise of environmental consciousness in themselves 
made the difference. It must be remembered that at CRAMRA's signing, the 
ATS's negotiators themselves concluded they had reached a new global height 
in the value of a resources convention's environmental provisions. "This 
agreement is very special," said chairman Beeby. "All too often the international 
community is simply reactive. ..For once we have had the foresight to think 
ahead, to make rules before activity reaches a dangerous level. That is a 
remarkable tribute to the Antarctic Treaty System which is itself a very special 
and very effective form of international co-operation that sets an example to the 
rest of the world." (Beeby 1988a, 4) There can be no assertion in hindsight 
that the abandonment of the minerals regime and its replacement was expected. 
We can say with certainty it was not something envisaged by negotiating 
countries in Wellington on June 2, 1988, when they signed CRAMRA. 
Over the ensuing three years of negotiation, state-to-state coalition building 
was vital to the achievement of change. But acknowledgement of this does not 
imply that the Realists' state-centric theory can explain the outcome. Instead 
what we have seen in the course of the current work is the effect of diverse 
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internal and external forces inside individual states and their collective regime, 
which induced a change in the regime's behaviour. The Rationalist belief in the 
strength of alliances among interest groups lets us conclude some non-state 
actors may under some circumstances have considerable influence. 
Proof lies in the extent to which the NGOs' ideal position was gained in the 
eventual PEP. When state actors first moved to abandon CRAMRA and replace 
it, the NGOs' proposal for a world park and mining ban was taken up. Some 
NGO members were pleasantly surprised by the extent to which their ideal 
position was adopted. Had this been sustained it would have been a resounding 
triumph for these NG0s, and it should be noted that such an encompassing 
victory was not gained. In ATS negotiations the indefinite mining ban was 
watered down to the nevertheless tough provision allowing a review after 50 
years. (Antarctic Treaty 1991c, Article 25). It also has as its objective: "the 
comprehensive protection of the antarctic environment and dependent and 
associated ecosystems" and designates Antarctica "a natural reserve, devoted to 
peace and science". (Antarctic Treaty 1991c, Article 2). Such an outcome 
represents a substantial achievement by non-state actors. Lacking great armies, 
treasuries and bureaucracies of the states, environment promotion groups 
marshalled popular backing for the power of an idea, one state actors felt 
compelled to adopt. 
What was it then, that non-state actors possessed to enable them to succeed 
to such a degree? In a word it was legitimacy. We recall that in this context, 
legitimacy is taken to mean the degree to which an actor could mobilise support, 
or in a confined sphere, demonstrable independent expertise. (Willetts 1982, 
17). The lack of a formal involvement with the ATS did not prevent the large 
popular NGOs from achieving their aims. They operated in a wider world to 
gain popular legitimacy and use this strength to overcome the ATS position. At 
the same time, experts in ASOC used their independent expertise to tackle both 
governments, and the forums of the system. 
By contrast, legitimacy in this debate was something that the official state 
system lacked, and this is the wider lesson from the outcome on Antarctica. 
Although an international regime is the agreed vehicle for the joint exercise of 
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power, it can be unable to counter non-state actors' pressure when that 
influence is focussed upon the regime with a le gi timate backing. The high level 
of transaction among most political actors in today's world, coupled with the 
extensive resources and political sophistication of promotional pressure groups, 
ends any claim to the autonomy of isolation for state actors and is ignored by 
regimes at their own peril. The change that shook that ATS came when it 
emerged from its closed, exclusive negotiations for CRAMRA into the hard 
light of current global environmental politics. It was met there by dynamic and 
free-acting NGOs who better reflected the general public's view of Antarctica's 
future, and persuaded governments of this view. As Barnes warned early in the 
course of the minerals convention's negotiation: policies formulated without 
consulting such pressure groups may lead to decisions far outside the reigning 
or conceivable political consensus.*(Wolfrum 1985, 175). What was heresy to 
the ATS was not to the wider public. This is the lesson offered to other political 
theatres from this study's construction of Antarctic politics. 
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APPENDIX  
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS  
1988-1991  
The following is a detailed outline of significant state and non-state events 
marking the demise of the ATS's previously agreed minerals regime, and the 
subsequent mining ban and Protocol on Environment Protection. It shows 
common reference points for the national examples of Chapter Four, and gives 
evidence of the approach taken in common by actors, for example the broad 
strategy adopted by NGOS in focussing on certain countries after CRAMRA. 
Details are restricted to the context of international Antarctic politics of the 
time, but also include some international events that at first glance may seem to 
have little connection with Antarctic politics though are now generally regarded 
as having contributed to the change. Excluded are most purely national events 
covered in the case studies; events such as state elections, internal government-
bureaucracy movements or political leadership struggles and party statements, 
each of which may have contributed along the way. Some purely national 
events are included if they are seen as representing a significant milestone along 
the main path. 
1988 
June 2 - The Antarctic Treaty Special Consultative Meeting on Antarctic 
Mineral Resources adopts CRAMRA. The meeting's chairman, Chris 
Beeby, describes the occasion as the most important political 
development regarding the regulation of Antarctica since 
the Antarctic Treaty itself was adopted in 1959. (Beeby 1988a) 
- Article 62 specifies that the convention shall come into force upon 
ratification by 16 Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties among those 
participating in the final session of negotiations, provided that the total 
includes five developing and II developed countries, the two 
superpowers, and all claimants. (Antarctic Treaty 1988) 
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June 5 - ASOC meets in Auckland to determine a strategy for delaying, or 
preventing ratification of CRAMRA. The meeting decides to 
concentrate its efforts on selected countries: Australia, Germany, Chile, 
New Zealand, and possibly Belgium. Later in a review of the strategy it 
also nominates second choice targets United States, United Kingdom 
and almost as an afterthought, France (Goldsworthy, interview). 
July 	- ASOC advises its member NGOs that the signing of the CRAMRA 
final act was inevitable and it would be wrong to assume NGOs had 
"lost" the battle. It says: "one strategy for the future will be to try to 
prevent some of the claimant states and/or superpowers from signing 
and ratifying the convention, or at least to severely delay them, which 
will have the effect of preventing the convention from coming into 
force." (Goldsworthy, undated 1988) 
Sept 21 - The first sign of future opposition to CRAMRA within an ASOC 
"target government" emerges when the Australian Treasurer 
Keating writes to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Senator 
Evans, opposing ratification on sovereignty and commercial grounds. 
(Keating, 1988) 
1989 
Jan 28 - the Argentine resupply/tourist ship BahiaParaiso runs aground 
and capsizes in the Bismarck Strait, Antarctic Peninsula, spilling 
950,000 litres of diesel fuel. The response to Antarctica's first major 
spill is widely publicised as an airborne clean-up team is flown into 
Antarctica from the continental United States. (Darby, 1989a) 
March - 15 ATS parties have signed CRAMRA (ASOC, 1989) 
March 6 - The Peruvian research ship Homboldt runs aground in the 
Antarctic Peninsula, puncturing two fuel tanks. (Reuter 1989a) 
March 24 - The supertanker Exxon Valdez runs aground, and is holed, 
spilling about 50 million litres of crude oil into Prince William 
Sound, Alaska. (Reuter, 1989b) 
April 23 - The Prime Minister of France, Michel Rocard, announces on a 
national television program that France will not ratify the minerals 
convention in its present state, and negotiations must be reopened. 
(Sinclair, 1989) 
May 9 - Preparatory meeting for XV ATCM, Paris. Australia informally 
floats the comprehensive environmental protection proposal. 
(Australia DFAT, 1989 ) 
May 22 - The Australian Government decides that it will not sign the 
Minerals Convention, and will explore specifically prospects for the 
establishment of an "Antarctic Wilderness Park" (Hawke, 1989a) 
June 10 - The Australian Foreign Affairs Minister, Senator Gareth Evans, 
claims India's backing for a wilderness park. (Murdoch, 1989) 
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June 19 - Rocard and Hawke agree at a meeting in Paris to jointly 
promote a wilderness park and begin a diplomatic offensive to 
convince other countries. (Grattan, 1989) 
June 21 - British Prime Minister Thatcher, tells Hawke that Britain is 
unenthusiastic. (Cockburn 1989b) 
June 24 - United States President George Bush rejects the Australia-France 
initiative. (Cockburn, 1989b) 
June 26 - Hawke spells out publicly the elements of a protection convention 
in Washington. (Hawke 1989b, 8) 
Sept 13 - U.S. State Department predicts that Australia's campaign will only 
slow down ratification of CRAMRA and Canberra will change its 
position. (Hope, 1989) 
Sept 26 - Senator Al Gore's resolution is introduced to the U.S. Senate 
advocating an Antarctic global commons. 
Oct 8 - ATCM XV opens in Paris. 
- Sixteen treaty parties have at this stage signed CRAMRA. 
(Grutzner 1989b) 
- Rocard officially opens meeting, calls for nature reserve/ land 
of science (Antarctic Treaty 1989, 117) 
- Working papers on comprehensive measures for the protection of 
the Antarctic environment and dependent and associated ecosystems 
are submitted by France-Australia, Chile, New Zealand, United 
States, Sweden. (Antarctic Treaty 1989, Annex C, D) 
- Joint Statement by WWF, Greenpeace and University of Oslo calls 
on treaty states to abandon the minerals convention (Greenpeace 
International 1989, 1) 
- United States describes a total ban on mineral resource activity as 
"not negotiable"; Britain calls for Antarctica's resource availability. 
(Antarctic Treaty 1989, 158-9) 
- ATCM XV adopts recommendations calling for a Special ATCM in 
1990 to explore and discuss all proposals relating to comprehensive 
protection; and a meeting to discuss CRAMRA liability clauses. 
(Antarctic Treaty 1989, 42-3) 
Nov 20 - UN First Committee debates Antarctica, raising this time an 
environmental slant, most speakers pressing for common heritage, 
applauding opposition to CRAMRA, citing Exxon Valdez and Bahia 
Paraiso. (Beck 1990a, 323) 
December - CRAMRA Signatories include 17 ATCPs, five developing 
countries and five claimants. (Beck 1990b, 6) 
1990 
Jan 19 - Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev announces: "the USSR is ready 
to participate in the survival of the Antarctic, this world reserve, which 
is our common natural laboratory." (Cousteau Society 1990b) 
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Feb 26 - New Zealand Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer announces the 
country will set aside consideration of the ratification of CRAMRA, and 
recalls its Paris "Antarctic Park" concept. (Palmer, 1990a) 
- In welcoming NZ statement, Hawke claims snowballing 
support from other European countries such as Italy, Belgium and 
Greece; keen interest from Soviet Prime Minister Ryzkhov, and 
increasing likelihood US Congress will not ratify. (Hawke, 1990a) 
July 6 - Palmer announces the promotion of a new protocol to the 
Antarctic Treaty on environmental protection, and an indefinite 
moratorium. (Palmer 1990b) 
Aug 17 - The Australian Foreign Minister, Senator Evans, describes the 
United States as "the most important hold-outs", but says there are 
solid grounds for optimism on achieving both a long-term mining ban 
and a rigorous environmental protection regime. (Evans, 1990) 
Nov 3 - British Foreign Office describes as "outside the realms of practical 
politics" the Australia-France initiative, and argues for a "primary duty 
to develop"; Tory Party conference lobbied against the minerals 
regime. (Porritt, 1988) 
Nov 16 - US Congress passes bills calling for Antarctic wilderness park and 
prohibiting US nationals and corporations from mineral resource 
activities in Antarctica (Anonymous 1990a) 
Nov 19 - SCM XI First Session opens in Vina Del Mar, Chile. 
- Observer status for the first time for ASOC. 
- Other NGOs and media admitted for opening statements 
- Four proposals tabled: Australia-France-Belgium-Italy; New 
Zealand; United Kingdom; United States. 
- Australia-France "Nature Reserve-Land of Science" is 
additionally backed by Sweden, Finland, Denmark and 
Greece. (Greenpeace 1990b) 
- The United Kingdom and Japan defended CRAMRA; 
Greenpeace claims some in U.S. delegation still believe 
Australia will back down (Greenpeace 1990b) 
Nov 23 - Hawke pays tribute to the substantial role of the world 
environment movement in achieving the international change. 
(Hawke 1990b) 
Nov 28 - IUCN General Assembly, Perth, exhibits strong pro-world park 
sentiment; passes a resolution advocating comprehensive 
environmental protection and a mining ban, which Britain allows 
through on consensus. (Phillips, 1990) 
Dec 4 - At Vina del Mar US/ UK/Japan/USSR et al continue to oppose 
push for the protocol to address the mining issue. (ASOC 1991a) 
Dec 6 - XI-SCM First Session concludes. Agrees to adopt a draft protocol 
on environmental protection as a basis for further work. However 
Article 6, a minerals ban, was included on paper only with the 




- U.S. delegation leader Curtis Bohlen says the United States is 
willing to discuss a finite or indefinite ban on mining, either within the 
environment protection protocol, or in some other forum. "The 
essential outcome is that mining be prohibited for a long period, and 
that if the ban were to be lifted, there should not be a legal vacuum that 
would leave mining unregulated." (Anonymous 1991b) 
- ATCPs' meeting on CRAMRA liability clause is limited to a half 
day wake for a now defunct regime (ASOC 1991a) 
Dec 14 - UN General Assembly unanimously endorses a ban on mining in 
Antarctica. iAssociated press, 1990) 
1991 
Jan 	- NGOs now claim that CRAMRA is no longer politically viable. 
(ASOC report to members 6/2191) However U.S. negotiator 
Tucker Scully says the formulation of the protocol prohibition is such 
as to make clear it may take place through a permanent ban, 
CRAMRA, or middle ground. (Scully 1991, 86) 
March 18 - Senator Gore and 15 other US Senators express grave concern in a 
letter to President Bush that the U.S. intends to encourage other 
nations to agree to a policy that would ultimately encourage and 
facilitate mining activities. "We understand that U.S. representatives 
are instructed to urge that mining be merely prevented for a limited 
period - some 30 to 40 years - after which time the moratorium would 
be lifted." (Gore 1991) 
March 25 - United Kingdom announces proposal for a moratorium with a 
termination or extension mechanism to be determined at resumed 
SCM in Madrid. (United Kingdom FCO, 1991) 
April 8 - Australia assesses 16 like-minded supporters of environmental 
initiative: Four co-sponsors Australia, Belgium, France, Italy; 
ATCPs: Chile, Ecuador, Finland, India, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Peru, Sweden; NCPs: Austria, Denmark, Greece, Romania. 
(Australia DFAT, 1991b) 
April 17 - Greenpeace assesses a recent U.S. non-paper circulated to all 
ATCPs as a step backwards to its pre-legislation attitudes. "It 
appears the pro-environment lobby in the US is under siege." 
- Germany announces its support for a permanent ban under what 
ASOC claims is enormous domestic public pressure (ASOC 1991b) 
April 22 - SCM XI resumes for Second Session in Madrid. 
- Japan announces commitment to permanent protection. 
(Greenpeace International, 1991a) 
April 30 - SCM XI Second Session concludes. Draft instrument on the 
comprehensive protection of the Antarctic environment, once 
approved by the respective governments, was considered to be a 
sufficient basis for calling a final meeting in Madrid to officially 
176 
adopt and sign the instrument. It includes a 50 year prohibition 
removable only by agreement of all parties to the PEP.(Antarctic 
Treaty 1991a) 
June 12 - The United States is still the only country reluctant to commit 
itself to the new agreement. Environmental groups are putting an 
increasing amount of pressure on the U.S. in order that it will sign 
the agreement at the final session of the Madrid SCM. (Greenpeace 
International, 1991c) 
June 13 - U.S. announces inability to accept articles relating to minerals 
prohibition in the protocol. (Greenpeace International 1991c) 
June 15 - SCM XI Second Session reopens 
- Agreement brought into question by the U.S., which proposes a 
clause allowing it, or any other ATCP, to opt out at a time in the 
future. U.S. position under heavy pressure from State Department. 
(Darby, 1991) 
- It becomes clear that Belgium, Italy and France are more 
concerned to reach agreement now than to hold firm for their original 
"near permanent ban" stance. They start to work independently of 
Australia, their previous partner. Australia joins with New Zealand, 
and to a lesser extent Germany, to fight for the maintenance of 
concessions won in the April text. (ASOC 1991c) 
June 23 - Compromise draft emerges. U.S. chief negotiator Curtis Bohlen 
calls for more time to consider. Timing of a further session is left 
unresolved. (ASOC 1991c 
July 3 	- President Bush agrees to sign the compromise protocol. (Bush, 
1991) 
Oct 4 	- SCM XI Second Session concludes 
- Environment Protocol opens for signature. In Canberra, 
Senator Evans says the enormous achievement of uniting 
ATPs owes much to the role of NGOs in sensitising government 
and public opinion. (Evans 1991). 
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